Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.For comments and advice we are grateful to Christopher Ansell, Ian Bache, Richard Balme, Arthur Benz, Tanja Borzel, Renaud Dehousse, Burkard Eberlein, Peter Hall, Edgar Grande, Richard Haesly, Bob Jessop, Beate Kohler-Koch, David Lake, Patrick Le Gales, Christiane Lemke, David Lowery, Michael McGinnis, Andrew Moravcsik, Elinor Ostrom, Franz U. Pappi, Thomas Risse, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Philippe Schmitter, Ulf Sverdrup, Christian Tusschoff, Bernhard Wessels, the political science discussion group at the University of North Carolina, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of APSR. We received institutional support from the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung in Berlin. Earlier versions were presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, the ECPR pan-European Conference in Bordeaux, and Hannover Universitat, Harvard University, Humboldt Universitat, Indiana University at Bloomington, Mannheim Universitat, Sheffield University, Sciences Po (Paris), Technische Universitat Munchen, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors' names appear in alphabetical order.

/pdf/unraveling-the-central-state-but-how-types-of-multi-level-38ppd8o353.pdf

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

We critically examine the content of contemporary understandings of corporate citizenship and locate them within the extant body of research dealing with business-society relations. Our main purpose is to realize a theoretically informed definition of corporate citizenship that is descriptively robust and conceptually distinct from existing concepts in the literature. Specifically, our extended perspective exposes the element of “citizenship” and conceptualizes corporate citizenship as the administration of a bundle of individual citizenship rights—social, civil, and political—conventionally granted and protected by governments.

http://195.130.87.21:8080/dspace/bitstream/123456789/1087/1/04-Corporate%20Citizenship%20Towards%20an%20extended%20theoretical%20conceptualization.PDF

Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization

The concept of “wicked problems” has attracted increasing focus in policy research, but the implications for public organizations have received less attention. This article examines the main organizational and cognitive dimensions emerging from the research literature on wicked problems. We identify several recent approaches to addressing problem complexity and stakeholder divergence based on the literatures on systems thinking, collaboration and coordination, and the adaptive leadership roles of public leaders and managers. We raise some challenges for public management in some key functional areas of government—strategy making, organizational design, people management, and performance measurement. We argue that provisional solutions can be developed, despite the difficulties of reforming governance processes to address wicked problems more effectively.

Wicked Problems: Implications for Public Policy and Management

Feel lonely? What about reading books? Book is one of the greatest friends to accompany while in your lonely time. When you have no friends and activities somewhere and sometimes, reading book can be a great choice. This is not only for spending the time, it will increase the knowledge. Of course the b=benefits to take will relate to what kind of book that you are reading. And now, we will concern you to try reading models of man as one of the reading material to finish quickly.

Models of man

Policy networks and policy analysis : Scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox

Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment"

Information exchange in policy networks is usually attributed to preference similarity, influence reputation, social trust, and institutional actor roles. We suggest that political opportunity structures and transaction costs play another crucial role and estimate a rich statistical network model on tie formation in the German toxic chemicals policy domain. The results indicate that the effect of preference similarity is absorbed by institutional, relational, and social opportunity structures. Political actors choose contacts who minimize transaction costs while maximizing outreach and information. We also find that different types of information exchange operate in complementary, but not necessarily congruent, ways.

/pdf/information-exchange-in-policy-networks-3grr0cin12.pdf

Information Exchange in Policy Networks

Visualization is an important aspect of both exploration and communication of categorical as well as relational data. Graphical displays of policy networks are particularly attractive, since they enable authors to display in a compact way the relevant actors in a network, how they are related to each other, and what the overall structure looks like. Sociograms were early companions of social network analysis, but have received surprisingly little attention during the following decades. Only in the last few years has easy accessibility to quality computing and graphic equipment revived a now rapidly growing interest. In this paper, we analyze the problem of visualizing policy networks. We first argue why network visualization is important and non-trivial. Then we show that current methods are somewhat ad hoc in their attempt to convey information contained in a network. Our main contribution is a systematic approach to network visualization, closely following the general principles of information visualization. It provides a generic formalization which may serve as a guideline for further developments.

/pdf/explorations-into-the-visualization-of-policy-networks-57tf3sfrsy.pdf

Explorations into the Visualization of Policy Networks

The European Community as a social configuration, with its complex division
of competencies and action capacities between EC institutions and national
governments, is still difficult to conceptualize In this context the authors propose
the concept of corporate actor networks in order to understand more
thoroughly the interaction processes of policy integration by which the European
community has accumulated increasing supranational action capacities
A case study on the emergence and development EC telecommunications policy
provides the background for a discussion of the scope, structure and operation
of such EC policy actor networks
Mit ihrer komplexen Verteilung von Kompetenzen und Handlungskapazitaten
zwischen den EG-Institutionen und den Mitgliedsstaaten ist das Sozialgebilde
Europaische Gemeinschaft immer noch schwierig zu konzeptualisieren Hierzu
schlagen die Autoren das Konzept des Netzwerks korporativer Akteure vor
Dieses soll die Interaktionsprozesse zwischen den relevanten Akteuren in den
Europaischen Gemeinschaften, welche der Integration verschiedener Politiken
(policies) dienen, genauer fassen Mittels einer Fallstudie uber die Herausbildung
und Entwicklung der EG-Telekommunikationspolitik wird ein Einblick
in die Reichweite, Struktur und Operationsweise dieser transnationalen Politiknetzwerke
auf EG-Ebene gegeben

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/43190/1/152571418.pdf

Volker Schneider

Papers

Policy networks and policy analysis : Scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox

Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment"

Information Exchange in Policy Networks

Explorations into the Visualization of Policy Networks

Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy-Making: Harmonizing Telecommunications Policy