世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

A rapidly growing body of research examines whether human conflict can be affected by climatic changes. Drawing from archeology, criminology, economics, geography, history, political science, and psychology, we assemble and analyze the 60 most rigorous quantitative studies and document, for the first time, a remarkable convergence of results. We find strong causal evidence linking climatic events to human conflict across a range of spatial and temporal scales and across all major regions of the world. The magnitude of climate's influence is substantial: for each 1 standard deviation (1σ) change in climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, median estimates indicate that the frequency of interpersonal violence rises 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict rises 14%. Because locations throughout the inhabited world are expected to warm 2-4σ by 2050, amplified rates of human conflict could represent a large and critical impact of anthropogenic climate change.

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Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict

A rapidly growing body of research applies panel methods to examine how temperature, precipitation, and windstorms influence economic outcomes. These studies focus on changes in weather realizations over time within a given spatial area and demonstrate impacts on agricultural output, industrial output, labor productivity, energy demand, health, conflict, and economic growth, among other outcomes. By harnessing exogenous variation over time within a given spatial unit, these studies help credibly identify (i) the breadth of channels linking weather and the economy, (ii) heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of locations, and (iii) nonlinear effects of weather variables. This paper reviews the new literature with two purposes. First, we summarize recent work, providing a guide to its methodologies, datasets, and findings. Second, we consider applications of the new literature, including insights for the "damage function" within models that seek to assess the potential economic effects of future climate change. ( JEL C51, D72, O13, Q51, Q54)

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What Do We Learn from the Weather? The New Climate-Economy Literature

How do income shocks aect armed con‡ict? Theory suggests two op- posite eects. If labor is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower con‡ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost eect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is the rapacity eect. Our paper exploits exogenous price shocks in inter- national commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in Colombia to assess how dierent income shocks aect con‡ict. We examine changes in the price of agricultural goods (which are labor intensive) and natural resources (which are capital intensive). We focus on coee and oil, the two largest exports. We …nd that a sharp fall in coee prices in the 1990s increased violence dierentially in regions growing more coee, by lower- ing wages and the opportunity cost of joining armed groups. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased violence dierentially in the oil region, by in- creasing municipal revenue siphoned through rapacity. This pattern holds in several other agricultural and natural resource sectors, providing robust evidence that price shocks aect con‡ict in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity.

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Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia

This book opens a fresh chapter in the debate on local enterprise clusters and their strategies for upgrading in the global economy. The authors employ a novel conceptual framework in their research on industrial clusters in Europe, Latin America and Asia and provide new perspectives and insights for researchers and policymakers alike.

Governance in global value chains

Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying.

https://conferences.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/gov2126/files/nichter_2008_0.pdf

Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot

Small Firm Growth in Developing Countries

This study estimates the effect of economic conditions on redistributive conflict. We examine land invasions in Brazil using a panel data set with over 50,000 municipality-year observations. Adverse eco- nomic shocks, instrumented by rainfall, cause the rural poor to invade and occupy large landholdings. This effect exhibits substantial heterogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems, but not by other observable variables. In highly unequal municipalities, negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality. Cross-sectional estimates using fine within-region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict. I. Introduction C ONFLICT over land is endemic to many rural econo- mies. In environments marked by a highly skewed distribution of property, incomplete land and credit markets, poorly or unevenly enforced property rights, and weak political institutions, agents often resort to extralegal means to improve their economic positions. The poor frequently invade private properties and occupy them until either forcibly expelled or granted official titles. Land conflict, which is prevalent in many countries such as Brazil, South Africa, Uganda, and Venezuela, may distort the allocation of resources in the agricultural sector away from productive uses and thereby contribute to the persistence of rural poverty. How do economic conditions affect this redistrib- utive conflict? This paper explores this question using a rich municipal- level data set of 5,299 land invasions from 1988 to 2004 in Brazil. We follow Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) by using rainfall as a source of exogenous variation to study the relationship between income and conflict, and we find that adverse economic shocks cause the rural poor to invade large landholdings. This effect exhibits considerable het- erogeneity by land inequality and land tenure systems. In highly unequal municipalities, negative income shocks cause twice as many land invasions as in municipalities with average land inequality. The effect of income shocks is even stronger in highly polarized municipalities, as measured by the degree of bimodality in the land distribution. Cross- sectional estimates using fine within-region variation also suggest the importance of land inequality in explaining redistributive conflict. We also find that income shocks cause significantly more land invasions in municipalities with a greater proportion of land under fixed-rent contracts. By contrast, we find no evidence of heterogeneity on a range of other political and socioeconomic variables, including political competition, sharecropping, police expenditures, and social welfare spending. Recent microeconometric studies have examined two

Economic Determinants of Land Invasions

Although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying, political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies. We provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections: vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion. Machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate. They also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors: compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, political salience, machine support, and political polarization. Our analysis yields numerous insights, such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying, and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying. Evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies.

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Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections

Clientelist parties (or political machines) engage in a variety of strategies during elections. Most studies focus exclusively on “vote buying”, a strategy that rewards opposing voters for switching their vote choices. Yet in many countries, machines also adopt other strategies, such as activating their passive constituencies through “turnout buying”. What factors explain variation in patterns of clientelism during elections? We develop an analytical framework and formal model that highlight the role of individual and contextual factors. Political machines focus on two key attributes of individuals – political preferences and inclination to vote – when choosing their mix of clientelist strategies. Machines also tailor their mix to five contextual factors: compulsory voting, machine support, political polarization, salience of political preferences, and strength of ballot secrecy. Evidence from Argentina, Brazil, and Russia is consistent with these findings.

Simeon Nichter

Papers

Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot

Small Firm Growth in Developing Countries

Economic Determinants of Land Invasions

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections

Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics During Elections