In response to globalization and structural changes in logistics, firms in the transport industry have re-evaluated the scope of their activities [1]. A large number of shipping lines are vertically integrated to include terminal operations through shareholdings in or full ownership of dedicated terminal facilities. A number of terminal operating companies expanded their activities from their respective homeports to an international terminal network structure. These two developments have led to a competitive setting in which trans-national terminal operating companies and shipping lines vie for the control over terminal capacity. In this paper, a horizontal product differentiation model is introduced to analyze competition between container terminals using a game theoretic approach. We focus on a landlord port management system with long-term concessions agreements shaping the formal relationships between the Port Authority (PA) (who owns the land) and the private Terminal Operators (TOs) (who use the land for terminal activities). Starting from the linear city model of Hotelling [2], we develop a framework for Cournot competition between multi-user terminals. By comparing the results (expected payoffs for potential TOs and PAs) of different cases, this paper demonstrates how the shift toward a fully dedicated terminal impacts on intra-port and inter-port competition between the remaining multi-user terminals. The model is illustrated by referring to a case of terminal competition in a realistic setting.

Game theoretical approach to competition between multi-user terminals: the impact of dedicated terminals

Various models that incorporate concepts from Non-Cooperative Game Theory (NCGT) are described in the transport literature. Game Theory provides powerful tools for analysing transport systems, but these tools have some drawbacks that should be recognised. In the current paper we review games that describe transport problems and discuss them within a uniform context. Although the paper does not introduce new tools, it presents insights concerning the relations between transport models and games. We divide existing games into groups and show that some common features characterise multiple games. We distinguish between games that make a conceptual contribution and games that are suitable for application. Compact or symmetric game structures make remarkable observations but often do not support actual decision-making. Less aesthetic formats, most of which are Stackelberg games between authorities and travellers, are stronger as instruments that assist in determining real-life policies; these formulations can be treated by practitioners as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and not as games.

The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis

A multicriteria approach with temporal indicators in optimizing the distribution of cargo flows in multimodal transport and technological system is presented. Based on the infrastructure indicators of the considered part of the railway landfill and the economic and geographical volumes of cargo accumulation, a mathematical model of the transport process is developed, expressed as a nonlinear integer programming problem. For various combinations of several objective functions, which are temporary indicators of the transportation process, an algorithm of optimal distribution of cargo flows for the considered loading stations and unloading stations is developed. Computational procedures for finding the Pareto optimal distribution of cargo flows are implemented in the environment of a computer mathematics system, which can be Free Ware. The distribution of grain cargo flows, which, as well known, are especially relevant from a commercial point of view for Russian exports, was chosen as a specific object for implementing the developed optimization approach.

Multimodal Freight Transportation Based on Multicriteria Optimization by Time Indicators

v. volkov1, orcid.org/0000-0003-2202-3441, I. taran2, orcid.org/0000-0002-3679-2519, t. volkova1, orcid.org/0000-0001-8546-4119, o. pavlenko1, orcid.org/0000-0003-4237-4310, n. Berezhnaja3, orcid.org/0000-0001-8740-3387 1 – Kharkiv National Automobile and Highway University, Kharkiv, Ukraine, e­mail: volf­949@ukr.net 2 – Dnipro University of Technology, Dnipro, Ukraine 3 – Kharkiv Petro Vasylenko National Technical University of Agriculture, Kharkiv, Ukraine

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Determining the efficient management system for a specialized transport enterprise

: It is shown that in the mixed traffic of trains compared to the directions specialized for transportation of freight and passengers, the traffic capacity is sharply reduced, and costs on repairs and maintenance of track infrastructure increase by 1.5-2 times. The paper outlines ways to solve the problem in the distribution of directions with mainly freight and passenger traffic to increase the traffic capacity of transportation on the rail network. Among the activities, there is the transmission of transit freight flow on parallel runs. Furthermore, changing the operation conditions of railways in the case of implementing the high-speed trains traffic requires strengthening the existing railway lines in the event of insufficient reserves.

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Increasing the Efficiency of the Railway Operation in the Specialization of Directions for Freight and Passenger Transportation

D. Kozachenko: ORCID 0000-0003-2611-1350; V. Skalozub: ORCID 0000-0002-1941-4751; Yu. Hermaniuk: ORCID 0000-0002-4905-8313; R. Korobiova: ORCID 0000-0002-6424-1079; A. Gorbova: ORCID -0000-0002-5612-2715

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Vladyslav V. Skalozub

Papers

A Model of Transit Freight Distribution on a Railway Network