Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Men and Women of the Corporation

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The Theory of Industrial Organization

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

The paper analyses ethical business codes as governance mechanisms, i.e. institutions which facilitate coordination of economic behaviour. Ethical business codes are compared to other social institutions (market solutions, government intervention, the prevailing social ethic), and their efficiency is evaluated in terms of transaction costs. A normative rationale for ethical codes is found when other institutions fail to achieve socially optimal outcomes, in particular when the firm has access to unique information. Some economic incentives are identified which induce firms to commit to socially optimal ethical codes but it is argued that economic forces will not in general be sufficient for optimality.

Business Ethics as Corporate Governance

Based on the impressive work of Hopt and von Hippel (2010), I review the comparative corporate governance of non-profit organizations and propose topics for future research. There is evidence of agency problems in non-profit as well as for-profit organizations, but the governance mechanisms employed to address them are by necessity different. In the absence of important governance mechanisms like monitoring by external owners or performance based pay, other mechanisms like regulation, reputation and transparency come to the foreground. However, we have little systematic knowledge of the costs and benefits of alternative governance arrangements in non-profits, which provides a range of opportunities for future research.

Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations

This project addresses the causes and effects of board diversity among Nordic publicly traded firms. The study identifies underlying mechanisms for evolution of board diversity based on nine in-dep ...

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Corporate Governance as a source of competitiveness for Nordic firms

Several European countries have mandatory employee representation on company boards, but the consequences for corporate governance are debated. We use employee representation rules in the otherwise quite similar Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) to elicit information on shareholder preferences for employee representation and board size. We find that shareholders tend to choose board structures that minimize the proportion of employee representatives. In Denmark and Norway employee representation depends on board size, and shareholders choose board sizes that minimize the number of employee representatives. However, many companies have more employee representatives than is mandatory. In Sweden, where the law mandates a fixed number of employee representatives (two or three depending on firm size), shareholders choose to have larger boards. In Finland, where employee representation is not mandatory, <1 % of companies choose to have it. Whatever, the merits of employee representation, shareholders appear to be mildly averse to it.

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Steen Thomsen

Papers

Business Ethics as Corporate Governance

Comparative Corporate Governance of Non-Profit Organizations

Corporate Governance as a source of competitiveness for Nordic firms

Employee Representation and Board Size in the Nordic Countries

An Introduction to Corporate Governance: Mechanisms and Systems