Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion--that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation--extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures--which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.

/pdf/implicit-social-cognition-attitudes-self-esteem-and-2j32pp6h9o.pdf

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes.

The greater power of bad events over good ones is found in everyday events, major life events (e.g., trauma), close relationship outcomes, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions, and learning processes. Bad emotions, bad parents, and bad feedback have more impact than good ones, and bad information is processed more thoroughly than good. The self is more motivated to avoid bad self-definitions than to pursue good ones. Bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones. Various explanations such as diagnosticity and salience help explain some findings, but the greater power of bad events is still found when such variables are controlled. Hardly any exceptions (indicating greater power of good) can be found. Taken together, these findings suggest that bad is stronger than good, as a general principle across a broad range of psychological phenomena.

/pdf/bad-is-stronger-than-good-42gd5eyc1l.pdf

Bad is Stronger than Good

Bad is stronger than good

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

An overview of self-related superiority biases in social comparison is presented. Included are false consensus, false uniqueness, pluralistic ignorance, illusory superiority, unrealistic optimism, the sensitive and multifaceted self, the “Barnum” effect and the self-other asymmetry. Important conceptual and theoretical problems characterizing the field are pointed out and a review of cognitive explanations is presented. It is argued that most superiority biases are closely related to each other and that the self-enhancement motive or the pervasive tendency to see oneself in a favourable light offers a more fruitful approach towards their integration than the cognitive point of view. Some theoretical and heuristic implications of the proposed integration are briefly outlined.

Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison

The relationship between self-favoring biases in social comparison, favorable self-presentation, and well-being and the self-other asymmetry effect was examined. Participants gave comparative chance estimations and trait ratings for positive and negative future events and traits. One-half of the participants compared themselves to the average other, while the remainder compared the average other to themselves. All participants completed measurements of two types of desirable responding (self-deception and impression management) and of subjective well-being. Participants who compared themselves to another showed stronger unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority effects for positive (but not for negative) future events und traits than participants comparing another to themselves, demonstrating a self-other asymmetry effect. Unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority concerning positive attributes were related to self-deception, while unrealistic optimism and illusory superiority concerning negative attributes were related to impression management. The relative independence of “positive” and “negative” self-favoring biases was further demonstrated by their differential relationship with self-esteem and subjective well-being.

Self‐Favoring Biases, Self‐Presentation, and the Self‐Other Asymmetry in Social Comparison

People typically attribute lower health risks to themselves than to others, a phenomenon referred to as unrealistic optimism. The present study tested the person positivity bias as a previously unexamined explanation of the phenomenon and analyzed the relationship between unrealistic optimism and expectations of control. High-school students estimated their own and one of three other persons' (the average student's, a randomly chosen student's, or their best same-sex friend's) chances of getting health problems. They also filled out questionnaires measuring locus of control and health-protective behavior. In contrast with the person positivity explanation, unrealistic optimism was not restricted to the 'average other'' condition. However, unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects with a more internal locus of control than in subjects with a rather external locus of control. An unpredicted effect of estimation order was observed: Unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects who estimated the comparison person's risks first than in subjects who started with own risks. This effect can be understood in terms of Codol's observation that people perceive others as more similar to themselves than they themselves are to others.

Social-comparison of health risks - locus of control, the person-positivity bias, and unrealistic optimism

According to the third person hypothesis, people believe that the media have a greater effect on other people's attitudes and behaviours than on their own attitudes and behaviours. A self-enhanceme nt explanation for the third person effect was tested, stating that people perceive their own responses to the media not as weaker but as more appropriate than other people's responses. Subjects rated the relative attitudinal impact of messages that are generally considered to be desirable to be influenced by and of messages that are generally considered undesirable to be influenced by on themselves as compared to the average peer. Both attitudinal impact in the direction advocated by the message and in the opposite direction was rated. A 'classic' third person effect was obtained in those cases in which attitudinal media impact was considered undesirable only. In cases in which attitudinal media impact was considered desirable a 'reversed' third person effect occurred, thus supporting the self-enhancement explanation and suggesting a reconceptualization of the third person effect in terms of an 'optimal impact phenomenon'.

The optimal impact phenomenon : beyond the third person effect

This paper first presents four different conceptualizations of social support: social integration, satisfying relationships, perceived helpfulness and enacted support. Then, classic and contemporary social comparison theory and social exchange theory are analysed as they are two theoretical perspectives that are particularly useful in understanding social support. These perspectives are employed to explain three seemingly paradoxical phenomena in the domain of social support: (1) the fact that support sometimes has negative effects; (2) the fact that the occurrence of stress itself can sometimes decrease the availability of support resources; and (3) the phenomenon that people believe that they give more support than they receive, and that there is more support available for them than for others.

Vera Hoorens

Papers

Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison

Self‐Favoring Biases, Self‐Presentation, and the Self‐Other Asymmetry in Social Comparison

Social-comparison of health risks - locus of control, the person-positivity bias, and unrealistic optimism

The optimal impact phenomenon : beyond the third person effect

Social support and stress: the role of social comparison and social exchange processes.