Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c.1800

Alliances will look and act differently, but they are not dead yet. The reality is that we are currently seeing a change in emphasis among the many U.S. alliances with new partners and relationships emerging to confront new strategic challenges.

The End of Alliances? Not So Fast

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to be the subject of considerable academic scrutiny and criticism. Starting with the Soviet Union's collapse and continuing through the bitter transatlantic dispute over Operation Iraqi Freedom, analysts in Europe and the United States have confidently predicted NATO's destiny of irrelevancy, if not total collapse. The view that the "United States is from Mars and Europe is from Venus" permeated much of the discussion surrounding NATO's future and its alleged trend toward insignificance. (1) American unilateralism under President George W. Bush and the views expressed by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld--that the future of multilateral security centers around "coalitions of the willing" rather than NATO, and that "old Europe" was out of step with modern security necessities--did much to lend credence to this view. (2) The acrid debate over Iraq between former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and President George W. Bush, whose immediate predecessors arguably built the foundation for NATO's post-Cold War survival, provided some observers with bona fide evidence of NATO's downfall. (3) These perspectives capture part of NATO's evolution in one of its more difficult periods. NATO has not been without trials and tribulations in its post-Cold War life. Such views, however, often focus heavily on recent conflict-ridden aspects of the transatlantic relationship and fail to recognize why NATO continues to exist and play an instrumental role in fostering transatlantic security interests. This article provides a more balanced assessment of the alliance. Through a brief examination of NATO's history and ability to overcome previous crises, coupled with an analysis of the ongoing impact of NATO's expansion, its institutional flexibility to reshape itself after 9/11, and the renewed interest from NATO's great powers, this analysis helps explain why NATO's skeptics have inaccurately portrayed the alliance's current condition. While it is clear that the transatlantic marriage remains rocky at times, such "gloom and doom" scenarios of NATO that are so popular today misrepresent the alliance's previous achievements and ongoing security functions. The article begins with a brief survey of recent literature on NATO, follows with a short summary of NATO's ability to overcome previous crises, and continues with an analysis of NATO's ongoing security functions and transformation. The article concludes with a discussion of how the major powers continue to utilize NATO within their larger national security policies, all of which gives reason to be skeptical about NATO's current critics and doomsayers. NATO Skeptics In the lead-up to the war in Iraq, with the NATO allies sorely divided over whether to provide defensive measures to protect Turkey in the event that Iraq decided to attack, then US Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, referred to the political differences at NATO as a "crisis of credibility." (4) The debate over how to address Saddam Hussein, coupled with the United States' decision to act without NATO in its 2001 strikes on the Taliban after 9/11, led a number of observers to argue that by 2003, NATO's place in transatlantic security had been badly, if not irreparably damaged. To many analysts it appeared that the United States, under President George W. Bush, had moved in a completely different direction from the European public and many European governments. In contrast to the Clinton administration, President Bush was viewed in Europe as far more unilateral and nationalistic in pursuing his administration's foreign policy ambitions, which had provoked a visceral political backlash from many in Europe, especially Belgium, France, and Germany. (5) Analysts also point to NATO's war in Kosovo, noting that the military differences between the United States and Europe, and the absence of interoperable weaponry among the allies, made for an unequal partnership at best. …

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The Miscalculation of NATO's Death

: Since September 11, 2001, the United States government has concentrated many of its resources on combating international terrorism. Military operations have taken place in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to destroy terrorist networks, eliminate weapons, or discourage states from supporting terror organizations and their goals. Despite the successes of the GWOT, some critics have questioned the direction of the current strategy. The operations have required and will continue to require significant resources from participating nations - especially the United States. Given these demands, it is imperative that the United States pursue the appropriate national strategy so that resources are not wasted and the enemy is effectively targeted. In order to evaluate the GWOT, this monograph examines several questions about the terrorist threat. First, what is the nature of the enemy? Should the terror groups be defined as 1ccriminal 1d or as representative of a larger disenfranchised population? Second, what is the enemy's desired endstate and how does it impact western interests? Finally, how should the elements of national power be applied against the threat? This paper will address four important areas. First, it will analyze the enemy, his situation, and his vision. Second, it will reveal enemy and friendly endstates and centers of gravity that support those endstates. Third, it will outline critical vulnerabilities based on those centers of gravity. Finally, it will offer implications and recommendations for the national strategy. Considered in the context of a mass movement, the international Islamic terror phenomenon poses a threat unique from those of other terrorist groups and, in turn, it should be analyzed and attacked based on those unique characteristics. Furthermore, a comprehensive national strategy must be designed to counter the pervasive menace.

