Parameters 

About: Parameters is an academic journal published by United States Army War College. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Politics & National security. It has an ISSN identifier of 0031-1723. Over the lifetime, 907 publications have been published receiving 10745 citations. The journal is also known as: US Army War College quarterly parameters & U.S. Army's senior professional journal.

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom

Abstract: The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov New York: Public Affairs, 2011 409 pages $16.99 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a highly touted speech on Internet freedom in which she stated, "The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once you're on the Internet, you don't need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society." Evgeny Morozov, in his book The Net Delusion, takes great issue with the implication, however, that the so-called "Arab Spring" and "Twitter Revolution" were caused by unfettered access to the Internet. Instead, Morozov, a research academic, provides a cautionary tale about what he argues is any attempt to establish a monocausal relationship to meaningful political change (especially when that single focus is information technology). The book opens with a discussion of cyber-utopianism and Internet-centrism--mind-sets that focus on the positive "emancipatory" aspects of Internet communication while ignoring the downsides. The argument throughout centers on nation-state policy, or lack thereof, that attacks the "wicked" problem of authoritarianism by, as a colleague of mine has dubbed it, "wiring the world." Morozov, expectantly, but importantly, cites the hedonistic world portrayed by Huxley and the "Big Brother" world of Orwell to consider both the proactive and reactive approaches to Internet freedom by authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, he notes that there is often a mix of both. Such regimes certainly use the anonymity and openness of the Internet to spy on their people and shutdown undesirable sites. But there is also a subtle approach that belies the jackboot on the keyboard methodology. While China may be known more for suppressing the Internet and for employing the masses to counter antiregime rhetoric, Russia imposes no formal Internet censorship. It relies on entertainment (porn is specifically cited) to soothe the masses, assuming that given options for political discourse and anything else, most opt for "anything else." Hitler would understand. And in nations where freedom is not widely understood from a western perspective, any bit of additional mindless diversion may be viewed as liberty by the populace. Perhaps most importantly, Morozov rails against social media determinism as driving the end of authoritarianism, labeling it "an intellectually impoverished, lazy way to study the past, understand the present, and predict the future." He does not dismiss the value of Facebook and Twitter to quickly mobilize like-minded individuals. He notes as well that the development of that very like-mindedness is complex and potentially can be manipulated by authoritarian governments using the same Internet freedom. …

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

Abstract: Professor Graham Allison gazes into the future of US-China relations in Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? only to find the best guide to the future is the past. Specifically based on Thucydides's well-known observation that "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable," Allison has popularized the phrase "Thucydides's Trap" to describe the dangerous historical dynamic that develops when a rising power threatens to displace an established ruling power. (1) This dynamic was summarized aptly in an earlier article: "The rise of a new power has been attended by uncertainty and anxieties. Often, though not always, violent conflict has followed. The rise in the economic and military power of China, the world's most populous country, will be a central question for Asia and for American foreign policy at the beginning of a new century. " (2) In researching cases of rising powers challenging ruling powers over the last 500 years, Allison and the Thucydides Trap Project at Harvard University found 12 of 16 cases resulted in war. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap thus equates to avoiding war. Based on this analysis, Allison concludes that "as far ahead as the eye can see, the defining question about global order is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides's Trap." (3) The high percentage of cases that resulted in war provide persuasive support to the overall argument that war between the United States and China may be more likely than generally considered. Yet a few cautionary notes on the data set and methodology are warranted. First, while the principal result of the study (12 of 16 cases led to war) seems objective, decisions on what cases to include necessarily involve some subjective analysis. As such, the overall data supporting the general argument have evolved since the initial Thucydides's Trap argument was presented. In 2012-14 the argument cited 11 of 15 cases leading to war. In 2015 and subsequently, the data set was revised to include 12 of 16 cases that resulted in war. (5) Later in 2015, a detailed argument presenting the Thucydides's Trap metaphor appeared in the Atlantic. The 16 cases were identified in a table accompanying the article and included information on time period, ruling power, rising power, and result. (6) In Destined for War the data also include 12 of 16 cases leading to war, but a comparison between the table in the book (42) and the table from the 2015 Atlantic article shows one case from the 2015 data was dropped and another was added. In the event, they both resulted in "no war" so the overall numbers remain the same; but, such changes highlight the difficulties inherent to determining which cases to include. While 12 of 16 may have a scientific ring, the result may be less rigorous than it appears; certainly, it is subject to further analysis. (7) Notwithstanding such questions about the aggregate data, the book's use of the Thucydides's Trap metaphor to alert the potential, indeed the seeming likelihood, that the current global shift in power could lead to war is its principal strength. The book's conclusion, based on the available evidence, "when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception," is a powerful warning that should help focus the attention of both policymakers and scholars to the perils inherent in the uneven growth of power. (8) Although a valuable lens through which to see the current shifting relationship between the United States and China, the text is somewhat less useful in prescribing policy or strategy responses that might be taken in pursuit of US objectives given the international context described. As an aid to statecraft, Allison says, "History shows that major ruling powers can manage relations with rivals, even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering war. …

Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming

Abstract: By Jonathan Shay. Foreword by Max Cleland and John McCain. New York: Scribner, 2002. 329 pages. $25.00. Shay's first book in this duet, Achilles In Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, was remarkable both for the truths it spoke that reached beyond the theme and immediate purpose of the book, and the manner in which it reopened the continuing sore of US Army personnel management systems. In one very important sense, this new book continues the latter theme. Until I read Odysseus in America, I had only fond memories of Odysseus. Shay destroys those memories and paints a picture of a scheming, lying, self-serving conniver. So much for my classical education. But out of the wreckage of this image, Shay establishes a compelling framework for dealing with the returning combat veteran. Once again pulling from his experience as a staff psychiatrist in the Boston Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic, Dr. Shay's research rests in significant measure on his patients, Vietnam veterans with severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Last year, his work won him a position as Visiting-Scholar-at-Large at the US Naval War College. Shay raises the issue of how a soldier adapts to the requirements of war, which, by their nature, contradict those of a civil environment. Odysseus, Shay relates, demonstrates success in the practice of those traits so essential to success in battle--"cunning intelligence, deception, reconnaissance, manipulation, secrecy, spying...." How then does the soldier, having become proficient in these skills in the course of a decade-long war, readapt to civil life? Not well in the case of Odysseus, nor in the case of many veterans, according to Shay. Shay was not privy to the Army Chief of Staff's "Well-Being" study, conducted at the US Army War College in 1999, but the issues addressed in Odysseus in America fall directly in line with the general thrust of that study--that the Army is people, and caring for people ought to be one of its principal concerns. The enormously expensive Agent Orange and Gulf War Syndrome experiences ought to tell the Army that the cost of not taking care of soldiers during their service can result in costs that far exceed those related to preventive measures. However, Shay notes clearly that issues associated with "coming home" are more difficult for the military to recognize and treat, because "home" is not the military's realm--it is the American society's realm. "Coming home," to Shay, means societal factors like safety, acceptance, value and respect, knowing one's way, living according to pattern, being part of each other's future, and comfort. None of these is directly related to the military's realm, and it is doubtful that the military services could ever prepare returning warriors for reintegration into a hostile society such as that to which many Vietnam veterans returned. But the cost of not even trying to do something has been enormous. Shay continues to insist that the one action the military can take, first surfaced in Achilles in Vietnam, is the institutionalization of some sort of military communal act of purification. This is especially important for combat soldiers, whose moral code, even though it may still have been in a formative state, has most likely been violated in combat. …

Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning”

