In this study I lest the prevalent Claims among contemporary psycholinguists that understanding metaphor does not involve a special process, and that it is essentially identical to understanding literal language. Particularly, I examine the claims that figurative language does not involve processing the surface literal meaning (e.g., Gibbs 1984), and that its comprehension is not processing-intensive, because it does not involve a trigger (e.g., Keysar 1989). A critique, review and reinterpretation ofa number of contemporary researches on literal and figurative language reveal that figurative and literal language use are governed by a general principle of salience: Salient meanings (e.g., conventional frequent, familiär, enhanced by prior context) are processed first. Thus, for example, when the most salient meaning is intended (äs in, e.g., the figurative meaning of conventional Idioms), it is accessed directly, without having toprocess the less salient (literal) meaning first (Gibbs 1980). However, when a less rather than a more salient meaning is intended (e.g., the metaphoric meaning ofnovel metaphors, the literal meaning of conventional Idioms, or a novel Interpretation ofa highly conventional literal expression) comprehension seems to involve a sequential process, upon which the more salient meaning is processed initially, before the intended meaning is derived (Blasko and Connine 1993; Gerrig 1989; Gibbs 1980; Gregory and Mergler 1990). Parallel processing is induced when more than one meaning is salient. For instance, conventional metaphors whose metaphoric and literal meanings are equally salient, are processed initially both literally and metaphorically (Blasko and Connine 1993). The directl sequential process debate, then, can be reconciled: Different linguistic expressions ( salient-less salient) may tap different (direct/parallel/sequential) processes.

Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience hypothesis

Introducing impoliteness 1. Understanding impoliteness I: face and social norms 2. Understanding impoliteness II: intentionality and emotions 3. Impoliteness metadiscourse 4. Conventionalised formulaic impoliteness and its intensification 5. Non-conventionalised impoliteness: implicational impoliteness 6. Impoliteness events: co-texts and contexts 7. Impoliteness events: functions 8. Conclusions.

Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence

Two experiments are described in which reaction times for understanding target sentences or phrases in terms of a preceding context were measured. In Experiment 1, the target sentences followed either short or long contexts which induced either literal interpretations or metaphorical ones. Results indicated that only in the short context condition did subjects take significantly longer to understand metaphorical than literal targets. This interaction is explained in terms of the availability of appropriate schemata for interpreting the target. In Experiment 2, targets were phrases that could be given either an idiomatic or a literal interpretation. It was found that the comprehension of phrases receiving an idiomatic interpretation took no longer than the comprehension of those same phrases when given a literal interpretation, and there was some evidence that idiomatic interpretations were consistently faster. It is argued that both experiments can be accounted for in terms of contextually generated expectations. The processes required for the comprehension of figurative and literal uses of language seem to be essentially similar.

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Interpreting Metaphors and Idioms: Some Effects of Context on Comprehension. Technical Report No. 93.

Irony as relevant inappropriateness

This article reports the findings of a single study examining irony in talk among friends. Sixty-two 10-min conversations between college students and their friends were recorded and analyzed. Five main types of irony were found: jocularity, sarcasm, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, and understatements. These different forms of ironic language were part of 8% of all conversational turns. Analysis of these utterances revealed varying linguistic and social patterns and suggested several constraints on how and why people achieve ironic meaning. The implications of this conclusion for psychological theories of irony are discussed.

Irony in Talk Among Friends

In three experiments, we investigated the social payoffs of speaking ironically. In Experiment 1, participants rated videotaped ironic remarks (criticisms and compliments) as funnier than literal remarks, but no more or less status enhancing. In Experiment 2, participants listened to audiotaped ironic criticisms and compliments. Ironic compliments were rated as more insulting than literal compliments, but ironic criticisms were found to be less insulting than literal criticisms. In Experiment 3, participants read literal or ironic criticisms. Ironic comments were rated as more amusing than literal ones. When irony was directed at the addressee's poor performance, it served to protect the addressee's face by softening the criticism. When irony was directed at the addressee's offensive behavior, it served to protect the speaker's face by showing the speaker as less angry and more in control. In addition, irony damaged the speaker—addressee relationship less than did literal criticism. Taken together, these ...

