The decline in the floating sea ice cover in the Arctic is one of the most striking manifestations of climate change In this review, we examine this ongoing loss of Arctic sea ice across all seasons Our analysis is based on satellite retrievals, atmospheric reanalysis, climate-model simulations and a literature review We find that relative to the 1981–2010 reference period, recent anomalies in spring and winter sea ice coverage have been more significant than any observed drop in summer sea ice extent (SIE) throughout the satellite period For example, the SIE in May and November 2016 was almost four standard deviations below the reference SIE in these months Decadal ice loss during winter months has accelerated from −24 %/decade from 1979 to 1999 to −34%/decade from 2000 onwards We also examine regional ice loss and find that for any given region, the seasonal ice loss is larger the closer that region is to the seasonal outer edge of the ice cover Finally, across all months, we identify a robust linear relationship between pan-Arctic SIE and total anthropogenic CO₂ emissions The annual cycle of Arctic sea ice loss per ton of CO₂ emissions ranges from slightly above 1 m² throughout winter to more than 3 m² throughout summer Based on a linear extrapolation of these trends, we find the Arctic Ocean will become sea-ice free throughout August and September for an additional 800 ± 300 Gt of CO₂ emissions, while it becomes ice free from July to October for an additional 1400 ± 300 Gt of CO₂ emissions

https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aade56/pdf

Changing state of Arctic sea ice across all seasons

textabstractIn Dutch: Naar een Nieuwe Wereldeconomie: voorstellen voor een internationaal economisch beleid, Rotterdam University Press, Rotterdam, 1965, XV + 335 p.\nIn Spanish: Hacia Una Economia Mundial: sugerencias para una politica economica internacional, Series Biblioteca de Economia No.7, Orbis, Barcelona, 1985, 242 p.

Shaping the World Economy. Suggestions for an International Economic Policy. By Jan Tinbergen. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. pp. xvii, 330. Index. 4.00, cloth.

The observed decline in Arctic sea ice is projected to continue, opening shorter trade routes across the Arctic Ocean, with potentially global economic implications. Here we quantify, using CMIP5 global climate model simulations calibrated to remove spatial biases, how projected sea ice loss might increase opportunities for Arctic-transit shipping. By mid-century for standard Open Water vessels, the frequency of navigable periods doubles, with routes across the central Arctic becoming available. A sea ice – ship speed relationship is used to show that European
routes to Asia typically become 10 days faster via the Arctic than alternatives by mid-century, and 13 days faster by late-century, while North American routes become 4 days faster. Future greenhouse-gas emissions have a larger impact by late-century; the shipping season reaching 4-8
months in RCP8.5, double that of RCP2.6, both with substantial inter-annual variability.
Moderately ice-strengthened vessels likely enable Arctic transits for 10-12 months by late century.

https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/2016GL069315

Sea ice decline and 21st century trans‐Arctic shipping routes

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the principal commercial maritime routes have changed very little. With global warming, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has opened up as a possible avenue of trade in containerized products between Asia and Europe. This paper verifies the technical and economic feasibility of regular container transport along the NSR. By adopting a model schedule between Shanghai and Hamburg, we are able to analyze the relative costs of various axes in the Asia–Europe transport network, including the NSR. While shipping through the Suez Canal is still by far the least expensive option, the NSR and Trans-Siberian Railway appear to be roughly equivalent second-tier alternatives.

Container shipping on the Northern Sea Route

Employment, Incomes, and Equality-a Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya.

Geographical factors and transport infrastructure are two of the key determinants that influence international competitiveness. In this sense, the quality of such infrastructure and how widespread it is, the distribution and capacity of logistics facilities in a country, as well as the number of private operators and their degree of specialisation, all play an increasingly important role in the design of business strategies aimed at increasing a country’s share of the international market. Until recently, however, availability and access to logistics services have been considered secondary factors when defining business competitiveness. This paper estimates an augmented gravity model of trade that specifically includes logistics and transport infrastructure indicators as explanatory variables. The model is estimated by using bilateral exports from 19 Spanish regions to 64 destinations (45 countries and 19 Spanish regions) with data for the period 2003–2007. The findings show that logistics is indeed important for the analysis of trade flows in goods and they highlight the importance of logistics measures at the regional level. In particular, the number, size and quality of logistics facilities positively influence export flows.

/pdf/relationship-between-logistics-infrastructure-and-trade-57c3rr2nba.pdf

Relationship between logistics infrastructure and trade: Evidence from Spanish regional exports

This paper focuses on the impact of maritime piracy on international trade. Piracy increases the cost of international maritime transport through an increase in insecurity regarding goods deliveries. Bilateral trade flows between the main European and Asian countries over the 1999 to 2008 period are used to estimate an augmented gravity model that includes various measures of piracy acts. We found robust evidence indicating that maritime piracy reduces the volume of trade; the effect of ten additional vessels hijacked being associated to an 11% decrease in exports. Using these results, the international cost of piracy in terms of trade destruction is estimated to be 28 billion dollars. Finally, we compare the cost of low intensity conflict like Somalia, to the cost of a full scale conflict (Afghanistan) and to the cost of an autarkic state (North Korea) for the international community in the year 2008.The results indicate that the cost of war more than doubles the cost of low intensity conflict.

How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community

/pdf/how-costly-is-modern-maritime-piracy-to-the-international-10battvvqt.pdf

How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community

A growing body of literature has recently focused on the economic origins and consequences of modern maritime piracy and on the perception that the international community has failed to control it. This paper aims to investigate maritime transport costs as one of the channels through which modern maritime piracy could have a major impact on the global economy. A transport-cost equation is estimated using a newly released data-set on maritime transport costs from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development together with data on maritime piracy from the International Maritime Bureau. Our results show that maritime piracy significantly increases trade costs between Europe and Asia.

/pdf/the-price-of-modern-maritime-piracy-nhyodlgzho.pdf

The price of modern maritime piracy

According to recently developed models of trade based on imperfect competition and heterogeneous firms, lower trade costs increase bilateral trade, not only through a rise in the mean value of individual shipments (the intensive margin of trade), but also through an increase in the number of exporting firms (the extensive margin of trade). The main aim of this paper is to provide new empirical evidence on the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean (EuroMed) agreements on both margins of trade. Using highly disaggregated export data for four North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) over the 1995–2008 period, we estimate the impact of the EuroMed agreements on both trade margins, thus providing empirical evidence about the validity of theoretical predictions. Our results show that North African countries enjoyed significant positive returns from the Barcelona Process, through increased exports of manufactured products to the four most populated continental countries in the European Union

Sami Bensassi

Papers

Relationship between logistics infrastructure and trade: Evidence from Spanish regional exports

How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community

How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community

The price of modern maritime piracy

Economic Integration and the Two Margins of Trade: The Impact of the Barcelona Process on North African Countries Exports