https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/197439/1207.0203v1.pdf

Internet of Things (IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions

Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

http://www.123seminarsonly.com/Seminar-Reports/015/53603449-zigbee.pdf

Wireless sensor networks: A survey on the state of the art and the 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards

In this paper, we describe LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAP supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node -- an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network. The protocol used for establishing and updating these keys is communication- and energy-efficient, and minimizes the involvement of the base station. LEAP also includes an efficient protocol for inter-node traffic authentication based on the use of one-way key chains. A salient feature of the authentication protocol is that it supports source authentication without precluding in-network processing and passive participation. We analyze the performance and the security of our scheme under various attack models and show our schemes are very efficient in defending against many attacks.

LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks

Internet of Things (IoT) is playing a more and more important role after its showing up, it covers from traditional equipment to general household objects such as WSNs and RFID. With the great potential of IoT, there come all kinds of challenges. This paper focuses on the security problems among all other challenges. As IoT is built on the basis of the Internet, security problems of the Internet will also show up in IoT. And as IoT contains three layers: perception layer, transportation layer and application layer, this paper will analyze the security problems of each layer separately and try to find new problems and solutions. This paper also analyzes the cross-layer heterogeneous integration issues and security issues in detail and discusses the security issues of IoT as a whole and tries to find solutions to them. In the end, this paper compares security issues between IoT and traditional network, and discusses opening security issues of IoT.

https://csi.dgist.ac.kr/uploads/Seminar/1407_IoT_SSH.pdf

Security of the Internet of Things: perspectives and challenges

We analyze the security vulnerabilities of PEAS, ASCENT, and CCP, three well-known topology maintenance protocols for sensor networks. These protocols aim to increase the lifetime of the sensor network by maintaining only a subset of nodes in an active or awake state. The design of these protocols assumes that the sensor nodes will be deployed in a trusted non-adversarial environment, and does not take into account the impact of attacks launched by malicious insider and outsider nodes. We describe three attacks against these protocols that can be used to reduce the lifetime of the sensor network, or to degrade the functionality of the sensor application by reducing the network connectivity and sensing coverage that can be achieved. Further, we describe counter-measures that can be used to increase the robustness of the protocols and make them resilient to such attacks.

Securing Topology Maintenance Protocols for Sensor Networks

We analyze the security vulnerabilities of PEAS, AS- CENT, and CCP, three well-known topology maintenance protocols for sensor networks. These protocols aim to in- crease the lifetime of the sensor network by maintaining only a subset of nodes in an active or awake state. The design of these protocols assumes that the sensor nodes will be deployed in a trusted non-adversarial environment, and does not take into account the impact of attacks launched by malicious insider and outsider nodes. We describe three at- tacks against these protocols that can be used to reduce the lifetime of the sensor network, or to degrade the functional- ity of the sensor application by reducing the network con- nectivity and sensing coverage that can be achieved. Fur- ther, we describe counter-measures that can be used to in- crease the robustness of the protocols and make them re- silient to such attacks. nectivity and the application's coverage requirements in a configurable fashion. All these protocols involve some form of coordination and message exchanges between neighboring nodes in order to elect coordinators and determine sleep schedules. These protocols were designed assuming a non-adversarial trusted environment. Consequently, they are vulnerable to secu- rity attacks in which malicious nodes send spoofed or false messages to their neighbors with the goal of defeating the objectives of the protocol. Attacks on the topology maintenance protocols can be performed either by entities external to the network (out- sider attacks) or by compromised nodes (insider attacks). Insider attacks are a particularly challenging problem for sensor networks because many sensor applications involve deploying nodes in an unattended environment, thus leav- ing them vulnerable to capture and compromise by an ad- versary. Unlike outsider attacks, insider attacks cannot be prevented by authentication mechanisms since the adver- sary knows all the keying material possessed by the com- promised nodes. In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of three well-known topology maintenance protocols (PEAS, CCP, and ASCENT). We describe three types of attacks that can be launched against these protocols: sleep depriva- tion attacks that increase the energy expenditure of sensor nodes and thus reduce the lifetime of the sensor network, snooze attacks that result in inadequate sensing coverage or network connectivity, and network substitution attacks in which multiple attackers collude to take control of part of the sensor network. Further, we describe counter-measures that can be used to increase the robustness of the protocols and make them resilient to such attacks. The proposed counter-measures include authentication mechanisms that can be used to pre- vent outsider attacks and certain insider attacks (such as im- personation attacks). However, for all these protocols, we

