Showing papers in "Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume in 2005"
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors argue that speakers do not voice their opinions directly, but make decisions about what words to use, and raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.
Abstract: The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.
52 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge, and the relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge.
Abstract: The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.
33 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values, not an apology for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness.
Abstract: Some egalitarian liberals have proposed a division of moral labour between social institutions and individual agents, but the division-of-labour metaphor has been understood in different ways. This paper aims to disentangle some of these different understandings, with an eye to clarifying the appeal of the egalitarian-liberal project and the challenges that it faces. The idea of a division of moral labour is best understood as the expression of a strategy for accommodating diverse values. It is not an apology for economic self-interest or a device for justifying personal acquisitiveness.
29 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that speakers do not voice their opinions directly, but make decisions about what words to use, and raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.
Abstract: The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.
22 citations
Journal Article•
19 citations
Journal Article•
13 citations
TL;DR: Shapiro as mentioned in this paper reviewed and evaluated his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise.
Abstract: To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, while in Section VII, I explore a possible line of response to such paradoxes given by Keefe [2000]. In Section VIII, I assess whether which Shapiro might adapt Keefe's response to combat both paradoxes.
12 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that Levinson cannot account for the phenomenon of aesthetic autonomy: namely, that we cannot be put in a position to make an aesthetic judgement by testimony alone.
Abstract: Jerrold Levinson maintains that he is a realist about aesthetic properties. This paper considers his positive arguments for such a view. An argument from Roger Scruton, that aesthetic realism would entail the absurd claim that many aesthetic predicates were ambiguous, is also considered and it is argued that Levinson is in no worse position with respect to this argument than anyone else. However, Levinson cannot account for the phenomenon of aesthetic autonomy: namely, that we cannot be put in a position to make an aesthetic judgement by testimony alone. Finally, Levinson's views on the ontology of aesthetic properties are considered and found wanting.
9 citations
TL;DR: On the view in question, predicates like‘borderline red’and‘determinately red�’are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from‘red’.
Abstract: After a brief account of the problem of higher-order vagueness, and its seeming intractability, I explore what comes of the issue on a linguistic, contextualist account of vagueness. On the view in question, predicates like‘borderline red’and‘determinately red’are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from‘red’. In particular,‘borderline red’and‘determinately red’are not colours. These predicates have linguistic components, and invoke notions like‘competent user of the language’. On my view, so-called‘higher-order vagueness’is actually ordinary, first-order vagueness in different predicates. I explore the possibility that, nevertheless, a pernicious regress ensues.
8 citations
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TL;DR: The question of whether or not aesthetic properties are response-dependent is addressed in this paper, and the tentative conclusion is that some are, and some are not, and that some aesthetic properties can be viewed as manifest higher-order ways of appearing.
Abstract: Being an aesthetic realist is hard work. Derek Matravers has raised a number of concerns for the brand of aesthetic realism that I have defended in the past, and that I continue to defend, albeit with modification. Much turns on the nature of aesthetic properties, and on the reasons for acknowledging their existence. I here try to provide further illumination on both scores, suggesting in particular that many aesthetic properties can be viewed as manifest higher-order ways of appearing. Toward the end of my discussion the question of whether or not aesthetic properties are response-dependent is addressed, and I offer the tentative conclusion that some are, and some are not.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider how medieval reflection on Aristotelian change led medieval Aristoteelians to analyses of primary substances that called into question how and whether they are metaphysically special.
Abstract: In this paper I begin with Aristotle's Categories and with his apparent forwarding of primary substances as metaphysically special because somehow fundamental. I then consider how medieval reflection on Aristotelian change led medieval Aristotelians to analyses of primary substances that called into question how and whether they are metaphysically special. Next, I turn to a parallel issue about supposits, which Boethius seems in effect to identify with primary substances, and how theological cases–the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and of the human soul's separate survival between death and resurrection–call into question how and to what extent supposits are metaphysically special. I conclude with some reflections on various senses of being metaphysically special and how they pertain to primary substances and supposits.
TL;DR: The authors explored the uses that Michael Friedman and Bas van Fraassen have recently made of the work of Hans Reichenbach and explored the status and content of the account of the epistemic subject available to an epistemological voluntarist.
Abstract: This essay explores the uses that Michael Friedman and Bas van Fraassen have recently made of the work of Hans Reichenbach It uses Friedman's work to complicate van Fraassen's invocation of Reichenbach's voluntarism in support of empiricism It uses van Fraassen's work to motivate a concern with Friedman's neo-Kantian reading of Reichenbach We are, finally, left with questions about the status and content of the account of the epistemic subject available to an epistemological voluntarist
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry.
Abstract: This response considers the question whether empiricists are condemned to silence about the epistemic agency their theories attribute or presuppose. It is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry. If this is correct, it underscores once more the need to distinguish between the various strands of logical positivism which show different strengths and weaknesses.
TL;DR: The authors argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism (in particular its consequentialism) while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has.
Abstract: Are there distinctively political values? Certain egalitarians seem to think that equality is one such value. Scheffler's contribution to the symposium seeks to articulate a division of moral labour between norms of personal morality and the principles of justice that regulate social institutions, and using this suggests that the egalitarian critique of Rawls can be deflected. In this paper, instead, I question the status of equality as an intrinsic value. I argue that an egalitarianism which focuses on the status of equality as valuable in itself embraces a theory of value with the worst elements of utilitarianism (in particular its consequentialism) while leaving behind any of the intuitive appeal that utilitarianism has. In its place I press that we need a political conception of egalitarianism which stresses the role of equality as a political ideal without presupposing any values with which we engage beyond those found in the norms of personal morality.