Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

Men and Women of the Corporation

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

We analyze delistings from European stock exchanges 1995-2005 as a function of market conditions, firm effects and governance regulation. We find that investor protection and corporate governance quality reduce the likelihood of going private, bankrupt or liquidated, but increase the likelihood of exit by merger or acquisition. Taking into consideration that corporate governance policy may be endogenously determined, the estimated policy effects turn out to be highly sensitive to model specification, but our best estimates produce qualitatively similar results. We conclude that the evidence is most consistent with efficient regulation: better protection of minority investors and higher corporate governance quality stimulates the market for corporate control (M&A) and reduces the incentive to go private. However, going private transactions have increased significantly while governance standards have been improved over the past decade, and we would not ignore the possibility that more regulation would lead to more delistings. For example, we find indications that the adoption of corporate governance codes and changes in the level of corporate governance indices increase the propensity to go private. It seems likely that increasing investor protection will at some point add more costs than benefits to companies and investors. Governments should therefore consider both costs and benefits of further regulation. Key words: Delisting, public listing, mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation, going private, private equity, investor protection.

Delistings in Europe and the Cost of Governance

A number of world class companies – such as the Tata Group, Robert Bosch, and Bertelsmann -- are majority owned by charitable nonprofit foundations. This structure places control of the company in the hands of a self-perpetuating foundation board that is immune to outside discipline through a proxy fight or hostile acquisition, and whose members receive no incentive compensation. Conventional economic theories of corporate governance predict that such companies would be riven with agency costs and therefore highly inefficient. Yet previous studies find that companies owned by industrial foundations seem to perform as well as more conventional investor-owned companies. In this paper we reassess the relative performance of foundation-owned companies by comparing a substantial sample of them from the Nordic countries with various different samples of investor-owned Nordic companies, including matched pairs of companies in the same industry and of comparable size. We find that, overall, foundation-owned companies have similar accounting profitability, take less risk, and grow more slowly than listed investor-owned companies. We offer alternative theories regarding the costs and benefits of foundation ownership that appear consistent with our results.

http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/200280/mod_resource/content/1/paper-thomsen-and-hansmann---performance-v11---amsterdam.pdf

The Performance of Foundation-Owned Companies 12

This paper studies female board representation in 534 public corporations in four Nordic countries during 2001-2008. We explore how the heterogeneity of male directors correlates with the appointments of female directors. Considering the diversity dimensions of age, gender and nationality, our results indicate that Nordic corporations choose to “minimize” overall board diversity. We find a “crowding–out” effect between different dimensions of diversity. We argue that this effect partly explains the low proportion of female directors in Nordic firms, and that the mandatory gender quota in Norway may come at the price of lower diversity in other respects. JEL-codes: G30, G38, J16, L22, M16, M52

/pdf/how-diverse-can-you-get-gender-quotas-and-the-diversity-of-46im6xm6ay.pdf

How diverse can you get? Gender quotas and the diversity of Nordic boards

The article discusses the development of a voting power theory that is applied to a unique data set on Swedish shareholder meetings. The authors hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and the largest shareholder's sensitivity to greater participation by small shareholders. It is shown that firms' amenability to small shareholder influence results in more proposals by nomination committees that are dominated by large shareholders, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. The importance of local institutions are highlighted and a call for more research regarding shareholder activism in alternative institutional settings is made.

Steen Thomsen

Papers

Delistings in Europe and the Cost of Governance

The Performance of Foundation-Owned Companies 12

How diverse can you get? Gender quotas and the diversity of Nordic boards

Voting Power and Shareholder Activism

Community and Compensation: Director Remuneration in Thailand