https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf

Deep learning in neural networks

https://www.cs.jhu.edu/~misha/ReadingSeminar/Papers/Bay08.pdf

Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF)

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63% of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks.

/pdf/maximizing-the-spread-of-influence-through-a-social-network-47y1ehuvwi.pdf

Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network

Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. These allocation and pricing decisions get complicated when buyers have some global constraints. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have global budget constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is to show that for this setting there is an individually-rational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-optimal auction that allocates these units and calculates prices on the fly, without knowledge of the total supply. We do so by showing that the Adaptive Clinching Auction satisfies a supply-monotonicity property.We also analyze and discuss, using examples, how the insights gained by the allocation and payment rule can be applied to design better ad allocation heuristics in practice. Finally, while our main technical result concerns multi-unit supply, we propose a formal model of online supply that captures scenarios beyond multi-unit supply and has applications to sponsored search. We conjecture that our results for multi-unit auctions can be extended to these more general models.

/pdf/clinching-auctions-with-online-supply-ps0rpxxbkv.pdf

Clinching auctions with online supply

This paper considers a traditional problem of resource allocation, scheduling jobs on machines. One such recent application is cloud computing, where jobs arrive in an online fashion with capacity requirements and need to be immediately scheduled on physical machines in data centers. It is often observed that the requested capacities are not fully utilized, hence offering an opportunity to employ an overcommitment policy, i.e., selling resources beyond capacity. Setting the right overcommitment level can induce a significant cost reduction for the cloud provider, while only inducing a very low risk of violating capacity constraints. We introduce and study a model that quantifies the value of overcommitment by modeling the problem as a bin packing with chance constraints. We then propose an alternative formulation that transforms each chance constraint into a submodular function. We show that our model captures the risk pooling effect and can guide scheduling and overcommitment decisions. We also develop a family of online algorithms that are intuitive, easy to implement and provide a constant factor guarantee from optimal. Finally, we calibrate our model using realistic workload data, and test our approach in a practical setting. Our analysis and experiments illustrate the benefit of overcommitment in cloud services, and suggest a cost reduction of 1.5% to 17% depending on the provider's risk tolerance.

Overcommitment in Cloud Services Bin packing with Chance Constraints

Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on designing a simple mechanism that always allocates the item. Rather than designing sophisticated pricing methods like prior literature, we design better allocation methods. In particular, we propose quasi-proportional allocation methods in which the probability that an item is allocated to a bidder depends (quasi-proportionally) on the bids. 
We prove that corresponding games for both all-pay and winners-pay quasi-proportional mechanisms admit pure Nash equilibria and this equilibrium is unique. We also give an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in polynomial time. Further, we show that the revenue of the auctioneer is promisingly high compared to the ultimate, i.e., the highest value of any of the bidders, and show bounds on the revenue of equilibria both analytically, as well as using experiments for specific quasi-proportional functions. This is the first known revenue analysis for these natural mechanisms (including the special case of proportional mechanism which is common in network resource allocation problems).

Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-free Revenue Maximization

Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided markets. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings, introduced by Gale and Shapley. It is well known that stable matchings can be computed in polynomial time, but many real-life markets lack a central authority to match agents. In those markets, matchings are formed by actions of self-interested agents. Knuth introduced uncoordinated two-sided markets and showed that the uncoordinated better response dynamics may cycle. However, Roth and Vande Vate showed that the random better response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but did not address the question of convergence time.In this paper, we give an exponential lower bound for the convergence time of the random better response dynamics in two-sided markets. We also extend the results for the better response dynamics to the best response dynamics, i.e., we present a cycle of best responses, and prove that the random best response dynamics converges to a stable matching with probability one, but its convergence time is exponential. Additionally, we identify the special class of correlated matroid two-sided markets with real-life applications for which we prove that the random best response dynamics converges in expected polynomial time.

/pdf/uncoordinated-two-sided-matching-markets-173i8hfs5l.pdf

Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets

We study the problem of efficiently optimizing submodular functions under cardinality constraints in distributed setting. Recently, several distributed algorithms for this problem have been introduced which either achieve a sub-optimal solution or they run in super-constant number of rounds of computation. Unlike previous work, we aim to design distributed algorithms in multiple rounds with almost optimal approximation guarantees at the cost of outputting a larger number of elements. Toward this goal, we present a distributed algorithm that, for any e > 0 and any constant r, outputs a set S of O(rk/e1/r) items in r rounds, and achieves a (1-e)-approximation of the value of the optimum set with k items. This is the first distributed algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of (1-e) running in less than log 1/e number of rounds. We also prove a hardness result showing that the output of any 1-e approximation distributed algorithm limited to one distributed round should have at least Ω(k/e) items. In light of this hardness result, our distributed algorithm in one round, r = 1, is asymptotically tight in terms of the output size. We support the theoretical guarantees with an extensive empirical study of our algorithm showing that achieving almost optimum solutions is indeed possible in a few rounds for large-scale real datasets.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3087556.3087574

Vahab Mirrokni

Papers

Clinching auctions with online supply

Overcommitment in Cloud Services Bin packing with Chance Constraints

Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-free Revenue Maximization

Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets

Bicriteria Distributed Submodular Maximization in a Few Rounds