Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

As we are moving towards the Internet of Things (IoT), the number of sensors deployed around the world is growing at a rapid pace. Market research has shown a significant growth of sensor deployments over the past decade and has predicted a significant increment of the growth rate in the future. These sensors continuously generate enormous amounts of data. However, in order to add value to raw sensor data we need to understand it. Collection, modelling, reasoning, and distribution of context in relation to sensor data plays critical role in this challenge. Context-aware computing has proven to be successful in understanding sensor data. In this paper, we survey context awareness from an IoT perspective. We present the necessary background by introducing the IoT paradigm and context-aware fundamentals at the beginning. Then we provide an in-depth analysis of context life cycle. We evaluate a subset of projects (50) which represent the majority of research and commercial solutions proposed in the field of context-aware computing conducted over the last decade (2001-2011) based on our own taxonomy. Finally, based on our evaluation, we highlight the lessons to be learnt from the past and some possible directions for future research. The survey addresses a broad range of techniques, methods, models, functionalities, systems, applications, and middleware solutions related to context awareness and IoT. Our goal is not only to analyse, compare and consolidate past research work but also to appreciate their findings and discuss their applicability towards the IoT.

/pdf/context-aware-computing-for-the-internet-of-things-a-survey-3nibvvc921.pdf

Context Aware Computing for The Internet of Things: A Survey

/pdf/a-break-in-the-clouds-towards-a-cloud-definition-svovsw1r5a.pdf

A Break in the Clouds: Towards a Cloud Definition

https://aprender.ead.unb.br/pluginfile.php/110249/mod_folder/content/0/Artigos%20descartados/ART_2009_Kim,%20Mirusmonov%20e%20Lee_An%20empirical%20examination%20of%20factors%20influencing%20the%20intention%20to%20use%20mobile%20payment.pdf?forcedownload=1

An empirical examination of factors influencing the intention to use mobile payment

A super-peer is a node in a peer-to-peer network that operates both as a server to a set of clients, and as an equal in a network of super-peers. Super-peer networks strike a balance between the efficiency of centralized search, and the autonomy, load balancing and robustness to attacks provided by distributed search. Furthermore, they take advantage of the heterogeneity of capabilities (e.g., bandwidth, processing power) across peers, which recent studies have shown to be enormous. Hence, new and old P2P systems like KaZaA and Gnutella are adopting super-peers in their design. Despite their growing popularity, the behavior of super-peer networks is not well understood. For example, what are the potential drawbacks of super-peer networks? How can super-peers be made more reliable? How many clients should a super-peer take on to maximize efficiency? we examine super-peer networks in detail, gaming an understanding of their fundamental characteristics and performance tradeoffs. We also present practical guidelines and a general procedure for the design of an efficient super-peer network.

Designing an Super-Peer Network

Resource management for Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) in cloud computing: A survey

A survey on authentication schemes in VANETs for secured communication

Review: Review of multicast routing mechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks

Applications of agent technology in communications: a review

To make the cities greener, safer, and more efficient, Internet of Things (IoT) can play an important role. Improvement in safety and quality of life can be achieved by connecting devices, vehicles and infrastructure all around in a city. Best technological solutions can be achieved in smart cities by making different stakeholders to work together [5][6][7]. System integrators, network operators and technology providers have a role to play in working with governments to enable smart solutions. But, building such solutions on an open, standards-based communications platform that can be continuously used is a challenge. We present a waste collection management solution based on providing intelligence to wastebins, using an IoT prototype with sensors. It can read, collect, and transmit huge volume of data over the Internet. Such data, when put into a spatio-temporal context and processed by intelligent and optimized algorithms, can be used to dynamically manage waste collection mechanism. Simulations for several cases are carried out to investigate the benefits of such system over a traditional system. We try to replicate the scenario using Open Data from the city of Pune, India stressing on the opportunities created by this type of initiatives for several parties to innovate and contribute to the development of Smart waste management solutions.

Sunilkumar S. Manvi

Papers

Resource management for Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) in cloud computing: A survey

A survey on authentication schemes in VANETs for secured communication

Review: Review of multicast routing mechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks

Applications of agent technology in communications: a review

Smart waste management using Internet-of-Things (IoT)