All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

Two Treatises of Government.

Arrow, Kenneth J.

Within corporate social responsibility (CSR), the exploration of the political role of firms (political CSR) has recently experienced a revival. We review three key periods of political CSR literature—classic, instrumental, and new political CSR—and use the Rawlsian conceptualization of division of moral labor within political systems to describe each period’s background political theories. The three main arguments of the paper are as follows. First, classic CSR literature was more pluralistic in terms of background political theories than many later texts. Second, instrumental CSR adopted classical liberalism and libertarian laissez-faire as its structural logic. Third, new political CSR, based on a strong globalist transition of responsibilities and tasks from governments to companies, lacks a conceptualization of division of moral labor that is needed to fully depart from a classical liberalist position. We end by providing a set of recommendations to develop pluralism in political CSR.

Pluralism in Political Corporate Social Responsibility

and Equity in European Education and Training Systems

Bioethics and human rights were conceived in the aftermath of the Holocaust, when moral outrage reenergized the outmoded concepts of “medical ethics” and “natural rights,” renaming them “bioethics,” and “human rights” to give them new purpose. Originally, the principles of bioethics were a means for protecting human rights, but through a historical accident, bioethical principles came to be considered as fundamental. In this paper I reflect on the parallel development and accidental divorce of bioethics and human rights to urge their reconciliation.

Bioethics and Human Rights: A Historical Perspective

I contend that a form of contractualism more individualistic than Rawls’ would do better at addressing concerns about justice and the family raised by feminist theorists, and that it would also compel us to be more egalitarian. Dissatisfactions expressed with Rawls's neglect of issues related to gender and the family can only be addressed if ‘parties in the original position’ are strictly defined as individuals. Thus defined, they are not only able to address questions of justice within families, but can also explore the less familiar question of justice of the family, namely whether the family should exist, from the point of view of justice. I conclude by exploring the question of whether the family should be abolished, in view of its leading to life chances unequal between individuals, and compare the family with a generalized, well resourced and well run orphanage.

Rawls, justice in the family and justice of the family

This article explores the justice of the family. From the perspective of justice, the family causes serious concerns, for it causes severe inequalities between individuals. Several justice theorists remark that by its mere existence the family impedes the access to equality of life chances. The paper examines whether this means that justice requires the abolition of the family. It asks whether everyone, and, in particular, the worst off, would prefer the family to a generalized well-run orphanage. This thought-experiment is used to inquire which value, if any, is such that (a) it would be menaced by the abolition of the family, and (b) in a just society, it would to prioritize over the principle of equality of life chances

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Is the family to be abolished then

Some egalitarian liberals have proposed a division of moral labour between social institutions and individual agents, but the division-of-labour metaphor has been understood in different ways. This paper aims to disentangle some of these different understandings, with an eye to clarifying the appeal of the egalitarian-liberal project and the challenges that it faces. The idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values. It is not an apology for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness.

I—Samuel Scheffler: Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism

“In comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights ... “(Rawls, 1971, p. 105). This observation, formulated by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, will occur to anyone who examines the Republican triad: political philosophy is very much concerned with liberty and equality, but considerably less so with fraternity.1 Always somewhat eclipsed by the other two values, fraternity has undergone neither the formal treatment initially generated by Berlin’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” liberty, nor the analytical effort to define the term similar to Williams’, Nagel’s, or Dworkin’s approach to equality.

Véronique Munoz-Dardé

Papers

Rawls, justice in the family and justice of the family

Is the family to be abolished then

I—Samuel Scheffler: Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism

Fraternity and Justice

The Division of Moral Labour