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Vahab Mirrokni

Researcher at Google

Publications -  390
Citations -  16175

Vahab Mirrokni is an academic researcher from Google. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 57, co-authored 346 publications receiving 14255 citations. Previous affiliations of Vahab Mirrokni include Vassar College & Microsoft.

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Traffic engineering of management flows by link augmentations on confluent trees

TL;DR: This paper forms a traffic engineering problem motivated by the above mentioned applications and uses efficient algorithms as the basis for designing efficient heuristics for alleviating congestion in general (non-tree) service provider network topologies.
Posted Content

Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the multiplicative bidding language adopted by major Internet search companies and give matching algorithmic and approximation hardness results for this problem; these results are against an information-theoretic bound.
Proceedings Article

Contextual Reserve Price Optimization in Auctions via Mixed Integer Programming

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the problem of learning a linear model to set the reserve price in an auction, given contextual information, in order to maximize expected revenue from the seller side.
Posted Content

Fully Dynamic Matching: Beating 2-Approximation in $\Delta^\epsilon$ Update Time

TL;DR: There is a randomized algorithm that with high probability maintains a $2-\Omega(1)$ approximate maximum matching of a fully-dynamic general graph in worst-case update time $O(\Delta^{\epsilon}+\text{polylog } n)$, where $\Delta$ is the maximum degree.
Posted Content

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on value maximizing bidders with return on spend constraints, and show that the introduction of reserve prices has a novel impact on the market, namely, by choosing reserve prices appropriately the auctioneer can improve not only the total revenue but also the total welfare.