/pdf/securing-topology-maintenance-protocols-for-sensor-networks-4v74kkwnla.pdf

Securing Topology Maintenance Protocols for Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures

In this paper, we describe DyRecT (Dynamic Reconfiguration Toolkit) a software library that allows programmers to develop adaptively parallel message-passing MPI programs for clusters of workstations. DyRecT provides a high-level API that can be used for writing adaptive parallel HPF-like programs while hiding most of the details of the dynamic reconfiguration from the programmer. In addition, DyRecT provides support for making a wider variety of applications adaptive by exposing to the programmer a low-level library that implements many of the typical tasks performed during reconfiguration. We present experimental results for the overhead of dynamic reconfiguration of several benchmark applications using DyRecT.

DyRecT: Software Support for Adaptive Parallelism on NOWs

In this paper, we introduce the concept of witness anonymity for peer-to-peer systems. Witness anonymity combines the seemingly conflicting requirements of anonymity (for honest peers who report on the misbehavior of other peers) and accountability (for malicious peers that attempt to misuse the anonymity feature to slander honest peers). We propose the Secure Deep Throat (SDT) protocol to provide anonymity for witnesses of malicious or selfish behavior to enable such peers to report on this behavior without fear of retaliation. On the other hand, in SDT the misuse of anonymity is restrained in such a way that any malicious peer that attempts to send multiple claims against the same innocent peer for the same reason (i.e., the same misbehavior type) can be identified. We also describe how SDT can be used in two modes. The active mode can be used in scenarios with real-time requirements, e.g., detecting and preventing the propagation of peer-to-peer worms, whereas the passive mode is suitable for scenarios without strict real-time requirements, e.g., query-based reputation systems. We analyze the security and overhead of SDT and present countermeasures that can be used to mitigate various attacks on the protocol. Our analysis shows that the communication, storage, and computation overheads of SDT are acceptable in peer-to-peer systems.

/pdf/providing-witness-anonymity-in-peer-to-peer-systems-2kqbb679gz.pdf

Providing witness anonymity in peer-to-peer systems

In this paper, we introduce the concept of witness anonymity for peer-to-peer systems, as well as other systems with the peer-to-peer nature. Witness anonymity combines the seemingly conflicting requirements of anonymity (for honest peers who report on the misbehavior of other peers) and accountability (for malicious peers that attempt to misuse the anonymity feature to slander honest peers). We propose the Secure Deep Throat (SDT) protocol to provide anonymity for the witnesses of malicious or selfish behavior to enable such peers to report on this behavior without fear of retaliation. On the other hand, in SDT, the misuse of anonymity is restrained in such a way that any malicious peer attempting to send multiple claims against the same innocent peer for the same reason (i.e., the same misbehavior type) can be identified. We also describe how SDT can be used in two modes. The active mode can be used in scenarios with real-time requirements, e.g., detecting and preventing the propagation of peer-to-peer worms, whereas the passive mode is suitable for scenarios without strict real-time requirements, e.g., query-based reputation systems. We analyze the security and overhead of SDT, and present countermeasures that can be used to mitigate various attacks on the protocol. Moreover, we show how SDT can be easily integrated with existing protocols/mechanisms with a few examples. Our analysis shows that the communication, storage, and computation overheads of SDT are acceptable in peer-to-peer systems.

Sanjeev Setia

Papers

Securing Topology Maintenance Protocols for Sensor Networks

Securing Topology Maintenance Protocols for Sensor Networks: Attacks and Countermeasures

DyRecT: Software Support for Adaptive Parallelism on NOWs

Providing witness anonymity in peer-to-peer systems

Providing Witness Anonymity Under Peer-to-Peer Settings