世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/ip_corpgov.pdf

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.

The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead

http://mx.nthu.edu.tw/~jtyang/Teaching/Corporate_Governance/Papers/Claessens,%20Djankov,%20Lang%202000.pdf

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

In this paper we investigate the impact of an increase in market discipline on total factor productivity (TFP) growth at the level of the firm in Bulgaria during 1991-95, focusing in particular on the effect of trade liberalization, corporatization and rationalization of conglomerates, and hard budget constraints. The data support the predicted relationship between increases in market discipline and subsequent productivity growth. Our results demonstrate the need to distinguish between exporting and non-exporting enterprises in assessing the impact of trade liberalization and the importance of taking into account other relevant policy changes.

Market discipline and corporate efficiency: evidence from Bulgaria

We examine a new data set of laws and practices governing public procurement, as well as procurement outcomes, in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on discretion of the procuring agents. We find that laws and practices are highly correlated with each other across countries, better practices are correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a model of procurement in which both regulation and public sector capacity determine the efficiency of procurement. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, and detrimental in countries with high public sector capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion. We find evidence broadly consistent with this prediction: regulation of procurement improves outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

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Public Procurement in Law and Practice

The relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been the subject of intense research in both transition and market economies. The Czech Republic's mass privatization program provides a unique opportunity to investigate this relationship. It changed the ownership of firms in a short period of time, and firm characteristics had only a limited influence on the resulting ownership structure. Using a cross-section of 706 Czech firms over the period 1992-7, we find that the more concentrated ownership, the higher firm profitability and labour productivity. These findings are weakly robust to the inclusion of control variables for the type of ownership, or to a correction for the endogeneity of ownership concentration.

Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. The authors instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In their set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Their results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points' reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

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Simeon Djankov

Papers

Market discipline and corporate efficiency: evidence from Bulgaria

Public Procurement in Law and Practice

Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic

The causes of civil war

The World Bank, Privatization and Enterprise Reform in Transition