Showing papers in "Parameters in 2003"

Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming

Abstract: By Jonathan Shay. Foreword by Max Cleland and John McCain. New York: Scribner, 2002. 329 pages. $25.00. Shay's first book in this duet, Achilles In Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, was remarkable both for the truths it spoke that reached beyond the theme and immediate purpose of the book, and the manner in which it reopened the continuing sore of US Army personnel management systems. In one very important sense, this new book continues the latter theme. Until I read Odysseus in America, I had only fond memories of Odysseus. Shay destroys those memories and paints a picture of a scheming, lying, self-serving conniver. So much for my classical education. But out of the wreckage of this image, Shay establishes a compelling framework for dealing with the returning combat veteran. Once again pulling from his experience as a staff psychiatrist in the Boston Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic, Dr. Shay's research rests in significant measure on his patients, Vietnam veterans with severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Last year, his work won him a position as Visiting-Scholar-at-Large at the US Naval War College. Shay raises the issue of how a soldier adapts to the requirements of war, which, by their nature, contradict those of a civil environment. Odysseus, Shay relates, demonstrates success in the practice of those traits so essential to success in battle--"cunning intelligence, deception, reconnaissance, manipulation, secrecy, spying...." How then does the soldier, having become proficient in these skills in the course of a decade-long war, readapt to civil life? Not well in the case of Odysseus, nor in the case of many veterans, according to Shay. Shay was not privy to the Army Chief of Staff's "Well-Being" study, conducted at the US Army War College in 1999, but the issues addressed in Odysseus in America fall directly in line with the general thrust of that study--that the Army is people, and caring for people ought to be one of its principal concerns. The enormously expensive Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome experiences ought to tell the Army that the cost of not taking care of soldiers during their service can result in costs that far exceed those related to preventive measures. However, Shay notes clearly that issues associated with "coming home" are more difficult for the military to recognize and treat, because "home" is not the military's realm--it is the American society's realm. "Coming home," to Shay, means societal factors like safety, acceptance, value and respect, knowing one's way, living according to pattern, being part of each other's future, and comfort. None of these is directly related to the military's realm, and it is doubtful that the military services could ever prepare returning warriors for reintegration into a hostile society such as that to which many Vietnam veterans returned. But the cost of not even trying to do something has been enormous. Shay continues to insist that the one action the military can take, first surfaced in Achilles in Vietnam, is the institutionalization of some sort of military communal act of purification. This is especially important for combat soldiers, whose moral code, even though it may still have been in a formative state, has most likely been violated in combat. …

Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning”

Abstract: We can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a "global village." Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States (during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet was used as a virtual battleground between NATO's coalition forces and elements of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface involved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups eit her aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a "cyberplanning" tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options. Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorism option--attacks against information and systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to intimidate or coerce people. (1) Cyberplanning, not defined by NPS or any other source, refers to the digital coordination of an integrated plan stretching across geographical boundaries that may or may not result in bloodshed. It can include cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan. Since 9/11, US sources have monitored several websites linked to al Qaeda that appear to contain elements of cyberplanning: * alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted information to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites, featured international news on al Qaeda, and published articles, fatwas (decisions on applying Muslim law), and books. * assam.com, believed to be linked to al Qaeda (originally hosted by the Scranton company BurstNET Technologies, Inc.), served as a mouthpiece for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine. * almuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. * qassam.net, reportedly linked to Hamas. * jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36-minute video of Osama bin Laden. (2) * 7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct computer attacks. (3) * aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious legal rulings that "justified" the terrorist attacks, and support for the al Qaeda cause. (4) * drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center (which some allege is a fake center), and reported to be the most credible of dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news. * jehad.net, alsaha.com, and islammemo.com, alleged to have posted al Qaeda statements on their websites. * mwhoob.net and aljehad.online, alleged to have flashed political-religious songs, with pictures of persecuted Muslims, to denounce US policy and Arab leaders, notably Saudi. (5) While it is prudent to tally the Internet cyberplanning applications that support terrorists, it must be underscored that few if any of these measures are really anything new. …

Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success

Abstract: "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." --Carl von Clausewitz (1) "If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war." --B. H. Liddell Hart (2) It is always easier to get into a conflict than to get out of one. In 1956, for example, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden with French Premier Guy Mollet planned to unseat President Nasser of Egypt and reduce his influence in the region by a combined and coordinated British, French, and Israeli military operation. The French and British leadership conducted detailed, thorough planning to ensure that the costs and risks were reduced to an acceptable minimum. In violation of Clausewitz's guidance above, however, the operation was launched without a good idea about termination and what the post-conflict situation would look like. What if landing on the Suez Canal at Port Said and Port Fuad did not force Nasser to step down? Were France and Britain then willing to march on Cairo? Would they have international support for such a move? If they seized Cairo, what would the new Egyptian government look like? Could it stay in power without keeping British and French troops in Egypt for years to come? Would the British and French have world opinion on their side for such an occupation? In the event, Israel launched the attack and British and French forces landed on the Suez Canal. But the operation did not turn out as planned. The United States and Soviets, along with world opinion, forced the British and French to withdraw. President Nasser, rather than being defeated, became the victor and the leader of the Arab cause, while the British and the French lost prestige and influence. How could rational decisionmakers get it so wrong? (3) This article examines the doctrinal basis for conflict termination planning and provides suggestions and approaches for greater success. Fundamentals Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of conflict. US doctrine holds that the goal of military operations is to set conditions that compel belligerents' decisionmakers to end hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. US joint doctrine and NATO doctrine state: "If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the adversary from renewing hostilities.... When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare." (4) The definition focuses on conflict termination, not conflict resolution. The military fight may stop without the causes of the conflict being resolved. Current joint doctrine thus recognizes that although coercive military operations may end, the conflict may continue under other means such as terrorism, insurgency, cyber war, economic disruptions, political actions, or acts of civil disobedience. Although the military may be engaged in a "post-conflict" peace operation, the belligerents may continue their struggle using these other means. This was definitely the case in Kosovo and is currently the case in Afghanistan, where the military is engaged in stability operations in the midst of conflict. Even in Iraq, where the coalition military victory is unquestioned, the post-conflict situation remains unsettled. Conflict termination and resolution clearly are not the same thing. Conflict resolution is a long process. It is primarily a civil problem that may require military support. Through advantageous conflict termination, however, the military can set the conditions for successful conflict resolution. …

Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare

Abstract: "Bad terminology is the enemy of good thinking" Warren Buffett (1) In the last few years the use of nerve agent in the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda's offensive leading to its 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon forced us to reevaluate the threat of terrorism to our art of operations As a term of art, asymmetric warfare now dominates public attention But many use the term with little understanding of its operational meaning In this new strategic environment we had best heed the admonition of Mr Buffett, the Sage of Omaha, and agree on a set of definitions that will provide our tools for analysis In preempting the terrorist are we really dealing with asymmetry, or is something else at work? Thinking of the threat as only asymmetric misses the mark, especially if we have the concept wrong The combination of asymmetry and the terrorists' ability continually to devise idiosyncratic approaches presents our real challenge Assessing the distinction and interrelationship between these two factors provides us with the initial understanding requ ired to address the operational challenges Asymmetry means the absence of a common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operational terms, a capability Idiosyncrasy has a different connotation--possessing a peculiar or eccentric pattern In a military sense, idiosyncrasy connotes an unorthodox approach or means of applying a capability, one that does not follow the rules and is peculiar in a sinister sense Actually, al Qaeda's overall strategy is not new In the 11th and 12th centuries the Assassins, a militarily weak fundamentalist and extremist sect, used pinpoint killing to bring more powerful ruling groups to heel Indoctrinating their young followers into an extreme and enthusiastic cult of Shiite Islam, they sent individuals and small teams out to infiltrate the inner circles of targeted leaders These zealots worked their way into the retinue of the targeted official by gaining trusted status as a groom, guard, or servant When close enough to the target and with no regard for their own survival, they murdered their prey with the dagger given them by their leader The Assassins even managed to threaten Sal al Din the Kurd, the commander who drove the Crusaders out of Palestine After Sal al Din's mail shirt foiled the first attempt, while on campaign a wooden tower was built in his camp to provide him a safe resting place For the Assassins, dying in the attempt mattered not, since their ascension into p aradise was assured (2) Sound familiar? Today, only the mechanism of attack has changed Dispatching individuals or small teams with a mission to painstakingly infiltrate and develop an opportunity for attack remains a part of al Qaeda's technique Instead of penetrating the structures within the palace of the ruler or the retinue of followers in the camp of a general, terrorist agents now weave their slow, purposeful way through international systems of education, commerce, and travel, accessing the fabric of democratic societies and exploiting our freedom of movement, information systems, protection of civil rights, and the general laxness in our public security Instead of a dagger, al Qaeda's infiltrators began with explosives and then discovered how to reverse-engineer the technological mechanisms of modern society in highly destructive and murderous ways Given our societal dependence on interconnected, technologically intensive systems, al Qaeda used asymmetric means to cleverly develop idiosyncratic attacks on its targets, thus changing our operational and strategic environment History of Asymmetric Warfare To isolate al Qaeda's true advantage, we should begin with a look at the historical roots of asymmetric warfare Military affairs are replete with campaigns won by forces with capabilities similar, though different by degree, to those of their opponents …

