S
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
Researcher at Microsoft
Publications - 32
Citations - 2391
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin is an academic researcher from Microsoft. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cryptography & Hash function. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 31 publications receiving 1983 citations. Previous affiliations of Santiago Zanella-Béguelin include Johns Hopkins University.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Verified Computational Differential Privacy with Applications to Smart Metering
TL;DR: A significantly enhanced version of EasyCrypt is reported on that accommodates a richer, user-extensible language of probabilistic expressions and supports reasoning about approximate forms of program equivalence, that notably include approximate and computational differential privacy.
Book ChapterDOI
Proving the TLS Handshake Secure (As It Is)
Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Cédric Fournet,Markulf Kohlweiss,Alfredo Pironti,Pierre-Yves Strub,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin +5 more
TL;DR: The TLS Internet Standard features a mixed bag of cryptographic algorithms and constructions, letting clients and servers negotiate their use for each run of the handshake, and is critical to obtain practical security guarantees for TLS.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Smart meter aggregation via secret-sharing
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a protocol for processing smart meter readings while preserving user privacy, implemented by adapting to the setting of efficient secret-sharing-based secure multi-party computation techniques.
Posted Content
Verified Low-Level Programming Embedded in F*
Jonathan Protzenko,Jean Karim Zinzindohoue,Aseem Rastogi,Tahina Ramananandro,Peng Wang,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin,Antoine Delignat-Lavaud,Catalin Hritcu,Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Cédric Fournet,Nikhil Swamy +10 more
TL;DR: Low* is a shallow embedding of a small, sequential, well-behaved subset of C in F*, a dependently- typed variant of ML aimed at program verification, and its application to high-assurance optimized cryptographic libraries.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Implementing and Proving the TLS 1.3 Record Layer
Antoine Delignat-Lavaud,Cédric Fournet,Markulf Kohlweiss,Jonathan Protzenko,Aseem Rastogi,Nikhil Swamy,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin,Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Jianyang Pan,Jean Karim Zinzindohoue +9 more
TL;DR: The TLS record layer is the main bridge between TLS applications and internal sub-protocols as mentioned in this paper, and the TLS 1.3 record layer has been shown to be provably secure.