Anarchy, state, and utopia

The morality of freedom

The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …

The Law of Peoples

The dramatic advances in DNA technology over the last few years are the stuff of science fiction. It is now not only possible to clone human beings it is happening. For the first time since the creation of the earth four billion years ago, or the emergence of mankind 10 million years ago, people will be able to choose their children's' sex, height, colour, personality traits and intelligence. It will even be possible to create 'superhumans' by mixing human genes with those of other animals for extra strength or longevity. But is this desirable? What are the moral and political consequences? Will it mean anything to talk about 'human nature' any more? Is this the end of human beings? Post Human Society is a passionate analysis of the greatest political and moral problem ever to face the human race.

The Problem with NatureOur Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution

The Theory and Practice of Autonomy

Within the latter half of the 30-year history of bioethics there has been an increasing pressure to address bioethical issues globally. Bioethics is not traditionally a theory-based enterprise, rather the focus has been problem related. With the introduction of the global perspective, theory has, however, become more important. One of the best known, probably the best known, theory of bioethics is the one presented by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics in 1979. This theory is known as the “four principles” or the “Georgetown mantra” approach or “mid-level principlism.” It is the attempt to create a global framework for bioethics on the four principles—autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence—that I will scrutinize in this paper.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0963180101001098

What Is Wrong with Global Bioethics? On the Limitations of the Four Principles Approach

In a contribution to The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Professor Rosamond Rhodes argues that individuals sometimes have an obligation to know about their genetic disorders, because this is required by their status as autonomous persons. Her analysis, which is based on Kant's concept of autonomy and Aristotle's notion of friendship, is extended here to consequentialist concerns. These are of paramount importance if, as we believe and Professor Rhodes herself implies, the Kantian and Aristotelian doctrines can be helpful only in the sphere of private morality, not in the public realm. Better tools for assessing the right to genetic ignorance as an issue of public policy can, we contend, be found in Mill's ideas concerning liberty and the prevention of harm. Our own conclusion, based on the Millian way of thinking, is that individuals probably do have the right to remain in ignorance in the cases Professor Rhodes presents as examples of a duty to know.

Genetic Ignorance, Moral Obligations and Social Duties

Two protechnology arguments, the “hopeful principle” and the “automatic escalator”, often used in bioethics, are identified and critically analysed in this paper. It is shown that the hopeful principle is closely related to the problematic precautionary principle, and the automatic escalator argument has close affinities to the often criticised empirical slippery slope argument. The hopeful principle is shown to be really hopeless as an argument, and automatic escalator arguments often lead nowhere when critically analysed. These arguments should therefore only be used with great caution.

High hopes and automatic escalators: a critique of some new arguments in bioethics

One of the much debated issues around the evolving human genetics is the question of the right to know versus the right not to know. The core question of this theme is whether an individual has the right to know about her own genetic constitution and further, does she also have the right to remain in ignorance. Within liberal traditions, it is usually held that people, if they so wish, have the right to all the knowledge available about themselves. This right is based on the value of autonomy or on the right of self-determination, and it is sometimes partly justified as a countermeasure to the authorities' control over people. I do not wish to deny the right to genetic knowledge (about oneself). I think that its existence is self-evident. The argument I want to put forth in this paper is that in liberal societies we should acknowledge people's right to remain in ignorance as well. The only reason for not doing this would be that grave harm to others would follow if people were allowed to make these seemingly self-regarding decisions. Arguments presented against the right to ignorance are twofold. First, there are those arguing against the right to ignorance on the grounds of harm to others, that is, philosophers who do not deny people's right to ignorance in self-related matters but wish to state that genetic ignorance causes harm to others, and this is one of the most commonly accepted reasons for restricting people's freedom. The other line of argument flows from the Kantian view that not even merely self-regarding foolishness (in the eyes of others) should be allowed.

The Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed

Rights, autonomy, privacy, and confidentialityare concepts commonly used in discussionsconcerning genetic information. When theseconcepts are thought of as denoting absolutenorms and values which cannot be overriden byother considerations, conflicts among themnaturally occur.In this paper, these and related notions areexamined in terms of the duties and obligationsmedical professionals and their clients canhave regarding genetic knowledge. It issuggested that while the prevailing idea ofautonomy is unhelpful in the analysis of theseduties, and the ensuing rights, an alternativereading of personal self-determination canprovide a firmer basis for ethical guidelinesand policies in this field.

Tuija Takala

Papers

What Is Wrong with Global Bioethics? On the Limitations of the Four Principles Approach

Genetic Ignorance, Moral Obligations and Social Duties

High hopes and automatic escalators: a critique of some new arguments in bioethics

The Right to Genetic Ignorance Confirmed

Genetic information, rights, and autonomy