Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Supply chain collaboration: making sense of the strategy continuum

http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_578.pdf

Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

The theory of cooperative games provides a rich mathematical framework with which to understand the interactions between self-interested agents in settings where they can benefit from cooperation, and where binding agreements between agents can be made. Our aim in this talk is to describe the issues that arise when we consider cooperative game theory through a computational lens. We begin by introducing basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value. We then introduce the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting: in particular, the issue of representing games, and the computational complexity of cooperative solution concepts.

/pdf/computational-aspects-of-cooperative-game-theory-22sw4t9fz8.pdf

Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards preventing environmental damage in Spain using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey for the periods 1990, 1995 and 1999/2000 Compared to many previous studies, we present a richer set of independent variables and found that strongly neglected variables such as political interest and social capital have a strong impact on individuals' preferences to prevent environmental damage An interesting aspect in our study is the ability to investigate environmental preferences over time The results show strong differences over time Finally, using disaggregated data for Spanish regions, we also find significant regional differences

/pdf/the-determinants-of-individuals-attitudes-towards-preventing-3ah20jksge.pdf

The Determinants of Individuals' Attitudes Towards Preventing Environmental Damage

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept. Convexity can be defined in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions. Basically, these definitions fall into two categories, namely those based on a supermodular interpretation and those based on a marginalistic interpretation. For games with nontransferable utility, however, the literature mainly focuses on two kinds of convexity, ordinal and cardinal convexity, which both extend the supermodular interpretation. In this paper, we analyse three types of convexity for NTU games that generalise the marginalistic interpretation of convexity.

A note on NTU convexity

A note on NTU-convexity

This paper considers two-stage solutions for multi-issue allocation situations, which are extensions of bankruptcy problems Characterizations are provided for the two-stage constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, based on the properties of composition up and composition down

/pdf/the-two-stage-constrained-equal-awards-and-losses-rules-for-2bqbm2k5p1.pdf

The two-stage constrained equal awards and losses rules for multi-issue allocation situations

In this paper, we propose a new extension of the run-to-the-bank rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of multi-issue allocation situations. We show that this rule always yields a core element and that it satisfies self-duality. We characterize our rule by means of a new consistency property, issue-consistency.

/pdf/a-composite-run-to-the-bank-rule-for-multi-issue-allocation-3f4c59xeqa.pdf

Ruud Hendrickx

Papers

A note on NTU convexity

A note on NTU-convexity

The two-stage constrained equal awards and losses rules for multi-issue allocation situations

A Composite Run-to-the-Bank Rule for Multi-Issue Allocation Situations

Balanced contributions for TU games with awards and applications