Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Men and Women of the Corporation

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Both in the USA and in Europe there has been an increase in delistings in recent years, which has been partly attributed to increasing governance costs for listed companies The question is whether stronger corporate governance regulation brings sufficient improvements in investor confidence to cover increased costs of disclosure and box checking as well as lower flexibility in board structure etc To answer this question we analyze the determinants of 3577 delistings among 12612 companies listed on European stock exchanges 1995-2005 We find that stronger minority investor protection and the adoption of corporate governance codes are associated with a higher delisting frequency both by M&A and going private transactions In contrast better overall governance (as measured by a modified version of the World Bank governance index) is associated with lower going private rates The policy effects on delistings turn out to be particularly strong and significant for small firms, profitable firms and in the post-2000 bear market Taking into consideration that corporate governance policy may be endogenously determined, we find that investor protection and a composite corporate governance index tend to lead to more going private transactions Our results therefore indicate that there are costs as well as benefits to corporate governance regulation

/pdf/delistings-in-europe-and-the-cost-of-governance-1l29fkicct.pdf

Delistings in Europe and the Cost of Governance

Industrial foundations are autonomous nonprofit entities that own and control one or more conventional business firms. These foundations are common in Northern Europe, where they own a number of internationally prominent companies. Previous studies have indicated, surprisingly, that companies controlled by industrial foundations are, on average, as profitable as companies with conventional patterns of investor ownership. In this article, we explore the reasons for this performance, not by comparing foundation-owned firms with conventional investor-owned firms, but rather by focusing on differences among the industrial foundations themselves. We work with a rich data set comprising 113 foundation-owned Danish companies over the period 2003-2008.We focus in particular on a composite structural factor that we term “managerial distance.” We propose this as a measure of the extent to which a foundation establishes an identity that is distinct from that of the company it owns. More particularly, we hypothesize that, within limits, greater managerial distance increases the intensity, clarity, and objectivity with which the foundation’s board of directors – which holds ultimate control of a foundation-owned company -- focuses on the company’s profitability. In effect, a substantial degree of distance puts members of the foundation board in the position of “virtual owners,” in the sense that information and decisions are framed for the board in roughly the way they would be framed for profit-seeking outside owners of the company. Consistent with this hypothesis, our empirical analysis shows a positive, significant, and robust association between managerial distance and the economic performance of foundation owned companies. The findings appear to illuminate not just foundation governance, but corporate governance and fiduciary behavior more generally.

Managerial Distance and Virtual Ownership: The Governance of Industrial Foundations

Preprint of published version of an article from Journal of International Business Studies with the title: "On the internationalization of corporate boards: the case of Nordic firms"

From Global Firms to Global Boards

The causal relationship between insider ownership and market valuation is tested by simultaneous estimation of the causes and effect of insider ownership among the largest continental European companies. Controlling for nation and industry effects insider ownership (measured by the fraction of “closely held” shares) is found to have a positive effect on market valuation (market-to-book values). And market valuation is found to have a positive feedback effect on the level of insider ownership. The findings provide empirical support for a theoretical model proposed by La Porta et al (1999). But the results are also found to be sensitive to owner identity: while a higher level of financial and corporate insider ownership is found to increase market valuation, family ownership has no significant effect, and a higher level of government ownership is found to reduce market valuation.

The Causal Relationship Between Insider Ownership, Owner Identity, and Market Valuation Among the Largest European Companies

We estimate the impact of non-pharmacological interventions (NPIs) on COVID-19 deaths in Scandinavia. We exploit policy variation between Denmark and Norway on the one hand and Sweden on the other. The former deployed relatively more stringent lockdowns, the latter did not. Our difference-in-differences models show that stricter lockdown policies are associated with fewer COVID-19 deaths.

Steen Thomsen

Papers

Delistings in Europe and the Cost of Governance

Managerial Distance and Virtual Ownership: The Governance of Industrial Foundations

From Global Firms to Global Boards

The Causal Relationship Between Insider Ownership, Owner Identity, and Market Valuation Among the Largest European Companies

Lockdowns and COVID-19 Deaths in Scandinavia