It comes as something ofa surprise to reflect that the New York Review ofBooks is now over twenty years old. Even people of my generation (that is, old enough to remember the revolutionary 196os but not young enough to have taken a very exciting part in them) think of the paper as eternally youthful. In fact, it has gone through years of relatively quiet life, yet, as always in a competitive journalistic market, it is the controversies that attract the interest of the reader and to which the history (especially an admittedly impressionistic survey that tries to include something of the intellectual context in which a journal has operated) must give some attention. Not all the attacks which the New York Review has attracted, both early in its career and more recently, are worth more than a brief summary. What do we now make, for example, of Richard Kostelanetz's forthright accusation that 'The New York Review was from its origins destined to publicize Random House's (and especially [Jason] Epstein's) books and writers'?1 Well, simply that, even if the statistics bear out the charge (and Kostelanetz provides some suggestive evidence to support it, at least with respect to some early issues), there is nothing surprising in a market economy about a publisher trying to push his books through the pages of a journal edited by his friends. True, the New York Review has not had room to review more than around fifteen books in each issue and there could be a bias in the selection of

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3507774.pdf

The New York Review of Books

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

/pdf/current-index-to-legal-periodicals-8re353ze53.pdf

Current index to legal periodicals

What external control mechanisms are most effective in detecting corporate fraud? To address this question we study in depth all reported cases of corporate fraud in companies with more than 750 million dollars in assets between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on one single mechanism, but on a wide range of, often improbable, actors. Only 6% of the frauds are revealed by the SEC and 14% by the auditors. More important monitors are media (14%), industry regulators (16%), and employees (19%). Before SOX, only 35% of the cases were discovered by actors with an explicit mandate. After SOX, the performance of mandated actors improved, but still account for only slightly more than 50% of the cases. We find that monetary incentives for detection in frauds against the government influence detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting gains from extending such incentives to corporate fraud more generally.

/pdf/who-blows-the-whistle-on-corporate-fraud-1nt12xu1oq.pdf

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud

We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind-the-scenes intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.

/pdf/behind-the-scenes-the-corporate-governance-preferences-of-5ijmvrsg04.pdf

Behind the scenes: the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors

/pdf/who-blows-the-whistle-on-corporate-fraud-55n3uy7xb4.pdf

We examine factors that might explain how sanctions imposed in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions vary across the firms and countries implicated using a dataset of FCPA actions resolved from 2004 to 2011. We find evidence that the sanctions in an individual FCPA action are positively correlated with the egregiousness and extensiveness of the bribe. The sanctions also increase if the ultimate parent company of entities involved in the FCPA violation is foreign and if foreign regulators are involved in the action. At the country level we report evidence that the SEC and DOJ impose greater aggregate sanctions for violations in countries with a lower GNI per capita and weaker local anti-bribery institutions. The SEC and DOJ also impose disproportionately greater aggregate sanctions for violations where the home country of the ultimate parent company of FCPA defendants has a greater GNI per capita, stronger anti-bribery institutions, and a cooperation agreement with U.S. regulators. Overall, these findings suggest that factors besides those deemed relevant by U.S. and international law influence enforcement of the FCPA.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2407916_code45668.pdf?abstractid=2116487&mirid=1

Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

The capital markets within the United States are among the largest in the world. Today, the combined volume of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq market system reaches approximately $ 4 trillion dollars annually. 1 With the size of the U.S. markets has come an understandable pride in the success of the American regulatory system. 2 Possessing one of the most complex and intricate of regimes, the regulatory system in the United States, as administered and monitored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is often praised. 3 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the United States has frequently attempted to extend the reach of its regime. Through international negotiations, for example, the United States has successfully exported portions of its insider trading prohibitions - at least formally - to Japan and Switzerland in recent years. 4 More directly, the United States often applies its own domestic laws extraterritorially to transactions in other countries, justifying its actions as necessary to protect American investors and the integrity of U.S. capital markets.This Article calls into question the desirability of applying American securities laws extraterritorially. Certainly the goals of protecting investors and ensuring capital market integrity are laudable. However, the use of extraterritoriality to accomplish these goals is both unnecessary and ineffective. Extraterritoriality results in frequent conflicts between the United States and other nations. Furthermore, the application of extraterritoriality limits the ability of investors and issuers to select the securities regime of their own choosing.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2175992_code56608.pdf?abstractid=2175992&mirid=5&type=2