Why not say it directly? The social functions of irony

According to the tinge hypothesis, the evaluative tone of the literal meaning of ironic utterances automatically colors the hearer's perception of the intended meaning. In Experiment 1, participants read short stories that end with either a literal or an ironic insult. Ironic insults are rated as less critical than literal insults, and the ironic speaker is rated as less annoyed than the literal speaker. In addition, the speaker-target relationship is affected less negatively when the insult is delivered ironically rather than literally. These results are obtained regardless of whether the addressee or a third person is the target of the remark and regardless of whether the story characters know one another or have just met. In Experiment 2, participants read similar short stories that end with either a literal or ironic compliment. Results mirror those of Experiment 1. Ironic compliments are rated as less praising than literal compliments, and the ironic speaker is rated as less pleased than the literal ...

Muting the Meaning A Social Function of Irony

We tested the hypotheses that the literal meaning of an ironic utterance is activated during comprehension and (a) slows the processing of the key ironic portion of the utterance (literal activation hypothesis) and (b) slows the processing of the literal portion of the utterance that follows (the spillover hypothesis). Forty-eight stories, each ending in an ironic comment, were constructed. Half of the ironic comments were ironic criticism (positive literal meaning, negative ironic meaning); half were ironic praise (negative literal meaning, positive ironic meaning). Final utterances were divided into 3 phrases: Phrase 1 gave no indication of irony, Phrase 2 contained the key word that made the utterance ironic, and Phrase 3 gave no indication of irony. Each story was then altered by 1 phrase so that the final comment became literal. One version of each of the stories was presented to each of 48 college undergraduates. Stories were presented 1 sentence at a time, but the final utterances were presented in...

Obligatory Processing of the Literal Meaning of Ironic Utterances: Further Evidence

Publisher Summary The chapter discusses two major forms of nonliteral language metaphor, and irony. The chapter sets forth a principled distinction between literal and nonliteral language, and between the two major forms of nonliteral language, metaphor and irony. The very different comprehension demands posed by metaphor and irony are discussed. These different comprehension demands account for the diverging developmental courses of metaphor and irony comprehension. The rest of the chapter focuses on irony, considering the forms that irony takes in every day usage and the social payoffs for using an ironic rather than a literal form of discourse. The chapter also discusses some recent evidence from laboratory showing that, contrary to the prevailing view, the literal meaning of irony must, at some level, be accessed. It is because speakers access the literal meaning of irony that irony is a muted form of criticism or a muted form of praise. Thus, the way in which irony is processed can helps to make sense of the vexing question of why speakers choose to use irony rather than direct speech.

Chapter 10 Attributing meaning to deliberately false utterances: The case of irony

According to Olson (1988), full comprehension of nonliteral language must include the recognition of the implied meaning of the utterance and an awareness that there are two distinct levels of meaning—what is said and what is meant. Three experiments were performed to investigate children's comprehension of nonliteral language and their awareness of the say-mean distinction in such language. In Experiment 1, children heard irony modeled and were asked to produce similar utterances. Six-year-olds produced literal insults, showing that they understood the modeled irony but were not aware of the say-mean distinction. In Experiment 2, 6- and 7-year-olds were tested for awareness and comprehension of both metaphor and irony.

Shelly Dews

Papers

Why not say it directly? The social functions of irony

Muting the Meaning A Social Function of Irony

Obligatory Processing of the Literal Meaning of Ironic Utterances: Further Evidence

Chapter 10 Attributing meaning to deliberately false utterances: The case of irony

Understanding Versus Discriminating Nonliteral Utterances: Evidence for a Dissociation