War and the Art of Governance

Abstract: "Power is one thing. The problem of how to administer it is another." (1) --Douglas MacArthur On 9 April 2003, jubilant crowds and US troops toppled the statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad and drew down the curtain on the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Within hours of the liberation of Baghdad, amid spreading disorder and growing expectations, debate began over the reconstruction challenges ahead. Criticism and frustration with the chaos on the ground intensified over the apparent failure of the United States to plan adequately for the restoration of political and economic order once major combat operations had ended. The root of Washington's failure to anticipate the political disorder in Iraq rests precisely in the characterization of these challenges as "postwar" problems, a characterization used by virtually all analysts inside and outside of government. The Iraq situation is only the most recent example of the reluctance of civilian and military leaders, as well as most outside experts, to consider the establishment of political and economic order as a part of war itself. The point is not academic. It is central to any effective reconstruction strategy in future wars and has profound implications for the military's planning, command arrangements, and implementation of current and future governance operations. (2) Military and political leaders need to distinguish between governance operations, which are a core element of all wars, and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war. Labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the creation of a favorable political order, a process overseen and administered by US military forces--usually the Army. The United States entered virtually all of its wars with the assumption that the government of the opposing regime would change or that the political situation would shift to favor US interests. During the Spanish-American War, we sought to change the governments of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and succeeded. During the Civil War, Washington was determined to change the way the South was governed. In Panama in 1989, the United States ousted Manuel Noriega, and the war did not end until the regime against which US forces had fought was out of power and political stability had resumed. In virtually all contingencies, political leaders in Washington conceded that only US military forces were up to the task of overseeing and implementing this final aspect of war. Arguably, the 2003 war in Iraq is rooted in the most prominent recent case where the political order did not change--the 1991 Gulf War. Some top Defense Department leaders have called the 2003 war a logical conclusion to the 1991 campaign. President Bush's early concerns, which emerged during his presidential campaign, about the involvement of US military forces in nation-building and peace operations stemmed from his desire to avoid overextending American resources and commitments. (3) A clear distinction between governance operations that are integral to war and the myriad of missions referred to in the peace operations discourse would be hugely beneficial. Such a distinction would allow US defense planners to focus on the political and economic reconstruction that is a part of war, while relegating humanitarian and nation-building missions to other organizations. Moreover, equating the governance tasks that occur in all wars with the broader missions associated with peace operations and humanitarian assistance reinforces the tendency to avoid planning for governance operations in tandem with planning for combat operations. The essential point is this: Combat operations and governance operations are both integral to war and occur in tandem. US soldiers in Iraq today are wondering why, if "the war is supposed to be over, we are still being shot at. …

Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?

Abstract: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity? AARON BELKIN © 2003 Aaron Belkin T en years ago, President Bill Clinton, the US Congress, and much of the na- tion were swept up in a monumental debate on whether or not acknowledged gays and lesbians would be allowed to serve in the US military. Having promised in his campaign to extend this civil right to gays and lesbians, Clinton faced a dif- ficult challenge when he attempted to fulfill his pledge, opposed as he was by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prominent members of Congress, like Senator Sam Nunn. In spite of their opposition, Clinton pressed on, and on 29 January 1993, he suspended the former policy that banned gay and lesbian personnel from service outright. Initiated by President Carter and implemented by President Reagan, this policy had been under attack by gay and lesbian military personnel since its inception as discriminatory, 1 and Clinton intended to formulate a new policy that would be more tolerant of sexual minorities in the US military and preserve mili- tary effectiveness. 2 Over the next six months, Congress held numerous hearings on this issue and ultimately included a new policy on homosexual soldiers in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 3 Billed by many as a compromise, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” has been the subject of much criticism by both experts and activists, who view it as an im- perfect solution to the problem it tried to solve ten years ago. 4 In many ways, it was a politically expedient policy that pleased no one, and on its ten-year anni- versary, perhaps it deserves to be revisited and evaluated in light of the impres- sive amount of evidence that scholars and experts have gathered about this issue in the interim. Parameters

The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq

Abstract: The Bush Administration issued its first National Security Strategy in September 2002, a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States by al Qaeda. The document's Chapter V summarizes the Administration's approach to using force, known as the Bush Doctrine. It essentially reiterates, in four pages, presidential statements made over the months following 9/11, including the President's speeches before a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001, before the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on 6 November, his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, his remarks before the student body of the Virginia Military Institute on 17 April, and his address to the graduating class at the US Military Academy at West Point on 1 June. The Bush Administration now has in place a clear, declaratory use-of-force policy whose objective is stated in Chapter V's title: "Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction." This article identifies and examines the Bush Doctrine's major tenets, and then assesses the doctrine's strengths and weaknesses within the context of the Administration's prospective attack on Iraq. The Threat The Bush Doctrine rests on a definition of the threat based upon what it sees as the combination of "radicalism and technology"--specifically, political and religious extremism joined by the availability of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In his West Point speech, President Bush declared: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology--when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. (1) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has subsequently and repeatedly spoken of the emergence of a "nexus between terrorist networks, terrorist states, and weapons of mass destruction... that can make mighty adversaries of small or impoverished states and even relatively small groups of individuals." (2) The Bush Doctrine identifies three threat agents: terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbor and assist such terrorist organizations, and rogue states. Al Qaeda and the Taliban's Afghanistan embody the first two agents. Rogue states are defined as states that: ...brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes; sponsor terrorism around the globe; and reject human values and hate the United States and everything it stands for. (3) The key attributes are regime aggressiveness and the search for WMD, especially nuclear weapons, which are far more efficient engines of mass slaughter than chemical and biological weapons. (4) This definition of rogue states seems to be modeled on Iraq, although Iran is a much greater purveyor of international terrorism, and North Korea, the third "axis of evil" state, is believed to have already acquired nuclear weapons capacity. North Korea has, however, pursued a foreign policy of moderation in recent years, at least until its October 2002 confession that it had resumed its nuclear weapons program in contravention of a 1994 agreement to suspend it. The Bush Administration has nonetheless sought a diplomatic solution via the enlistment of pressure from Tokyo and Beijing on Pyongyang. There has been no talk of war against North Korea, even though Pyongyang has a far more advanced nuclear program than Iraq's, and even though Kim Jong Il is, if anything, more unpredictable than Saddam Hussein. …

Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy

Abstract: By Bharat Karnad. (New Delhi, India: MacMillan India Limited, 2002). 724 pages. $37.50. For at least three reasons, this will be a most valuable book for anyone concerned about the nuclear confrontation in South Asia. To begin, the author was a member of India's first National Security Advisory Board, and was involved in the development of the 1999 Nuclear Draft Doctrine (included as an appendix in the book); he is today one of the more visible younger defense analysts in New Delhi. In this massive work, Karnad presents an analysis that many other Indians of his generation, will share on the current nuclear choices as India faces Pakistan, China, and the world, and on what the tradition of Gandhi and Nehru might mean for all this. It is an analysis that is unabashedly "realist" in its stress on national power and national self-interest, and that calls on India to do more rather than less in terms of acquiring nuclear weapons. If any outsider thinks that India will be guided by memories of Gandhi's nonviolence and Nehru's neutralism, this book serves as a valuable antidote, as it interprets such earlier approaches as merely effective tactical stratagems, not to be mistaken for absolute principle. Its interpretation, locked into a "realist" power-politics perspective, of these two great men of Indian history, and of other principal figures, is a mixture of the complimentary and quite derogatory. Gandhi and Nehru are seen as having developed formulas well-suited to the British or the third-world prejudices of the moment, and thus advanced Indian interests for a time, but formulas which these great figures and other Indian leaders made the mistake of taking too seriously over the longer term, treating such principles as absolutes. The author thus explicitly brings to the surface what many of his countrymen may now feel, and the book would be worth reading merely as an update on how informed Indian policymakers, and ordinary Indian citizens, see the international security question today. Second, the author offers an enormous amount of detail and anecdote about the various stages of the Indian nuclear decision process since the 1950s, pulling together all the published Western and Indian literature on the subject, but importantly adding in a great many observations based on interviews. As is always the case with such interview research, some of the descriptions and judgments on the historical events will be controversial, but anyone else writing his own book on Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon developments will have to contend with what is presented in this work. There are sections on the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, arguing, based on outside-world analyses and interviews within India, that such tests were not nearly sufficient to put India on the road to reliable nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. …

Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Rise of China: Regional Security after 9/11