The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law

Common wisdom holds that many federal judges do not write their own opinions. While their degree of input into opinion writing varies, almost all rely to some extent on law clerks, typically recent law school graduates, to research and draft substantial sections of the opinion. Why should we care which judges write their opinions? We posit that determining the actual input of federal judges into the authorship of opinions provides useful information in a number of contexts, including judicial promotion decisions, the allocation of scarce judicial resources, and the judicial clerkship market for law students. We start with generic tests of authorship obtained from computational linguistics. To assess the effectiveness of these tests in the judicial context, we identify (based on an informal survey of several sitting federal judges), three judges reputed to write their own opinions. We then use a randomly selected set of opinions for active circuit judges from 1998 to 2000 to examine whether the generic tests succeed in ranking these three judges high in terms of authorship. The generic tests failed to distinguish authorship due in part to the subject matter specific nature of opinions. Whether an opinion is a criminal, administrative, or commercial law opinion matters. Comparing two judges based on their criminal law opinions may provide different results than comparing the same judges based on the criminal law opinions of one judge against the administrative law opinions of the other judge. Our generic tests did not control for subject matter of opinions. We provide a number of more customized tests for the judicial context that attempt to control for subject matter. Using these customized tests, we are able to distinguish the three test judges based on authorship.

/pdf/which-judges-write-their-opinions-and-should-we-care-51240xxkpp.pdf

Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)

This article provides the first empirical analysis of punitive damages in securities arbitrations. Using a data set of over 6,800 securities arbitration awards, we find that claimants prevailed in 48.9 percent of arbitrations, and that 9.1% of those claimant victories included a punitive damages award. The existence of a punitive damages award was associated with claims that suggested egregious misbehavior and with claims that provided higher compensatory awards. The pattern of punitive awards is more consistent with a traditional view of punitive damages that incorporates a retributive component than with a law and economics emphasis on efficient deterrence. We also test whether securities arbitration results in different punitive damages compared with litigation before juries and judges. The relation between punitive and compensatory awards did not differ substantially between the securities arbitrators’ data and data on juries available from periodic Civil Justice Surveys by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The rate of punitive awards by arbitrators was higher than the overall rates for juries and judges and slightly lower than the rate of punitive awards by juries in cases lacking bodily injury.

/pdf/punitive-damages-in-securities-arbitration-an-empirical-2u8soplj2h.pdf

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Author(s): Choi, Stephen; Gulati, Mitu | Abstract: Network externalities may lead contracting parties to stay with a "standardized" term despite preferences for another term. Using a dataset of sovereign bond offerings from 1995 to early 2004, we test the importance of standardization for the modification provisions relating to payment terms. We provide evidence that (a) standardization may lead parties to adopt provisions not necessarily out of preference and (b) standards, nonetheless, may change. The process of change, however, is not necessarily quick or straightforward. In the sovereign bond context, change came by way of an "interpretive shock". Contracts with modification provisions requiring the unanimous consent of bondholders (UACs) suddenly became vulnerable to change with less than unanimous approval through the unexpected use of exit consents. After the shock, sovereigns and investors did not initially react with a significant shift in contract terms. However, we provide evidence that after this initial lull (once investors and sovereign gained experience on the value of allowing modification of payment terms with less than unanimous consent), large shifts in contract terms followed, moving sovereign bond contracts even further away from UACs toward collective action clauses (CACs). We also report evidence that issuer's attorneys dealing with a high volume of sovereign offerings were the driving factor behind this delayed large shift in contract terms.

/pdf/innovation-in-boilerplate-contracts-an-empirical-examination-540vyv0mtq.pdf

Stephen J. Choi

Papers

Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law

Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)

Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study

Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds