S
Stefan Mangard
Researcher at Graz University of Technology
Publications - 195
Citations - 17568
Stefan Mangard is an academic researcher from Graz University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Side channel attack & Encryption. The author has an hindex of 56, co-authored 179 publications receiving 14723 citations. Previous affiliations of Stefan Mangard include Infineon Technologies.
Papers
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Book
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a comprehensive treatment of power analysis attacks and countermeasures, based on the principle that the only way to defend against such attacks is to understand them.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul C. Kocher,Jann Horn,Anders Fogh,Daniel Genkin,Daniel Gruss,Werner Haas,Mike Hamburg,Moritz Lipp,Stefan Mangard,Thomas Prescher,Michael Schwarz,Yuval Yarom +11 more
TL;DR: Spectre as mentioned in this paper is a side channel attack that can leak the victim's confidential information via side channel to the adversary. And it can read arbitrary memory from a victim's process.
Book
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards
TL;DR: This volume explains how power analysis attacks work and provides an extensive discussion of countermeasures like shuffling, masking, and DPA-resistant logic styles to decide how to protect smart cards.
Proceedings Article
Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space
Moritz Lipp,Michael Schwarz,Daniel Gruss,Thomas Prescher,Werner Haas,Anders Fogh,Jann Horn,Stefan Mangard,Paul C. Kocher,Daniel Genkin,Yuval Yarom,Mike Hamburg +11 more
TL;DR: It is shown that the KAISER defense mechanism for KASLR has the important (but inadvertent) side effect of impeding Meltdown, which breaks all security guarantees provided by address space isolation as well as paravirtualized environments.
Posted Content
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul C. Kocher,Daniel Genkin,Daniel Gruss,Werner Haas,Mike Hamburg,Moritz Lipp,Stefan Mangard,Thomas Prescher,Michael Schwarz,Yuval Yarom +9 more
TL;DR: This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process that violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms.