Showing papers by "Todd S. Braver published in 2022"

The Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control dataset, a theoretically-guided within-subject task fMRI battery

Abstract: Cognitive control is a critical higher mental function, which is subject to considerable individual variation, and is impaired in a range of mental health disorders. We describe here the initial release of Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) project data, the DMCC55B dataset, with 55 healthy unrelated young adult participants. Each participant performed four well-established cognitive control tasks (AX-CPT, Cued Task-Switching, Sternberg Working Memory, and Stroop) while undergoing functional MRI scanning. The dataset includes a range of state and trait self-report questionnaires, as well as behavioural tasks assessing individual differences in cognitive ability. The DMCC project is on-going and features additional components (e.g., related participants, manipulations of cognitive control mode, resting state fMRI, longitudinal testing) that will be publicly released following study completion. This DMCC55B subset is released early with the aim of encouraging wider use and greater benefit to the scientific community. The DMCC55B dataset is suitable for benchmarking and methods exploration, as well as analyses of task performance and individual differences.

Working memory capacity preferentially enhances implementation of proactive control.

Abstract: Previous research has linked working memory capacity (WMC) with enhanced proactive control. However, it remains unclear the extent to which this relationship reflects the influence of WMC on the tendency to engage proactive control, or rather, the ability to implement it. The current study sought to clarify this ambiguity by leveraging the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) version of the AX-CPT task, in which the mode of cognitive control is experimentally manipulated across distinct testing sessions. To adjudicate between competing hypotheses, Bayesian mixed modeling was used to conduct sequential analyses involving two separate data sets. Posterior parameter estimates obtained from the initial analysis were entered as informed priors during the replication analysis to evaluate the influence of new data on previous estimates. Results yielded strong evidence demonstrating that the influence of WMC on proactive control is most robust under experimentally controlled conditions, during which use of proactive control is standardized across participants via explicit training and instruction. Critically, the observed pattern of findings suggests that the relationship between WMC and proactive control may be better characterized as individual differences in the ability to implement proactive control, rather than a more generalized tendency to engage it. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Domain-general cognitive motivation: Evidence from economic decision-making – Final Registered Report

Abstract: Stable individual differences in cognitive motivation (i.e., the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities) have been documented with self-report measures, yet convergent support for a trait-level construct is still lacking. In the present study, we used an innovative decision-making paradigm (COG-ED) to quantify the costs of cognitive effort, a metric of cognitive motivation, across two distinct cognitive domains: working memory (an N-back task) and speech comprehension (understanding spoken sentences in background noise). We hypothesized that cognitive motivation operates similarly within individuals, regardless of domain. Specifically, in 104 adults aged 18-40 years, we tested whether individual differences in effort costs are stable across domains, even after controlling for other potential sources of shared individual variation. Conversely, we evaluated whether the costs of cognitive effort across domains may be better explained in terms of other relevant cognitive and personality-related constructs, such as working memory capacity or reward sensitivity. We confirmed a reliable association among effort costs in both domains, even when these other sources of individual variation, as well as task load, are statistically controlled. Taken together, these results add support for trait-level variation in cognitive motivation impacting effort-based decision making across multiple domains.

Incorporating ecological momentary assessment into multimethod investigations of cognitive aging: Promise and practical considerations.

Abstract: Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) represents a promising approach to study cognitive aging. In contrast to laboratory-based studies, EMA involves the repeated sampling of experiences in daily life contexts, enabling investigators to gain access to dynamic processes (e.g., situational contexts, intraindividual variability) that are likely to strongly contribute to aging and age-related change across the adult life-span. As such, EMA approaches complement the prevailing research methods in the field of cognitive aging (e.g., laboratory-based paradigms, neuroimaging), while also providing the opportunity to replicate and extend findings from the laboratory in more naturalistic contexts. Following an overview of the methodological and conceptual strengths of EMA approaches in cognitive aging research, we discuss best practices for researchers interested in implementing EMA studies. A key goal is to highlight the tremendous potential for combining EMA methods with other laboratory-based approaches, in order to increase the robustness, replicability, and real-world implications of research findings in the field of cognitive aging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Domain-general cognitive motivation: Evidence from economic decision-making – Final Registered Report

Abstract: Stable individual differences in cognitive motivation (i.e., the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities) have been documented with self-report measures, yet convergent support for a trait-level construct is still lacking. In the present study, we used an innovative decision-making paradigm (COG-ED) to quantify the costs of cognitive effort, a metric of cognitive motivation, across two distinct cognitive domains: working memory (an N-back task) and speech comprehension (understanding spoken sentences in background noise). We hypothesized that cognitive motivation operates similarly within individuals, regardless of domain. Specifically, in 104 adults aged 18-40 years, we tested whether individual differences in effort costs are stable across domains, even after controlling for other potential sources of shared individual variation. Conversely, we evaluated whether the costs of cognitive effort across domains may be better explained in terms of other relevant cognitive and personality-related constructs, such as working memory capacity or reward sensitivity. We confirmed a reliable association among effort costs in both domains, even when these other sources of individual variation, as well as task load, are statistically controlled. Taken together, these results add support for trait-level variation in cognitive motivation impacting effort-based decision making across multiple domains.

Cognitive effort-based decision-making across experimental and daily life indices in younger and older adults.

Abstract: OBJECTIVES The study investigated whether cognitive effort decision-making measured via a neuroeconomic paradigm that manipulated framing (gain vs. loss outcomes), could predict daily life engagement in mentally demanding activities in both younger and older adults. METHOD Younger and older adult participants (N=310) completed the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm (Cog-ED), under both gain and loss conditions, to provide an experimental index of cognitive effort costs for each participant in each framing condition. A subset of participants (N=230) also completed a seven-day Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) protocol measuring engagement in mentally demanding daily life activities. RESULTS In a large, online sample, we replicated a robust increase in cognitive effort costs among older, relative to younger, adults. Additionally, costs were found to be reduced in the loss relative to gain frame, although these effects were only reliable at high levels of task difficulty and were not moderated by age. Critically, participants who had lower effort costs in the gain frame tended to report engaging in more mentally demanding daily life activities, but the opposite pattern was observed in the loss frame. Further analyses demonstrated the specificity of reward-related cognitive motivation in predicting daily life mentally demanding activities. DISCUSSION Together, these results suggest that cognitive effort costs, as measured through behavioral choice patterns in a neuroeconomic decision-making task, can be used to predict and explain engagement in mentally demanding activities during daily life among both older and younger adults.

The multi-angle extended three-dimensional activities (META) stimulus set: A tool for studying event cognition.

Abstract: To study complex human activity and how it is perceived and remembered, it is valuable to have large-scale, well-characterized stimuli that are representative of such activity. We present the Multi-angle Extended Three-dimensional Activities (META) stimulus set, a structured and highly instrumented set of extended event sequences performed in naturalistic settings. Performances were captured with two color cameras and a Kinect v2 camera with color and depth sensors, allowing the extraction of three-dimensional skeletal joint positions. We tracked the positions and identities of objects for all chapters using a mixture of manual coding and an automated tracking pipeline, and hand-annotated the timings of high-level actions. We also performed an online experiment to collect normative event boundaries for all chapters at a coarse and fine grain of segmentation, which allowed us to quantify event durations and agreement across participants. We share these materials publicly to advance new discoveries in the study of complex naturalistic activity.

Control-theoretic integration of stimulation and electrophysiology for cognitive enhancement

Abstract: Transcranial electrical stimulation (tES) technology and neuroimaging are increasingly coupled in basic and applied science. This synergy has enabled individualized tES therapy and facilitated causal inferences in functional neuroimaging. However, traditional tES paradigms have been stymied by relatively small changes in neural activity and high inter-subject variability in cognitive effects. In this perspective, we propose a tES framework to treat these issues which is grounded in dynamical systems and control theory. The proposed paradigm involves a tight coupling of tES and neuroimaging in which M/EEG is used to parameterize generative brain models as well as control tES delivery in a hybrid closed-loop fashion. We also present a novel quantitative framework for cognitive enhancement driven by a new computational objective: shaping how the brain reacts to potential “inputs” (e.g., task contexts) rather than enforcing a fixed pattern of brain activity.

An fMRI protocol for administering liquid incentives to human participants

Abstract: This protocol describes the materials and approaches for administering liquid incentives to human participants during fMRI scanning. We first describe preparation of the liquid solutions (e.g., neutral solution and saltwater) and liquid delivery setups. We then detail steps to connect the setups to the computer-controlled syringe pump in the MRI control room, followed by procedures for testing the syringe pump dispensing a liquid bolus during the task. Description of custom software and required adapters for implementing the liquid setup are included. For complete details on the use and execution of this protocol, please refer to Yee et al. (2021).

Aversive motivation and cognitive control Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews

Abstract: Aversive motivation plays a prominent role in driving individuals to exert cognitive control. However, the complexity of behavioral responses attributed to aversive incentives creates significant challenges for developing a clear understanding of the neural mechanisms of this motivation-control interaction. We review the animal learning, systems neuroscience, and computational literatures to highlight the importance of experimental paradigms that incorporate both motivational context manipulations and mixed motivational components (e.g., bundling of appetitive and aversive incentives). Specifically, we postulate that to understand aversive incentive effects on cognitive control allocation, a critical contextual factor is whether such incentives are associated with negative reinforcement or punishment. We further illustrate how the inclusion of mixed motivational components in experimental paradigms enables increased precision in the measurement of aversive influences on cognitive control. A sharpened experimental and theoretical focus regarding the manipulation and assessment of distinct motivational dimensions promises to advance understanding of the neural, monoaminergic, and computational mechanisms that underlie the interaction of motivation and cognitive control. incentivized mental effort task (Leng et al., 2020). They were rewarded with monetary gains for correct responses and were penalized with monetary losses for incorrect responses. The motivational value of the rewards and penalties were varied, which enabled clear dissociation between how expected rewards increased response rate (via faster response times while maintaining accuracy) and expected penalties decreased response rate (via slower response times and increased ac- curacy). Together, these paradigms demonstrate the utility of using mixed motivation to more precisely evaluate how aversive motivation influences cognitive control.

We need to be braver about the generalizability crisis

Abstract: Abstract We applaud the effort to draw attention to generalizability concerns in twenty-first-century psychological research. Yet we do not feel that a pessimistic perspective is warranted. We outline a continuum of available methodological tools and perspectives, including incremental steps and meta-analytic approaches that can be readily and easily deployed by researchers to advance generalizability claims in a forward-looking manner.

What is the Nature of “Internal Content” Prior to Attentional Selection?

Abstract: A recurring distinction in attention research is between external attention, which selects among perceptual objects/ representations, and internal attention, which selects among cognitive representations like memories, mental images, or goals (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). In contrast to our detailed knowledge of the mechanisms supporting external attention, the dynamics of internal attention remain poorly understood. Amir and Bernstein (this issue) develop an ambitious model that seeks to fill this gap and account for how internal attention integrates information from working memory, emotional states, and contextual demands to select among cognitive representations. To put it differently, in William James’s oft-quoted definition of attention as “the taking possession by the mind... of one out of what may seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought,” researchers have often focused on the former target (perceptual objects), but rarely on the latter (trains of thought). Amir and Bernstein’s are to be applauded for their comprehensive attempt to characterize the dynamics of internal attention, especially as it relates to psychiatric symptoms like rumination. We are generally quite enthusiastic about the dynamical systems approach developed by Amir and Bernstein to characterize internal attention in a computationally explicit manner. However, in this response, we highlight a fundamental question about internal attention dynamics that is left unaddressed in the model of Amir and Bernstein. The question revolves around the nature of the internal cognitive representations that become targeted by internal attention. Amir and Bernstein are clear that, once the representations are attended to, they enter working memory. But what is the nature of the representations before they are attended to? Here we suggest that there are three possible ways to interpret Amir and Bernstein’s characterization of their model, which are left ambiguous and implicit in the authors’ account. We refer to these as the generation, activation, and selection interpretations. Critically, these differing interpretations each have important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of internal attention. Below, we elucidate these three interpretations, spell out their implications, and propose avenues for testing them experimentally. In particular, we propose that experimenters could profitably employ cognitive neuroscience methods to distinguish these interpretations empirically.