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Rüdiger Kapitza
Researcher at Braunschweig University of Technology
Publications - 146
Citations - 4112
Rüdiger Kapitza is an academic researcher from Braunschweig University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cloud computing & Byzantine fault tolerance. The author has an hindex of 28, co-authored 137 publications receiving 3330 citations. Previous affiliations of Rüdiger Kapitza include IBM & University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
SCONE: secure Linux containers with Intel SGX
Sergei Arnautov,Bohdan Trach,Franz Gregor,Thomas Knauth,Andre Martin,Christian Priebe,Joshua Lind,Divya Muthukumaran,Dan O'Keeffe,Mark Stillwell,David Goltzsche,David Eyers,Rüdiger Kapitza,Peter Pietzuch,Christof Fetzer +14 more
TL;DR: SCONE is a secure container mechanism for Docker that uses the SGX trusted execution support of Intel CPUs to protect container processes from outside attacks and offers a secure C standard library interface that transparently encrypts/decrypts I/O data.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
CheapBFT: resource-efficient byzantine fault tolerance
Rüdiger Kapitza,Johannes Behl,Christian Cachin,Tobias Distler,Simon Kuhnle,Seyed Vahid Mohammadi,Wolfgang Schröder-Preikschat,Klaus Stengel +7 more
TL;DR: CheapBFT is presented, a BFT system that tolerates that all but one of the replicas active in normal-case operation become faulty, and which allows the system to safely switch to another, more resilient agreement protocol.
Proceedings Article
Telling your secrets without page faults: stealthy page table-based attacks on enclaved execution
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that an untrusted operating system can observe enclave page accesses without resorting to page faults, by exploiting other side-effects of the address translation process.
Book ChapterDOI
AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves
TL;DR: It is shown that previously considered harmless synchronisation bugs can turn into severe security vulnerabilities when using SGX, by exploiting use-after-free and time-of-check-to-time- of-use bugs in enclave code.
Proceedings Article
Glamdring: automatic application partitioning for intel SGX
Joshua Lind,Christian Priebe,Divya Muthukumaran,Dan O'Keeffe,Pierre-Louis Aublin,Florian Kelbert,Tobias Reiher,David Goltzsche,David Eyers,Rüdiger Kapitza,Christof Fetzer,Peter Pietzuch +11 more
TL;DR: Glamdring is described, the first source-level partitioning framework that secures applications written in C using Intel SGX, and achieves small TCB sizes and has acceptable performance overheads.