Stefan Mangard

TL;DR: It is shown how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution to show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed Fulmine, a system-on-chip (SoC) based on a tightly-coupled multi-core cluster augmented with specialized blocks for compute-intensive data processing and encryption functions.

TL;DR: This work presents the first memory-disclosure attack in sandboxed Javascript which exploits page deduplication, and is not only able to determine which applications are running, but also specific user activities, for instance, whether the user has specific websites currently opened.

TL;DR: This article presents a simple power-analysis (SPA) attack on implementations of the AES key expansion that efficiently utilizes information leakage to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key.

TL;DR: TIMBER-V is a new tagged memory architecture featuring flexible and efficient isolation of code and data on small embedded systems, and significantly reduces the problem of memory fragmentation, and improves dynamic reuse of untrusted memory across security boundaries.