Abstract: Napoleon Bonaparte once described China as a sleeping dragon and warned not to wake it up. Now that China has awakened, it causes many nations to tremble--including the United States, the sole global power and the world's preeminent policeman. The unprecedented rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a global reality. From one of the world's least developed countries in the 1970s, China had developed one of the largest economies in the world by the late 1990s. (1) The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that from 1979 to 1997, China's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 9.8 percent. (2) This phenomenal economic growth has spilled over to China's defense budget, with military spending rising to 17.6 percent of China's outlays, an equivalent of $3 billion in March 2002 alone. (3) Because of the burgeoning economic and military power of China, there are enormous worries about the idea of a "China threat." The United States has particularly expressed strong apprehensions regarding the ascension of China. The US Commission on National Security/2 1st Century warns that "the potential for competition between the United States and China may increase as China grows stronger." (4) Even the Global Trends 2015 prepared under the direction of the US National Intelligence Council argues that the implications of the rise of China "pose the greatest uncertainty" in the world. (5) The Commission on America's National Interests describes China as "America's major potential strategic adversary in East Asia," (6) while the Council on Foreign Relations has stated that "China poses significant economic, military, and political challenges for the United States and for the nations of Southeast Asia." (7) This theme is supported by a RAND study describing China as a potential military threat to the United States and Southeast Asia. (8) While the United States views China as a potential threat to its national security, how do Southeast Asian countries view the rise of China? What are the implications of the growth of China for regional security, especially in the aftermath of 9/11? This article aims to present Southeast Asian perspectives on the rise of China and its regional security implications since 9/11. Southeast Asian Perspectives Taken individually, Southeast Asian countries have varying perspectives on the many ramifications of strategic issues in the region. (9) Unlike some Western countries, however, Southeast Asian nations, taken as a whole, consider the rise of China as a great opportunity, with concomitant security challenges, rather than as a serious threat. From an economic standpoint, Rodolfo Severino, former Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), candidly describes China and ASEAN as "partners in competition." (10) There is also a widespread perception in Southeast Asia that "China will be the new engine of growth for the entire region." (11) In a report submitted by the ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic Cooperation in October 2001, Southeast Asia optimistically views China as an economic opportunity. The Expert Group has, in fact, proposed the forging of closer ASEAN-China economic relations in the 21st century to integrate their economies. (12) Recognizing the economic potential that China may bring to Southeast Asia, one important recommendation of the Expert Group is the establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The group views ACFTA as "an important move forward in terms of economic integration in East Asia," as well as "a foundation for the more ambitious vision of an East Asia Free Trade Area, encompassing ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea." (13) The group suggests that "the realization of a China-ASEAN free trade zone agreement indicates that historical feuds and political clashes between ASEAN member states and the PRC are no longer one of the most important factors influencing ASEAN-PRC relations. …

Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare

Abstract: "We have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenge us." -- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1) Both current and past senior civilian defense officials reportedly have grown increasingly frustrated with the conventional mindset of many strategic-level military officers. In their view, too many senior leaders are too cautious, lacking the "fresh thinking, creativity, and ingenuity" to engage in the "out-of-the-box" thinking required to fully understand the new asymmetric (2) threats and challenges posed by the global war on terrorism. (3) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a speech delivered at National Defense University on 31 January 2002, made clear that in his view, "The future will require us to think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances." (4) General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also recently noted how al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have "made lots of adaptations to our tactics and we've got to continue to ... try to out-think them and to be faster at it." (5) At the heart of the issue is whether and how the operational art and leadership attributes differ, if at all, in symmetric versus asymmetric approaches to warfare. The conceptual underpinning of these statements and criticisms also raises significant questions about whether asymmetric warfare (6) poses unique challenges for strategic leaders or whether it more appropriately requires time-tested leadership competencies applied with more creativity and risk-taking. The answers to these important questions would seem to hold great significance for strategic leaders' readiness and the leadership competencies needed for asymmetric warfare. This article seeks to identify the adaptive linkages that exist between strategic leader competencies and the mental readiness (7) for asymmetric and more conventional warfare. Fortunately, the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz seem to offer a framework to help guide the needed adaptation in strategic leader thinking with regard to asymmetric approaches to warfare. (8) An identification of these characteristics in the writings of both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz offers the opportunity to adapt their concepts to the present and anticipated challenges of asymmetric approaches to warfare. However, it is also important to recognize that while "asymmetry is important to strategy... not everything is asymmetry." (9) Conventional Leaders and Asymmetric Warfare It is unfortunate that so-called "conventional warriors" (10) are finding both their relevance and adaptability being challenged because of asymmetric warfare. At its core, this issue raises the question of whether conventional warriors can effectively lead in unconventional (i.e., asymmetric) wars. (11) For some, the answer to this important question will seem obvious. They will intuitively sense and view asymmetric approaches to warfare as counterinsurgency once was viewed, as "secondary or peripheral to conventional threats." (12) However, "conventional" and "symmetrical" are often seen as synonymous, since by definition symmetrical refers to instances when "our force and the enemy force are similar (e.g., land versus land)." (13) For many, this similarity implies predictable, and denying that predictability lies at the heart of asymmetric approaches. This is no small matter given the various adjectives used to describe the current national security environment: uncertain, dynamic, fluid, unpredictable, unknown, turbulent, asymmetric, and complex. (14) Identifying and finding ways for strategic leaders to bridge and "leverage" the leadership competencies required in symmetrical scenarios to apply them effectively in asymmetrical warfare could have important implications for strategic leader training, development, and doctrine. …

Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO

Abstract: In 1877, Lord Salisbury, commenting on Great Britain's policy on the Eastern Question, noted that "the commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcass of dead policies." (1) Salisbury was bemoaning the fact that many influential members of the British ruling class could not recognize that history had moved on; they continued to cling to policies and institutions that were relics of another era. Salisbury went on to note that the cost was enormous because this preoccupation with anachronism damaged Britain's real interests. Despite Salisbury's clever words, his observation is nothing new. Throughout Western history policymakers often have tended to rely on past realities, policies, and institutions to assess and deal with contemporary and future situations. Post-Cold War American policymakers have not been immune from falling into this trap. Indeed, this inertial approach, characterized by Washington's unbending support for NATO and its expansion, has defined American foreign and security policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world. During the Cold War, NATO provided the proper linchpin of American--and West European--security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO's time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist. Although the strong differences exhibited in the Alliance over the war against Iraq have accelerated NATO's irrelevancy, the root causes of its problems go much deeper. Consequently, for both the United States and Europe, NATO is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic to their respective contemporary security needs. The Inertial Imperative The end of the Cold War presented a problem similar to the one faced by post-World War II American leaders. A tectonic shift had occurred that required innovation, creativity, and a real understanding of the evolving world. For some experts--both in government and academia, as well as on both sides of the Atlantic--the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact called into question the need for NATO. They recognized that an era had ended and the time was ripe for a basic debate about the future of NATO and Western security policies and structures. Unfortunately, the policymakers in Washington who established the priorities for the post-Cold War era reacted quite differently from their predecessors. A small, influential coterie of policymakers in the elder Bush and then the Clinton administrations reacted reflexively and inertially, cutting off what should have been useful debate on the future. Moreover, virtually all of the officials who helped define the foreign and security policy in the Bush "41" Administration have resurfaced in the current Bush Administration. According to them, the existence and viability of NATO was not to be questioned. It was to remain basically the same successful alliance of American and European foreign and security policy that it had been since 1949. But a fundamental change was taking place in the post-Cold War security environment. In 1949, a genuine, measurable security threat justified NATO for all its members. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the inertial attachment to NATO meant that the alliance had to seek or invent reasons to justify its existence and relevance. American officials recognized the threats to the alliance. NATO needed props. Expansion into the former Warsaw Pact was one. Not only did expansion provide a whole new raison d'etre for the alliance, but--perhaps more important--it spawned a large new bureaucracy and the accompanying "busyness" that provide the lifeblood of institutions trying to justify their existence. At the same time, the theological mantra changed. Since there was no longer an enemy, NATO could not be described as a defensive alliance, it now was to be a combination of a wide-ranging political and collective security alliance. …

The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam

Abstract: Terrorism and society; Terrorism and society/Racial and ethnic relations; Terrorism and society/Religion and belief; Terrorism and society/Social and cultural policies

An Alternative Future Force: Building a Better Army

Abstract: Recent operations in Iraq highlight the need for the Army's leadership to rethink major aspects of its transformation strategy. While the three-week period of combat operations that toppled the regime illuminates one set of implications, the continued and contested postwar operations illuminate another. Furthermore, the insights emerging from Iraq are not isolated, but part of a growing body of operational knowledge gleaned from post-Cold War operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In the light of this decade of hard-won experience, it seems that the Army's transformation concept rests on a set of major assumptions which should be questioned. This article examines some of those assumptions and suggests an alternative pathway for preparing US ground forces to meet the challenges of the next several decades. The Objective Force The intent of the Army's Transformation Plan is to transform the Army into a generally homogenous force--the Objective Force, now termed the Future Force--equipped with advanced technology medium-weight combat vehicles (less than 20 tons) that will allow it to have battlefield effectiveness similar to today's heavy forces. In this sense, homogeneity implies that multiple types of divisions and brigades of the current Army (heavy, light, airborne, air assault) will merge into one uniform type--although apparently the Army is still considering the possibility that the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) divisions may remain unique organizations. In October 1999, General Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, articulated a vision whose laudable goal was to make the Army more strategically relevant. Since that time, an Army Transformation Plan has evolved centered around the creation of a new generation of fighting vehicles based on a common platform, the Future Combat Systems (FCS), and a new organization where brigades, divisions, and corps are replaced by Units of Action (UA) and Units of Employment (UE). General Shinseki also laid out an ambitious schedule under which the FCS "system of systems," with its proposed array of manned and unmanned combat vehicles and associated situational awareness technologies, would be developed by the early years of the next decade. The first operational UA, roughly equivalent in size to a current brigade, would appear around 2012, followed by approximately two maneuver brigades converted to the Objective Force design each year thereafter. Current Army plans assume that the combat elements of the Army National Guard also would be transformed by 2030. The principal design constraint on the Future Combat Systems is weight. The requirement that the FCS weigh between 16 and 18 tons has two origins. First is the goal of creating an Army that is strategically more responsive than today's heavy forces but more capable than today's rapidly deployable light forces. Second, the Army wants to give the Objective Force the capability to conduct "air mechanized" maneuver via tactical airlift, initially by the C-130 and in the future by a follow-on system that is either a very short take-off and landing, fixed-wing aircraft or a heavy-lift rotary-wing aircraft, the Air Maneuver Transport (AMT). (1) To realize this operational airmechanized maneuver capability, potentially deep in an enemy's rear areas, the Future Combat Systems can weigh no more than 16 to 18 tons. (2) The Army is resorting to an array of approaches to squeeze weight out of the force structure. Instead of relying on heavy armor for protection, the Army is postulating a combination of high-technology protective measures and situational awareness to protect the FCS combat vehicles. Second, it is slimming down the supporting logistical structure by exploiting hybrid engine technology so that the FCS family will demand far less logistical support for large-scale military campaigns at both transoceanic (strategic) and regional (operational) distances. …

Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization

Abstract: Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated, or should have demonstrated, that joint warfighting--that is, the synergistic application of the unique capabilities of each service so that the net result is a capability that is greater than the sum of the parts--is not just the mantra of the Department of Defense, but is, in fact, a reality. Nevertheless, as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom was, the department might take the concept of joint operations to still another level. If Operation Iraqi Freedom provided the observer with glimpses of innovative, task-organized units such as the Army's elite Delta Force special missions unit working with a platoon of M1 Abrams main battle tanks and close air support, we still see a segmentation of the battlespace that creates unnatural seams, inhibiting the full potential of a joint force. How does this square with future joint operational concepts? Can the current architecture of joint force command and control arrangements react responsively and effectively to the threat environment that exists today and will likely confront our forces in the future? Is there a better way? In this article, we will explore those questions as we look at alternative joint force architectures that might better unleash the full capability of the Department of Defense. The Paths to Military Innovation In simple terms, states prepare their militaries for the future by reworking, reequipping, or redesigning their forces to better meet their security needs, to develop decisive means, or to ensure their competitive lead in military capabilities. "Transformation" is the pursuit of such an increase in military capability, and the DOD's Transformation Planning Guidance tells us that it is a "strategic imperative" for the US military to transform. The Transformation Planning Guidance defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position." (1) Each of the four components of transformation can be seen as a path or axis along which one might proceed toward military innovation, either separately or in conjunction with a journey down one or more of the other paths. In order to put our discussion within a broader framework, each of the paths bears closer examination at the outset of this article. * Concepts. New operational concepts seek to create synergies between the aerospace, ground, and maritime forces. The development of the blitzkrieg doctrine of rapid mechanized warfare supported by close air support is the oft-cited prime example of a new operational concept. * Capabilities. In a limited sense, new capabilities derive from new technologies. Clearly, technology plays a pivotal role in military transformation. The arrival of the tank and FM radio transformed the battlefield (which in turn enabled the development of the transformational blitzkrieg concept), and nuclear weapons completely changed the face of warfare. Today, advances in precision strike weapons and information technology have enabled the military to do things never before contemplated. Indeed, the destruction of a regime no longer requires the destruction of a society. Technology plays a key role in many of the service transformation visions, from the Air Force's super-stealthy F-22 fighter to the Army's future combat system and the Navy's effort to transform ballistic-missile submarines into land-attack platforms. * People. One aspect of transformation is learning to use the complex technologies properly. It is not enough to present new technology and simply instruct service members in the technical operation of the new systems. Blending the skill and experience of high-quality people with functional technology is what produces a gain in combat capability, and the continual process of assessing, recruiting, and retaining those people will require a transformation in the way the Defense Department approaches personnel challenges. …

Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary

Abstract: "A [military] philosophy grows from the minds and hearts, social mores and customs, traditions and environment of a people. It is the product of national and racial attributes, geography, the nature of a potential enemy threat, standards of living and national traditions, influenced and modified by great military philosophers, like Clausewitz and Mahan, and by great national leaders like Napoleon." (1) "The major risk of a big-war predilection is that the US Army will retain the thinking, infrastructure, and forces appropriate for a large-scale war that may not materialize while failing to properly adapt itself to conduct simultaneous smaller engagements of the type that seem to be occurring with increasing frequency." (2) Those quotations highlight the salience of military culture as an influence on how military institutions perceive and conduct war. Military culture as an explanation of behavior may be particularly relevant to the US Army now because the Army is transforming, is still engaged in a small counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan, and is currently engaged in stability operations to counter terrorist and subversive paramilitary elements and thugs who use guerrilla hit-and-run tactics against coalition forces in Iraq. In short, military culture comprises the beliefs and attitudes within a military organization that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force. These attitudes can impede or foster innovation and adaptation, and military culture sometimes exhibits preferences for big wars in favor of small wars. This article discusses one characteristic of US military culture that since the end of the 19th century has had a profound influence on how the American military views the nexus between politics and war. This characteristic is the Uptonian paradox, named so because Emory Upton's influence on American military thought contributed to the following contradiction: the US Army has embraced Clausewitz as the quintessential oracle of war, but it has also tended to distance itself from Clausewitz's overarching theme--the linkage of the military instrument to political purposes. To be sure, the propensity of 19th- and early 20th-century Western militaries to divorce the military sphere from the political sphere was not solely Uptonian--this inclination stemmed at first from the widespread influence of Jomini, whose work was more influential than Clausewitz's for most of the 19th century. In Upton's writings, however, he strengthened the tendency to separate the civil and military spheres by advocating minimal civilian control to maximize military effectiveness. (3) A similar phenomenon, engendering similar tendencies, manifested itself after the Vietnam War. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the US military underwent an intellectual and professional renaissance after hitting its nadir at the end of the Vietnam War. This renaissance displayed an Uptonian character because it refocused the Army exclusively on the big-war paradigm, eschewed several studies that captured the true lessons of Vietnam, and embraced a book sponsored by the Army War College that asserted the US military failed in Vietnam not because it didn't adapt to counterinsurgency, but because it didn't fight that war conventionally enough. Consequently, the big-war-only school was ultimately codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine--a prescription for the use of force that essentially proscribes anything other than conventional war. This article postulates that the Uptonian paradox remains an important influence on the US military and is shown in two tendencies: the inclination to separate the military and political domains after a war begins, and the tendency of the US military to prescribe its preferred paradigm for war to its civilian leadership. Regular Army officers of the late 19th and early 20th centuries viewed Emory Upton, whose ideas included an unconcealed contempt for civilian control of the military, as a warrior prophet. …

North Korea's Military Strategy

Abstract: Simply put, military strategies derive from national strategies intended to achieve goals and conditions that satisfy national interests. Military strategies reflect capabilities vis-a-vis potential opponents, resource constraints, and desired end states. North Korea is no different; its military strategy is a reflection of Pyongyang's national goals. Military strategies also reflect what one might call "cultural rules of engagement"; i.e., they are based on the socially constructed views unique to the nation. (1) Pyongyang's Foremost National Goal Historically, Pyongyang's foremost goal has been the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms. The regime's constitution describes reunification as "the supreme national task," (2) and it remains a consistently pervasive theme in North Korean media. However, despite what the North Koreans have continued to tell us for the past five decades, outside observers and specialists differ greatly over exactly what North Korea's goals really are. Since at least the mid-1990s, there has been a widespread view among Korea observers that, because of severe economic decline, food shortages, and related problems, regime survival has replaced reunification as Pyongyang's most pressing objective. (3) Further, these observers argue, despite its rhetoric, North Korea realizes that reunification through conquest of South Korea is no longer possible. (4) There are also some who argue that the North Korean leadership has recognized the need to initiate substantial change in order to survive in the international community and is embarking on economic reform, reconciliation with South Korea, and reduction of military tensions. In addition to the goals of regime survival, reform, and reconciliation, there is another explanatory view of North Korea's foremost national goal that has been held by a minority of observers for several decades (and has been a consistent theme of North Korean media)--defense against foreign invasion by "imperialist aggressors and their lac key running dogs." (5) Adherents of this view believe that the North Korean leadership genuinely fears an attack by the United States and South Korea and maintains a strong military purely for defense. (6) President Bush's reference to the "axis of evil" in his January 2002 State of the Union address, announcement of plans to adopt a "pre-emptive" military strategy, and increasing numbers of statements by Administration officials about US intentions to employ military force to remove Iraq's Saddam Hussein from power have added support to the "defense" explanation. Some have also argued that enhancement of the military by Kim Jong II (7) serves primarily to strengthen his domestic political power base. While there is an obvious element of truth in this proposition, it is an oversimplification that distorts the true role of military strength in the regime. Others accept North Korea's word that reunification remains the primary goal and argue that Pyongyang's long-term strategy to dominate the peninsula by any means has not changed. They cite North Korea's continued focus of scarce resources to the military, (8) development of longer-range ballistic missiles, and the recent revelation by Pyongyang that it seeks a nuclear weapons capability9 as indications that reunification remains the foremost goal. The preponderance of evidence clearly supports the conclusion that reunification under the leadership of Kim Jong II, by whatever means, remains "the supreme national task." North Korean media rhetoric continues to extol reunification under Kim. A parallel but closely related theme is that of completing the socialist revolution. When North Korean leaders speak of achieving "socialist revolution in our country," they mean unification of the entire peninsula on their terms. (10) The Kim regime in North Korea considers the entire peninsula as constituting its sovereign territory. It does not recognize South Korea as being a separate nation, nor the government of South Korea as legitimate. …

S. L. A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios

Abstract: The findings of journalist-soldier S. L. A. Marshall about combat fire ratios--particularly that in World War II less than 25 percent of American combat infantrymen in battle fired their weapons--have been controversial since Marshall published them in his 1947 book, Men Against Fire. (1) He continued to apply his methodology--the after-action, group interview with enlisted men--during the Korean War, where he concluded that more than half the front-line soldiers were firing their weapons. In the past 20 years, Marshall's controversial figures have come under more intensive attack, in part because, after his death in 1977, his papers did not include statistical analyses or more than a couple of the field notebooks produced during group interviews. (2) Yet Marshall continues to have supporters as well as detractors, and the controversy rages on, fueled by emotional beliefs, individual vested interests, missing documents, and absent statistics. (3) One of the key questions concerns where Marshall obtained his figures about the ratio of fire, the proportion of a rifle unit firing its weapons in battle. Marshall claimed it was derived from his group after-action interviews, a method he developed as a field historian in World War II and which as a civilian journalist, Reserve officer, and military consultant, he employed and advocated for use by the US Army and later by the Israeli Defense Force. Although the ratio-of-fire figure was his most famous product, Marshall was proudest of his methodology--informal, open-ended, group interviews of enlisted personnel, as soon as possible after a particular combat action, to learn about the actual behavior of the soldiers in battle. Timing was sometimes but not always on his side. In the Pacific in November 1943, he was with G.I.'s when a forward unit at Makin Island in the Gilberts sustained a Japanese counterattack at night, and Marshall could interview American survivors the next day. But in the European Theater of Operations the following year, he was not able to interview the combat troops involved in the Normandy Invasion in June 1944 until several weeks afterward. (4) In each case, however, he would interview the men and, he said, take contemporaneous notes and later write up his report on the action. The following oral history provides some fresh insights into Marshall's methodology and findings. It also raises troubling questions about the reliability of Marshall's statistics on fire ratios. The oral history comes from a citizen-soldier, Frank J. Brennan, Jr., now a retired high school and community college history instructor and administrator. As a young junior officer in Korea in 1953, Brennan accompanied S. L. A. Marshall on some of the journalist's after-action group interviews along the Main Line of Resistance, including the Battle of Pork Chop Hill. A native of New Brunswick, New Jersey, Brennan graduated from Rutgers in the spring of 1951 with a B.A. in journalism. Having completed ROTC, he received a commission as a second lieutenant in the infantry. After additional training, including Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia (where Marshall's Men Against Fire was among the required reading), and in Japan, he arrived in Korea in May 1952, assigned to the 7th Infantry Division, a Regular Army division that had been fighting in Korea since September 1950. Lieutenant Brennan was sent to the front line with the 32d Infantry Regiment in the 7th Infantry Division's central sector near the 38th Parallel. For six weeks on the line, he served as a rifle platoon leader. His unit was engaged in patrols and in repelling attacks on its position along the Main Line of Resistance. Perhaps partly because of his journalism degree, Brennan was assigned to G-3 (Operations) at Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division, in late July 1952. He was subsequently promoted to first lieutenant. At G-3, Brennan's main responsibility was to prepare the monthly reports of the division's activity and send them directly to Washington, D. …

The Atlantic Century

Abstract: Throughout the previous decade, strategists and statesmen asserted that we were about to enter the "Pacific Century. Global power and wealth would shift to East Asia. American interests, power, and investments would follow. The Atlantic would become a dead sea strategically, its littoral states and their continents declining to marginal status. Economic opportunities, crucial alliances, and the gravest threats would rise in the east, as surely as the morning sun. An alternative view of the evidence suggests that the experts were wrong. Although the United States will remain engaged in the Far East--as well as in the Middle East, Europe, and nearly everywhere else--the great unexplored opportunities for human advancement, fruitful alliances, strategic cooperation, and creating an innovative, just, and mutually beneficial international order still lie on the shores of the Atlantic. The difference is that the potential for future development lies not across the North Atlantic in "Old Europe," but on both sides of the South Atlantic, in Africa and Latin America. Especially since 9/11, the deteriorating civilization of the Middle East has demanded our attention. But we must avoid a self-defeating strategic fixation on the Arab Muslim world and self-destructive states nearby. Any signs of progress in the Middle East will be welcome, but the region overall is fated to remain an inexhaustible source of disappointments. While Africa suffers from an undeserved reputation for hopelessness (often a matter of racism couched in diplomatic language) and Latin America is dismissed as a backwater, the aggressive realms of failure in the Middle East always get the benefit of the doubt. When the United States places a higher priority on relations with Egypt than on those with Mexico or Brazil, and when Jordan attracts more of our attention than does South Africa, our foreign policy lacks common sense as much as it does foresight. Our obsession with the Middle East is not just about oil. It's about intellectual habit. We assign unparalleled strategic importance to the survival of the repugnant Saudi regime because that's the way we've been doing things for half a century, despite the complete absence of political, cultural, or elementary human progress on the Arabian Peninsula. Certainly, the United States has genuine strategic interests between the Nile and the Indus, and the threats from the region's apocalyptic terrorists and rogue regimes are as deadly as they are likely to be enduring. But we must stop pretending there is a bright, magical solution for the darkest region on earth, if only we Americans could discover the formula. The Middle East will remain a strategic basket case beyond our lifetimes. We will need to remain engaged, but we must be careful not to be consumed. If you are looking for hope, look elsewhere. Apart from crisis intervention and measured support for any promising regimes that may emerge in the region (such as, perhaps, an independent, democratic Kurdistan), we need to begin shifting our practical as well as our emotional commitments away from the Middle East--and even away from Europe and northeast Asia--in order to help Africa and Latin America begin to realize their enormous strategic potential. Our past lies to the east and west, but our future lies to the south. This is not a utopian vision. On the contrary, the returns of such a shift in our commitments would be practical and tangible. Turning our focus to Africa and Latin America would be the strategic equivalent of a "dogs of the Dow" approach, investing in "stocks" that are out of favor and unwanted, and placing our resources where the potential returns are highest, instead of continuing to throw them at strategic investments with, at best, marginal rates of return. Nor is this about forging a neo-classical American empire. Rather, it's about creating strategic partnerships to supercede our waning relations with continental Europe and about structuring alternatives to an overreliance on the states, populations, and markets of East Asia. …

Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession

Abstract: "Skilled officers, like all other professional men, are products of continuous and laborious study, training, and experience. There is no shortcut to the peculiar type of knowledge and ability they must possess. Trained officers constitute the most vitally essential element in modern war, and the only one that under no circumstance can be improvised or extemporized." --Douglas MacArthur, May 1932 "How can I be a professional, if there is no profession?" --A field grade officer, 2001 This article reviews the evolution toward jointness since the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, (1) relates that progress to the newer initiative of defense transformation, and derives a need for a new joint warfare profession. What has been meant by "jointness," however, is not agreed; it is not a term in the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. In this analysis the term is used to mean the effective integration of the combat capabilities of the services, America's warfighting professions. The evolution of this "effective integration," as well as the mindset among military officers who facilitate it, has progressed unevenly since 1986. There have been clear evolutionary successes in some areas and a consistent lack of progress in others. Evolutionary success in attaining jointness has been manifested perhaps most clearly in the execution of joint warfare--America now fights wars almost solely under joint commands. Most recently and vividly this was seen by the integration of combat effects in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, there have been other, less visible successes in the global war on terrorism. There also have been less pronounced but consistent successes toward jointness made in peacetime--the steady evolution in joint doctrine and exercises, for one example. But it is also the case that jointness has failed to evolve in other areas in which it was anticipated and intended by the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There are still few standing joint forces ready for joint deployment and employment. (2) Rather, forces are, by and large, still assembled only at the time of deployment. Further, there has been only glacial movement toward joint force training and experimentation and the determination of force requirements based on combatant commanders' warplans. (3) In other words, while recent decades have shown remarkable improvements in developing warfighting concepts and in planning for and executing joint warfare, they have not shown the same progression, if any at all, in creating truly ready joint forces in peacetime nor in rationalizing the services' future capabilities related to joint warfighting needs. Why is this the case? Why successful evolution in some areas and evolutionary failure in others? It is certainly not because those personnel assigned to command and staff positions within the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and defense agencies are not solid military professionals deeply steeped in the doctrines and warfighting expertise of their respective services. Nor are those who have cycled through the joint assignments people of bad intent. Quite to the contrary, there are today a few officers who are truly joint in mindset and practice, particularly those who have cycled into the joint arena and then stayed or returned for repetitive joint assignments, notwithstanding the bureaucratic pressures to serve elsewhere. And in them we see a glimpse of the real need for the future. In this article I will suggest that the uneven evolution toward jointness is symptomatic of a deeper problem, one that is systemic--simply stated, there has been no evolution toward a joint warfare profession. Instead, such evolution has been constrained by the intent and language of the original Goldwater-Nichols Act: "to establish policies, procedures and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on active duty who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward joint matters. …

Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement

Abstract: By Selig S. Harrison. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. 409 pages. $29.95. The core message of this closely argued book is that American military presence in the Korean peninsula will gradually wane in the near future, and that thoughtful preparations for this should be considered now. Whatever the readers of Korean Endgame think of Selig Harrison's ideas, his message should be considered seriously because of his decades-long access to North Korean, Chinese, and Japanese decisionmakers. Korean Endgame has strong chess overtones, given the China/Russia/Japan/ North Korea/South Korea/US grid as the arena where all country actors have only hawks and pragmatists (no doves fly in this six-dimensional space). A fascinating aspect of the book is the ping-pong dominance of hard-liners in Seoul, Pyongyang, and Washington, intent upon sabotaging their own sides' negotiating efforts. Part I, titled "Will North Korea Collapse?," is a welcome presentation of relevant facts about the North. Part II deals with the postponed dream of reunification. Part III, "Toward U.S. Disengagement," centers on the "Tar Baby Syndrome." Nuclear policy is the concern of the six chapters in Part IV, and "Korea in Northeast Asia," as a well-argued Part V, concludes the book. Some degree of urgency pervades the text. Harrison notes that "Koreans on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel regard a rearmed Japan as their major potential security threat." Chapter 15, "Guidelines for U.S. Policy," presents a reasoned approach, with safeguards to protect US interests, and shows that Harrison is not a cat's paw for North Korea. The author points out that Beijing and Moscow have moved to positions as "honest brokers" as their comradely enthusiasms have waned. He notes, "Both Moscow and Beijing are increasingly attempting to play the role of honest broker between the North and South. That is what they want the United States to do, and that is what the North also wants the United States to do." Harrison offers "U.S. as an honest broker" as the leading concept in the peninsula's short-term future. The phrase is not listed in the Index, but it appears a handful of times in the text. Relations between South Korea and North Korea, as one would expect, form a central theme in the book. It may surprise Parameters readers that both sides in the peninsula think that the United States is mostly responsible for the division of the Koreas, that they both think that Japan has no interest in the reunification of the peninsula, and that both regard Japan as their common enemy. …

NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11

Abstract: It would be an understatement to note that the last months have not been kind to the transatlantic relationship. When Iraq moved to the front burner, the transatlantic community was forced to tackle an issue that threatened to overwhelm it. As a result, the spirit of transatlantic solidarity, which was so impressively displayed after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, has faded rapidly. The United States is disappointed with what it sees as only qualified European support for the war on terror, and it scoffs at European military weakness. Many Europeans, in turn, are disappointed about what they perceive as a US fixation on military responses, and they resent the US approach of casually lumping together the war on terror with issues such as weapons of mass destruction or regime change in Iraq. NATO, the manifestation of the transatlantic security relationship, could never have remained unaffected by such discord. Although the real debate on Iraq was played out in the halls of the United Nations, and although NATO was not expected to play a direct role in a war on Iraq, sooner or later the Atlantic Alliance was bound to be hit by this debate. In February 2003, a short but agonizing disagreement erupted over the timing of planning for the defense of Turkey in case of war on Iraq. Only a few Allies held the view that the initiation of NATO's planning should be made contingent on further developments in the United Nations, yet for almost two weeks, NATO appeared to be blocked. That the disagreement was indeed one over timing, and not over substance, helped to bring the crisis to an end before any permanent damage was done. As NATO's Secretary General, Lord Robertson, put it in his personal account of the crisis, the Alliance had taken a hit above, not below, the waterline. The short crisis within NATO, as well as the protracted crisis over Iraq, demonstrated that the Atlantic community has not yet fully adjusted to the post-9/11 security environment--in either political or institutional terms. However, one ought to resist the temptation to judge a long-term, strategic Alliance by short-term tactical tests. The current focus on Iraq and its discontents obscures the fact that NATO has embarked on a process of post-9/l 1 adaptation that will help bridge the enormous divides within Europe and across the Atlantic that the Iraq crisis has exposed. The New Transatlantic Debate: 1990 Revisited Today's transatlantic security debate is, in essence, the debate that did not take place a little over a decade ago, when the Cold War ended. Back then, a fundamental discussion about the future shape of the transatlantic relationship seemed inevitable. But it was put off. There was simply too much unfinished business left over from the Cold War. The transatlantic community could not afford to divert its attention away from the task it still faced together: the task of cleaning up the mess left by the Cold War. That entailed significant challenges: * To embrace the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, who were craving their share of Europe, including its Atlantic dimension in NATO. * To associate a Russia that, in a sense, was both an old empire and a new state, still unsure of its European vocation. * And to address the conflicts in the Balkans, which were making a mockery of the idea of Europe as a zone of peace and shared values. Meeting these challenges required Europe and North America to work together. Accordingly, NATO reached out to Central and Eastern Europe, through its policy of partnership and through NATO enlargement. The Alliance also played a major role in associating Russia to NATO and, thus, to the emerging new Europe. And NATO played a key role in pacifying the Balkans through its military engagement. However, this impressive display of transatlantic unity could not hide the fact that eventually the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic was bound to change in the longer run. …

A Perilous Progress: Economics and Public Purpose in Twentieth Century America

Abstract: By Michael A Bernstein Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 376 pages $4250 At the outset of the 20th century, academic economists were struggling for a professional identity and the discipline of economics lacked coherence By the second half of the century, economists had a direct hand in shaping US government policy, and their field had infiltrated the curricula of other social sciences and even the humanities By century's end, however, the credibility of the profession and the discipline had been undermined: their capitulation to a statist agenda had left both vulnerable to unforeseen historical forces Those developments motivate the work of historian Michael Bernstein Dr Bernstein explains that while professionalism is consistent with the aspirations of middle-class America and with US predominance in 20th-century world affairs, it is nonetheless imbued with competing values: individual achievement and meritocracy on the one hand, bureaucratic and even anti-democratic forms of governance by credentialed elites on the other Furthermore, he believes there is a dialectical relationship between disciplinary knowledge and professional standing, that both are subject to the influences of the modern state, and that the state in turn is shaped by powerful historical events Thus, he constructs a narrative that weaves threads from three sources--the evolution of the economics discipline, the purposeful cultivation of the economics profession, and the social, political, and military history of the United States The American Economic Association (AEA) was established in 1885 Over the next two decades, founders tackled those functional yet nonetheless essential tasks needed to shape a professional community--they promoted value-free research, identified disciplinary boundaries, built a national membership, launched The American Economic Review, and initiated an annual convention With the advent of World War I, economists helped the government mobilize resources for the effort In the 1920s, the discipline witnessed an internal debate between "institutionalists," who advocated an inductive approach to research that acknowledged the rich interaction between economics, politics, history, and society, and "neoclassicists," who argued for a deductive approach to research, based on narrowly focused models of individual choice, as the foundation for understanding market processes Ultimately, the latter group prevailed and shaped economics into a more formal, abstract, esoteric, and mathematically oriented field Despite those theoretical advances, economists did not anticipate the onset of the Great Depression and could not explain its underlying causes The blind spot spurred challenges to neoclassical doctrine, including the work of John Maynard Keynes, who emphasized the interdependence between aggregate consumption and investment and the potential benefits of deficit spending by government during economic downturns Nevertheless, throughout the 1930s President Roosevelt kept economists at arm's length and adapted ineffective, ad hoc policies that were motivated by opportunistic political calculation rather than a sustained and coherent economic strategy The economy recovered only when the country prepared for and entered World War II To help the government with the tasks of efficiently managing production plans and transporting material and troops, economists developed new optimization and linear programming techniques For its part, the AEA took steps to elevate the significance of the profession: it channeled economists into government service, generated consensus reports on various issues, and, following the war, sent emissaries abroad during reconstruction Contrary to expectations, in the immediate postwar period, US economic growth was robust, with strong demand for consumption, investment, and exportable goods In that environment, the economics profession became more homogeneous …

British Bulldog or Bush’s Poodle? Anglo-American Relations and the Iraq War

Abstract: On 26 February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced the largest parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years. Some 120 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government's policy of support for US military action against Iraq. Earlier that month, more than one million people had taken to the streets of London to protest against the prospect of war, while respondents to a UK Internet poll had voted America the country that posed the greatest threat to world peace. The UK's major partners in Europe--France and Germany--also opposed Britain's stance, the government having singularly failed in its self-appointed role of providing a bridge of understanding between Europe and the United States. Prime Minister Blair faced personal attacks in the media, being frequently portrayed as America's lap dog; even Nelson Mandela referred to him disapprovingly as the foreign minister of the United States. The Prime Minister's political survival itself seemed to be at stake. In the face of such pressures, it would have been understandable if the British government had taken a less determined position on Iraq. In spite of the oft-touted "special relationship," British and American governments have not always seen eye-to-eye during international crises. But that was not the case. Notwithstanding dissension and resignations from his Cabinet, Prime Minister Blair's advocacy of the Bush Administration's hard line on Iraq hardly wavered, diplomatic support remained constant and vigorous, and Britain was the only American ally to make a sizable military contribution to the campaign. It is not surprising then that Tony Blair has been hailed as a hero in the United States, becoming the first Briton since Winston Churchill to be nominated for a Congressional Gold Medal. Blair's firm leadership was critical to sustaining the British government's support for US policy in Iraq. For some commentators, the Prime Minister's resolve demonstrated principled, international statesmanship; to others it displayed a naive faith in American virtue. Regardless, foreign policy in a parliamentary democracy is rarely made at the whim of even a powerful personality like Tony Blair. (1) There are many factors beside Blair's leadership that helped to shape the government's thinking. These included the long-standing special Anglo-American relationship, an institutionalized habit of security cooperation between the two countries, an ambitious perception of Britain's role in the modern world, and an apparently genuine conviction that Saddam Hussein's regime posed a threat to national security. This article addresses these issues and places them in historical context. It also draws conclusions about the British government's support for US policy on Iraq and its significance for Anglo-American relations in the medium term. A Special Relationship The partnership between the United States and United Kingdom has been described as "a relationship rooted in common history, common values, and common interests around the globe." (2) It has been become a journalistic cliche to refer to this as a "special relationship," but such a description has been in common usage since first coined by Winston Churchill during his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. The close diplomatic and military relationship between the UK and the United States had its origins in the strategic partnership of the Second World War. It was sustained by common security concerns throughout the Cold War, and was revived in the 1990s by a mutual recognition of the need to cooperate against new threats to international peace and stability. After 9/11, Prime Minister Blair's proactive role in the war against terrorism and his strong, supportive line on Iraq brought new vigor to the Anglo-American partnership. On a visit to Britain in May 2003, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, not a notable Anglophile, exclaimed, "The special relationship between the US and the UK is stronger than ever, and Americans are the better for it. …

Reflections on the Citizen-Soldier

Abstract: When it comes to war, I have been sheltered from the storm Too young to have faced the draft, which was last used in the United States in 1973, I did not volunteer for the military My father, by contrast, was conscripted into the US Army during World War II and saw action in Italy His father was conscripted into the US Army during World War land saw action in France My grandfather's outfit was gassed; my father dodged shells in the Tuscan hills One of my father's cousins fought in the French Resistance; another survived Nazi concentration camps, airplane factories, and a death march, to be liberated by Patton's Third Army In my generation, American cousins have served in the US military, foreign cousins served in the French and Israeli armies, and another American cousin was a civilian casualty of the war on terror: He died in New York City in the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 As a student of military history, I knew well before 9/11 that I owed my freedom to the sacrifices of others But the events of that day and the year and more since have underlined that lesson As a student of the Classics, I also know that republican theory teaches that unless the citizens of a republic serve in their own defense, they risk losing their freedom In the United States today, citizens of the republic do serve in their own defense Yet only a small proportion of us do so, and a smaller proportion than in the generations that preceded us Between 1940 and 1973, a large proportion of American males were conscripted to serve in the military Since 1973, conscription has been replaced by recruitment of an all-volunteer force A professional military of American men and, increasingly, women, defends the nation On the whole, the move from conscription to volunteering is excellent news No one is forced into service, nor is the nation burdened with an overly large military in an era when improvements in technology require ever less manpower in the armed forces But there is a trade-off The personal freedom that the average American gained from the end of the draft 30 years ago has unfortunately not been matched by an increase in either civic duty or sense of self-sacrifice It is doubtful that the average person today is as knowledgeable about military realities as he was in the days of the draft, and that relative ignorance surely has something to do with the tensions in civil-military relations of recent years Few of the politicians who have to make decisions about war and peace actually have the experience of military service The politicians' relative ignorance is made worse by a generation-long trend in the American intellectual elite away from military studies Furthermore, although the volunteer force is by and large representative of the American public in terms of race and class, it is lopsidedly conservative in politics and religion All things considered, it would be better to have a more representative military Yet, recognizing the reality of these problems does not mean advocating a return to conscription In fact, we do not need to revive the draft Conscripting young people means taking away their liberty, and the only justification for that is military emergency Besides, the purpose of the American military is to defend the United States, and since the volunteer force fulfills that purpose, it would make no sense to change it The current security crises facing the United States may indeed require a bigger military, but probably not so big as to require a draft Yet, even if no increase in the number of soldiers proves necessary, there is a modest reform that we should consider: diversifying the number and range of civilians who do a term of service in the military The reason has nothing to do with the patriotism or professionalism of the men and women in the military today In fact, no one could serve their country better than they do The target audience, rather, is those who do not currently serve in the military …

Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way

Abstract: Since the late 1980s, elements of the Department of Defense and the US intelligence community have used commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) to augment their organic SATCOM capabilities. Following the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-91, Congress directed the DOD to pursue greater use of commercial SATCOM, providing $15 million in the fiscal year 1992 Defense appropriation in order for DOD "to study ways of using commercial communication satellite capabilities" and "begin moving aggressively toward maximum utilization of commercial satellite communications systems." (1) In 1997, the senior communications flag officers of the military services committed the military to the long-term employment of commercial satellite communications to augment military owned and operated SATCOM systems. (2) The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) endorsed this decision in October 1997. (3) Today, the Defense Department continues to expand its use of commercial satellite communications; however, DOD's approach for leasing commercial SATCOM is inefficient and expensive. Joint Vision 2020 identifies continuous information superiority as an essential element of US warfighting for the first part of the current century. (4) The various service requirements to pass information between dispersed, mobile elements, as in the Army's concept for the Future Force and the Navy's vision for Network-Centric Warfare, rely on information superiority. (5) The result is that the US military's need to pass large amounts of information (hundreds and soon thousands of megabits per second) will continue to grow. Only space-based communications can meet this need. Although the military is undertaking an effort to greatly increase the information-carrying capacity of its organic military SATCOM (MILSATCOM) systems, the Transformational Communications Office will not be able to deliver a functional worldwide system until sometime in the second decade of this century. (6) Until such new capabilities are available--and quite probably even after they are, the Defense Department will require commercial SATCOM to complement its military systems to fully meet its needs for transmitting information among deployed forces and between deployed forces and the sustaining base in the United States. In 1997, military communications planners projected that the growing demand within the military for satellite communications would consistently exceed the capacity of available military systems. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom have more than validated this projection. Before Operation Enduring Freedom, the greatest demand US Central Command (CENTCOM) projected for information transfer using SATCOM was 500 megabits (million bits) per second (Mbps) and it routinely used about 100 Mbps. Shortly after the operation commenced, however, CENTCOM identified that its forces needed not less than 500 Mbps and potentially more than one gigabit (one billion bits) per second (Gbps). The required increase in SATCOM capacity was met by leasing it from commercial industry. As shown in Figure 1, the demand for SATCOM by deployed military forces has grown markedly since Operation Desert Storm in 1991. This has been the case even though the number of deployed forces in operations since Desert Storm has been smaller, often much smaller. A good way to assess the trend in the military's demand for satellite communications is to look at the amount of SATCOM required to support a consistently-sized increment of military forces. Figure 1 and Figure 2 are based on historical information regarding the SATCOM actually used, which is available from US Strategic Command, DOD's SATCOM operational manager. They show that since 1991 the satellite communications required to support an increment, or force package, of 5,000 deployed military members has increased from 1 Mbps during Operation Desert Storm to an initial assessment of about 51 Mbps during Operation Iraqi Freedom. …

