Many scholars have argued that mistrust can prevent cooperation. These arguments often fail to adequately address the possibility that states can take steps to reassure each other, build trust, and thereby avoid conflict. I present a rational choice theory of reassurance focusing on costly signals and identify the conditions under which players can use costly signals to reassure the other side. The central result is that reassurance will be possible between trustworthy players in equilibrium if trustworthy actors are more willing to take risks to attain mutual cooperation than untrustworthy actors. I discuss the implications of the model in the context of the reassurance strategies pursued by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War.

Trust, reassurance and cooperation

The Secretary of Defense

Research on conflict theory, that is, studies of conflict or war using formal reasoning or mathematical approaches, is cross-classified by eight analytic approaches and eight areas of application. ...

Research on Conflict Theory: Analytic Approaches and Areas of Application

This monograph examines security-related track two diplomacy efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, including how such efforts have socialized participants into thinking about security in more cooperative terms, and whether the ideas generated in track two forums have been acknowledged at the societal level or influenced official policy. Kaye concludes with suggestions on how to improve future track two efforts.

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Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia

Recent formal work in nuclear deterrence theory has focused on brinkmanship crises in which states exert coercive pressure by manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear exchange. This essay extends the formal analysis of deterrence theory to the strategy of limited retaliation in which states exert coercive pressure by inflicting limited amounts of damage in order to make the threat of future punishment more credible. This strategy is modeled as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information. The equilibria suggest that states prefer relatively smaller, less-destructive limited options; that counterforce options are desirable even if they cannot limit the total amount of damage an adversary can inflict; that smaller, less-destructive limited nuclear options may make a nuclear exchange more likely; and that uncertainty and incomplete information may significantly enhance deterrence.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400083349

Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation.

Introduction: the role and prospects of CSBMs in South Asia, Sumit Ganguly and Ted Greenwood. Part 1 The record of conflict: conflict, cooperation and CSBMs with Pakistan and China - a view from New Delhi, Kanti P. Bajpai conflict between Pakistan and India - a view from Islamabad, Shireen M. Mazari sources of conflict between China and India as seen from Beijing, Rosemary Foot past attempts at mediation and conflict prevention in South Asia - would CSBMs have made a difference?, Sumit Ganguly. Part 2 Experience with CSMBs elsewhere: experience from European and U.S.-Soviet agreements, T. Greenwood Arab-Israeli CSBMs - implications for South Asia, Mark A. Heller. Part 3 CSBMs in South Asia: mutual security pledges and prospects for a nonproliferation regime, Neil Joeck transparency measures, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema military postures, risks and security building, Jasjit Singh crisis management and confidence building, C. Raja Mohan prerequisites for success, John Sandrock.

Ted Greenwood

Papers

Mending Fences: Confidence- And Security-building Measures In South Asia

The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?

Mending Fences: Confidence and Security-Building in South Asia