Abstract: We can say with some certainty, al Qaeda loves the Internet. When the latter first appeared, it was hailed as an integrator of cultures and a medium for businesses, consumers, and governments to communicate with one another. It appeared to offer unparalleled opportunities for the creation of a "global village." Today the Internet still offers that promise, but it also has proven in some respects to be a digital menace. Its use by al Qaeda is only one example. It also has provided a virtual battlefield for peacetime hostilities between Taiwan and China, Israel and Palestine, Pakistan and India, and China and the United States (during both the war over Kosovo and in the aftermath of the collision between the Navy EP-3 aircraft and Chinese MiG). In times of actual conflict, the Internet was used as a virtual battleground between NATO's coalition forces and elements of the Serbian population. These real tensions from a virtual interface involved not only nation-states but also non-state individuals and groups eit her aligned with one side or the other, or acting independently. Evidence strongly suggests that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11. Computers seized in Afghanistan reportedly revealed that al Qaeda was collecting intelligence on targets and sending encrypted messages via the Internet. As recently as 16 September 2002, al Qaeda cells operating in America reportedly were using Internet-based phone services to communicate with cells overseas. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a "cyberplanning" tool for terrorists. It provides terrorists with anonymity, command and control resources, and a host of other measures to coordinate and integrate attack options. Cyberplanning may be a more important terrorist Internet tool than the much touted and feared cyberterrorism option--attacks against information and systems resulting in violence against noncombatant targets. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital property to intimidate or coerce people. (1) Cyberplanning, not defined by NPS or any other source, refers to the digital coordination of an integrated plan stretching across geographical boundaries that may or may not result in bloodshed. It can include cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan. Since 9/11, US sources have monitored several websites linked to al Qaeda that appear to contain elements of cyberplanning: * alneda.com, which US officials said contained encrypted information to direct al Qaeda members to more secure sites, featured international news on al Qaeda, and published articles, fatwas (decisions on applying Muslim law), and books. * assam.com, believed to be linked to al Qaeda (originally hosted by the Scranton company BurstNET Technologies, Inc.), served as a mouthpiece for jihad in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine. * almuhrajiroun.com, an al Qaeda site which urged sympathizers to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. * qassam.net, reportedly linked to Hamas. * jihadunspun.net, which offered a 36-minute video of Osama bin Laden. (2) * 7hj.7hj.com, which aimed to teach visitors how to conduct computer attacks. (3) * aloswa.org, which featured quotes from bin Laden tapes, religious legal rulings that "justified" the terrorist attacks, and support for the al Qaeda cause. (4) * drasat.com, run by the Islamic Studies and Research Center (which some allege is a fake center), and reported to be the most credible of dozens of Islamist sites posting al Qaeda news. * jehad.net, alsaha.com, and islammemo.com, alleged to have posted al Qaeda statements on their websites. * mwhoob.net and aljehad.online, alleged to have flashed political-religious songs, with pictures of persecuted Muslims, to denounce US policy and Arab leaders, notably Saudi. (5) While it is prudent to tally the Internet cyberplanning applications that support terrorists, it must be underscored that few if any of these measures are really anything new. …

Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia

Abstract: Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. By Richard J. Samuels. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007. 277 pages. $49.95 ($19.95 paper). The author, a scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has specialized in Japanese affairs for many years, identifies his thesis in the opening line: "Many Japanese analysts do not believe Japan now has a coherent grand strategy, and more than a few insist that it has never had one." This reviewer agrees with that judgment. Professor Samuels, however, strives mightily over the next 210 pages to show that Japan, indeed, has had a grand strategy since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 when it left its feudal age and leapt into the modern era. "Japanese security policy," Samuels asserts, "has traveled a consistent path since the nineteenth century." In that time, Japan entered the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 to ally itself with Britain, then a powerful empire whose navy ruled the waves. In 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to join the Axis of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, which Samuels fails to mention. After that pact ended in utter defeat, Japan signed a mutual security treaty with the United States. Samuels sees all those alliances and relationships as crafting a grand strategy. They might be better labeled, in the kindest interpretation, as a series of pragmatic and expedient maneuvers to align Japan with the prevailing power of the time. Japan, a middle-sized, resource-poor island nation, is stuck in a rough neighborhood and needs outside friends to survive, not to mention prosper. The author makes much of the "Yoshida Doctrine," named for the late Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, the towering figure who led Japan out of the valley of death following World War II. The Japanese, however, do not favor doctrines, preferring instead vague guidelines that permit freedom of action when circumstances change. Yoshida, ever the practical politician, is not known to have ever used the term. Nor did his "deshi" or followers such as Prime Ministers Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Sato, Kakuei Tanaka, and on through Kiichi Miyazawa, a lineage lasting until 1993. Samuels says the first Japanese to cite the Yoshida Doctrine was Masataka Kosaka, who in 1963 was credited with first use of the term. It is interesting that the author only identifies him as an adviser of Yoshida's. In any event, most scholars agree that the concept of the Yoshida Doctrine rests on two principles: (1) Rely on America to ensure Japan's security while Japan does the minimum necessary to defend itself, and (2) Place maximum effort on economic development, largely through export of goods to pay for much-needed imports. Japan has put those two principles of security policy into practice for the last half century. The nation spends only one percent of its gross national product on defense, a limit endorsed by Japanese taxpayers. Its armed forces are about the 25th largest in the world and are circumscribed with constitutional, legal, and political restraints. …