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The War Against International Islamic Terrorism: Who is the Enemy: How Can It Be Defeated?

THE REINVENTION OF NATO Robert M. Antis Old Dominion University, 2006 Director: Dr. Regina Karp In 2006, NATO is operating well out of area and conducting missions beyond the collective defense limits of its founding Treaty. NATO increasingly supports humanitarian relief operations, while also engaged in Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, and African crisis spots. These changes provide the reason to examine the thesis: only i f NATO is able to effectively transform will it be able to continue in its role as the primary European security institution. This transformation of the Alliance is a process, and one that could yet come to an untimely conclusion following any crisis. How NATO has adapted so far, and the potential for further successful adaptation are important European and Transatlantic issues. The reinvention of a treaty-based collective defense Alliance signed in 1949 to an institution projecting power and stability well beyond its own region resulted from slow and methodical consensus building since the end of the Cold War. Rather than disappearing, NATO enlarged and changed. Alliance members continued to see value in the institution that provided security for decades. Meanwhile, emerging dangers reinvigorated the collective defense nature of the Alliance. As an intergovernmental organization, NATO is not quickly changed. Nevertheless, since 1989 the Alliance has transformed remarkably. Changes in NATO policies, structure, and capabilities have resulted in a significantly different institution. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission. Externally, NATO has provided a sense of stability and security as it enlarged and engaged the newly democratic nations of Europe. Through partnership activities, NATO provides regional transparency, resulting in the continuation of stability that began at the end of World War Two. Internally, NATO continues developing a European identity in order to provide a more balanced relationship within the Alliance. It has established the CJTF as a means of supporting the EU in selected contingencies when the Alliance as a whole does not wish to be involved. NATO has shown great flexibility and adaptability since the end of the Cold War. It is imperative that Alliance members begin to share a common vision and an understanding of their differences. It is also critical that changes within the EU and a future constitution not limit Alliance flexibility. R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

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The Reinvention of NATO

In 1877, Lord Salisbury, commenting on Great Britain's policy on the Eastern Question, noted that "the commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcass of dead policies." (1) Salisbury was bemoaning the fact that many influential members of the British ruling class could not recognize that history had moved on; they continued to cling to policies and institutions that were relics of another era. Salisbury went on to note that the cost was enormous because this preoccupation with anachronism damaged Britain's real interests. Despite Salisbury's clever words, his observation is nothing new. Throughout Western history policymakers often have tended to rely on past realities, policies, and institutions to assess and deal with contemporary and future situations. Post-Cold War American policymakers have not been immune from falling into this trap. Indeed, this inertial approach, characterized by Washington's unbending support for NATO and its expansion, has defined American foreign and security policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world. During the Cold War, NATO provided the proper linchpin of American--and West European--security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO's time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist. Although the strong differences exhibited in the Alliance over the war against Iraq have accelerated NATO's irrelevancy, the root causes of its problems go much deeper. Consequently, for both the United States and Europe, NATO is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic to their respective contemporary security needs. The Inertial Imperative The end of the Cold War presented a problem similar to the one faced by post-World War II American leaders. A tectonic shift had occurred that required innovation, creativity, and a real understanding of the evolving world. For some experts--both in government and academia, as well as on both sides of the Atlantic--the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact called into question the need for NATO. They recognized that an era had ended and the time was ripe for a basic debate about the future of NATO and Western security policies and structures. Unfortunately, the policymakers in Washington who established the priorities for the post-Cold War era reacted quite differently from their predecessors. A small, influential coterie of policymakers in the elder Bush and then the Clinton administrations reacted reflexively and inertially, cutting off what should have been useful debate on the future. Moreover, virtually all of the officials who helped define the foreign and security policy in the Bush "41" Administration have resurfaced in the current Bush Administration. According to them, the existence and viability of NATO was not to be questioned. It was to remain basically the same successful alliance of American and European foreign and security policy that it had been since 1949. But a fundamental change was taking place in the post-Cold War security environment. In 1949, a genuine, measurable security threat justified NATO for all its members. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the inertial attachment to NATO meant that the alliance had to seek or invent reasons to justify its existence and relevance. American officials recognized the threats to the alliance. NATO needed props. Expansion into the former Warsaw Pact was one. Not only did expansion provide a whole new raison d'etre for the alliance, but--perhaps more important--it spawned a large new bureaucracy and the accompanying "busyness" that provide the lifeblood of institutions trying to justify their existence. At the same time, the theological mantra changed. Since there was no longer an enemy, NATO could not be described as a defensive alliance, it now was to be a combination of a wide-ranging political and collective security alliance. …

Steven E Meyer

Papers

Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO