世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, henceforth AJR, (2001), we advanced the hypothesis that the mortality rates faced by Europeans in different parts of the world after 1500 affected their willingness to establish settlements and choice of colonization strategy. Places that were relatively healthy (for Europeans) were—when they fell under European control—more likely to receive better economic and political institutions. In contrast, places where European settlers were less likely to go were more likely to have “extractive” institutions imposed. We also posited that this early pattern of institutions has persisted over time and influences the extent and nature of institutions in the modern world. On this basis, we proposed using estimates of potential European settler mortality as an instrument for institutional variation in former European colonies today. Data on settlers themselves are unfortunately patchy—particularly because not many went to places they believed, with good reason, to be most unhealthy. We therefore followed the lead of Curtin (1989 and 1998) who compiled data on the death rates faced by European soldiers in various overseas postings. 1 Curtin’s data were based on pathbreaking data collection and statistical work initiated by the British military in the mid-nineteenth century. These data became part of the foundation of both contemporary thinking about public health (for soldiers and for civilians) and the life insurance industry (as actuaries and executives considered the

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The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/ip_corpgov.pdf

Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.

The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead

http://mx.nthu.edu.tw/~jtyang/Teaching/Corporate_Governance/Papers/Claessens,%20Djankov,%20Lang%202000.pdf

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

WTO members are starting to consider whether and how to develop multilateral disciplines on competition policies. These discussions are taking place in the absence of concerted efforts to compile comparable information on the conditions of competition existing on member country markets. We argue in this paper that collection of simple measures of industrial structure and import penetration would be useful in characterizing the 'conditions of competition' that prevail in an economy. Although these types of data are not policy-specific, they could be used for monitoring, reporting and multilateral surveillance purposes, and allow cross-country comparisons and the establishment of 'benchmarks' against which changes in a given country over time could be measured.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Conditions of Competition and Multilateral Surveillance

This paper examines case study evidence of large Slovak firms chosen to represent a wide range of initial conditions, privatization techniques and success with restructuring. We document the ownership changes and restructuring actions of firms. We then re-examine several hypotheses about firm restructuring in the light of this new evidence. In particular, we show that the majority of Slovak firms have successfully restructured in the absence of foreign investors and government-led restructuring programs. The study also throws some new queries on the effectiveness of different privatization methods in enhancing corporate governance and improving access to skills and capital. We find that privatization to insiders through management- employee buy-outs did not hamper firm restructuring as the new owners (old managers) invested heavily in new technology, laid off substancial part of their workforce, sought foreign partnerships, and were prepared to sell controlling stakes to outsiders in return for fresh financial resources. The evidence also suggests that the mass privatization program did not result in weak corporate governance since it was followed by a rapid consolidation of ownership. Our findings support the view that the main objective for privatization programs should be the speedy transformation of ownership, not the selection of perfect owners.

The Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia

What determines the enforcement of reform of business regulation? What are the outcomes of such reform? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive eect of regulatory reform on net entry into the ocial

/pdf/reforms-in-business-regulation-evidence-from-russia-568trikp3t.pdf

Reforms in Business Regulation: Evidence from Russia

WITHDRAWN: A response to Is Doing Business Damaging Business?

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the "curse of natural resources" literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse than oil.

Simeon Djankov

Papers

Conditions of Competition and Multilateral Surveillance

The Restructuring of Large Firms in Slovakia

Reforms in Business Regulation: Evidence from Russia

WITHDRAWN: A response to Is Doing Business Damaging Business?

The curse of aid