Thirteen Years: The Causes and Consequences of the War in Iraq

Abstract: The mission of our troops is wholly defensive," President George H. W. Bush intoned as elements of the 82d Airborne and US Air Force arrived in Saudi Arabia to defend it against an Iraqi invasion. "Hopefully, they will not be needed long." That was 8 August 1990. Thirteen years later, the Americans are finally withdrawing from the land of Mecca and Medina--and the long, strange war against Saddam Hussein is essentially over. When it began, no one thought it would last 13 years, that it would set the stage for a global conflict unlike any in history, that it would fracture the Atlantic Alliance and mortally wound the United Nations. But it did. As the postwar period begins, it is largely left to the United States to face these realities and brace for new challenges. To avoid making similar mistakes in the aftermath of this war, the United States should be guided by these "Three R's": Rebuilding, Reviewing, and Reforming. The Beginning As others have explained elsewhere at great length, the forces of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism seldom work together. However, in a very real sense it was Saddam Hussein--once the personified definition of Arab nationalism--that catapulted fundamentalist al Qaeda into a terror superpower and set in motion a series of events that led to the bloodiest day on American soil since the Civil War. By invading Kuwait in the summer of 1990, Saddam left the defenseless Saudis with two options--cut a deal and surrender, or allow the Americans to dig in. The Saudis chose the latter, hopeful that the American deployment would be short and small. Of course, those hopes weren't realized. The initial deployment of a few hundred troops swelled to some 600,000 in preparation for Operation Desert Storm. Kuwait was liberated and Saddam was weakened, but Washington declared a cease-fire before the American juggernaut could destroy key units of the Republican Guard, which were vital to Saddam's survival. Historian Derek Leebaert calls the war a "tactical success misread as strategic triumph." (1) Deflecting criticisms of the war's untidy conclusion in their book A World Transformed, Bush and his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, argued in 1998 that shutting down the ground war at the hundred-hour mark was the right thing to do. "The United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land," they concluded. (2) Of course, that's effectively what happened, at least in the eyes of Osama bin Laden and his followers. In a sense, occupation was inevitable after the war; perhaps the United States ended up occupying the wrong country. Since a wounded Saddam could not be left unattended and an oil-rich Saudi Arabia could not be left unprotected, US troops took up permanent residence in the Saudi kingdom. The presence of foreign troops in the Muslim holy land galvanized al Qaeda, which carried out the attacks of 11 September 2001, which triggered America's global war on terror, which led inevitably back to Iraq, which is where America finds itself today. When viewed from this side of history, the events between 1990 and 2003 look like something out of a Greek tragedy--each decision fateful, each step leading inexorably to the very thing we hoped to prevent. This is not to say that the first Bush Administration is to blame for the tragedy. The elder Bush crafted a historic diplomatic and military campaign, hewed to the UN mandate, and took a calculated risk that Saddam would fall. He wasn't the first President to make such a calculation, but like Kim, Castro, and others, Saddam survived. To finish him off, Washington waged what came to be known as "low-grade war." It consisted of sanctions, CIA operations, and weekly or even daily air attacks on targets of opportunity such as radar posts, SAM sites, and other facilities on the extreme periphery of Saddam Hussein's power. Capitalizing on Washington's preoccupation with Iraq, al Qaeda and its partners launched a global guerilla war against the United States in 1993. …

Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses

Abstract: "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home." --Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, January 2001 Political and economic upheavals over the past decade have weakened the ability of Soviet successor states to monitor and control their potentially dangerous nuclear assets. A strong theoretical possibility exists--and has existed for some time--that nuclear material and even complete weapons could be removed from insecure stockpiles, trafficked abroad, and sold to virulently anti-Western states and groups. Several factors underscore the significance of this threat. One is the enormous quantity of former Soviet fissile material stored outside of weapons--some 600 to 650 tons scattered among 300 buildings at more than 50 nuclear facilities. (1) According to standard calculations, only six to eight kilograms of plutonium and 15 to 25 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) are needed to make an implosion-type nuclear bomb; hence, even minor leakage episodes could provide the makings of a major proliferation catastrophe. (2) (The required amounts could be greater or less, depending on the design of the device and the engineering skills of the producer.) A second factor relates to reputedly lax physical security and accounting systems at many nuclear weapons enterprises. A third is the depressed economic situation of employees in parts of the nuclear complex, reflected in relatively low pay, a shrinking social safety net, and uncertain professional prospects. These factors are widely believed to constitute a pri me source of proliferation danger on the supply side. A fourth concern, frequently cited by US authorities, is that outside adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, and the al Qaeda organization have made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or sufficient materials and expertise to make them. There seems little doubt that Russia's vast and troubled nuclear complex has been a target of such attempts, although adversaries also may have looked to other nuclear-armed states (such as Pakistan) to supply their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requirements. Finally, existing US nuclear security programs have only modestly reduced the nuclear proliferation threat from Russia and other newly independent states (NIS). The basic US approach has been twofold: to contain the threat at the source with technological fixes and procedural norms--"to build better fences around nuclear facilities" in the words of a former Department of Energy (DOE) official familiar with the programs (3)-and to improve export control regimes, including NIS border defenses against nuclear smuggling. The new systems, though, still do not extend to many facilities, and adversaries with sufficient resources and the right connections could easily exploit the gaps in them. Also, insider corruption and economic hardship can erode the deterrent value of even the advanced safeguards being introduced, possibly paving the way for serious proliferation episodes. Additionally, the extraordinary length of Russia's border with neighboring countries, which runs some 12,000 miles, underscores the immense ch allenge of preventing clandestine exports of nuclear goods from that country. In surveying the condition of nuclear security in the new states, the question arises whether hostile states or groups already have acquired ingredients of nuclear weapons (or the weapons themselves) and from where and in what quantities. No clear answers are available, although there is much speculation. An international black market of sorts for radioactive substances developed in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, but it provides few clues. Confirmed smuggling cases involving weapons-usable material are few and far between, and traffickers in these instances have had no obvious links to customers. …

Sino-US Military Relations since Tiananmen: Restoration, Progress, and Pitfalls

Abstract: Sino-US relations have experienced uneven developments over the last decade as the two major powers have grappled with the evolving post-Cold War international security environment as well as shifting domestic agendas and foreign policy priorities The bilateral military-to-military relationship likewise has gone through a period of resumption and exploration, important achievements and major setbacks, and continued efforts at improving mutual trust and understanding Among the key features of this relationship are high-level exchange visits of defense ministers and military leaders; confidence-building measures, including the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, annual Defense Consultation Talks, and port visits; and regular contacts at the functional level between the two countries' national defense universities and military academies Through these contacts, the two militaries have begun to engage each other in exchanging views on threat perceptions, perspectives on global arms control and regional se curity, defense conversion, military doctrines, and broader politico-security issues This article offers a preliminary assessment of the nature, evolution, and pitfalls of the Sino-US military relationship since the Tiananmen incident in 1989 It begins with a brief overview of the major developments over the last decade, identifying both progress and setbacks The next section discusses US and Chinese interests in developing and maintaining military ties both from the broader strategic objectives sought by policymakers in Beijing and Washington and the institutional perspectives of the two militaries It is clear that the two sides have different agendas and have adopted different approaches This at once explains the tensions in pursuing the bilateral military relationship and calls for pragmatic initiatives conducive to future developments This is followed by an examination of the factors that have influenced, and may well continue to affect, bilateral military relations The article concludes by summarizing the major findings of the research and offering some tentative recommendations f or developing stable, pragmatic, and meaningful bilateral military relations between China and the United States Sino-US Military Relations Since 1989: An Overview The Tiananmen incident of June 1989 remains a pivotal event in the chronicle of Sino-US relations It fundamentally changed the way in which bilateral relations had been managed since President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the fundamental basis of bilateral cooperation during the Cold War years evaporated Among the first casualties of Tiananmen was the Sino-US bilateral military relationship The Bush Administration of that era immediately suspended all high-level military contacts and froze the ongoing foreign military sales (FMS) programs for China (1) Although the US National Defense University (NDU) "Capstone" delegations resumed visits to China in 1991, and there were informal contacts between the two militaries during Operation Desert Storm, including the PRC Defense Attache's visiting the Pentagon and receiving briefings on US operations in the Gulf, it was not until October 1993 when Chas W Freeman , Jr, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, visited China that bilateral military-to-military contacts resumed This important visit followed the Clinton Administration's decision to shift from a confrontational China policy to one of engagement In the aftermath of the Yinhe fiasco (2) and faced with the looming crisis over the North Korean nuclear weapons program in the summer of 1993, the Pentagon, in particular two senior officials--Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry and Freeman- pushed for a more conciliatory China policy, including resuming contacts and opening up dialogues with the Chinese military …