世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

In the West are the 'haves', while much of the rest of the world are the 'have-nots'. The extent of inequality today is unprecedented. Drawing on an extraordinary range of contemporary and historical examples, Why Nations Fail looks at the root of the problems facing some nations. Economists and scientists have offered useful insights into the reasons for certain aspects of poverty, such as Jeffrey Sachs (it's geography and the weather), and Jared Diamond (it's technology and species). But most theories ignore the incentives and institutions that populations need to invest and prosper: they need to know that if they work hard, they can make money and actually keep it - and the key to ensuring these incentives is sound institutions. Incentives and institutions are what separate the have and have-nots. Based on fifteen years of research, and stepping boldly into the territory of Ian Morris's Why the West Rules - For Now, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson blend economics, politics, history and current affairs to provide a new, persuasive way of understanding wealth and poverty. And, perhaps most importantly, they provide a pragmatic basis for the hope that those mired in poverty can be placed on the path to prosperity.

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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

This study surveys the literature examining the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) We review the history of privatization, the theoretical and empirical evidence on the relative performance of state owned and privately owned firms, the types of privatization, if and by how much privatization has improved the performance of former SOEs in non-transition and transition countries, how investors in privatizations have fared, and the impact of privatization on the development of capital markets and corporate governance. In most settings privatization "works" in that the firms become more efficient, more profitable, and financially healthier, and reward investors.

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From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization

Service-dominant logic continues its evolution, facilitated by an active community of scholars throughout the world. Along its evolutionary path, there has been increased recognition of the need for a crisper and more precise delineation of the foundational premises and specification of the axioms of S-D logic. It also has become apparent that a limitation of the current foundational premises/axioms is the absence of a clearly articulated specification of the mechanisms of (often massive-scale) coordination and cooperation involved in the cocreation of value through markets and, more broadly, in society. This is especially important because markets are even more about cooperation than about the competition that is more frequently discussed. To alleviate this limitation and facilitate a better understanding of cooperation (and coordination), an eleventh foundational premise (fifth axiom) is introduced, focusing on the role of institutions and institutional arrangements in systems of value cocreation: service ecosystems. Literature on institutions across multiple social disciplines, including marketing, is briefly reviewed and offered as further support for this fifth axiom.

Institutions and axioms: an extension and update of service-dominant logic

China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. To solve the "China puzzle," this paper analyzes China's institution—a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas subnational governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and laws. China's reform trajectories have been shaped by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on the other hand are all determined by this governance structure. ( JEL O17, O18, O43, P21, P25, P26)

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The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development

Why are some countries much richer than others? This technical note proposes a framework to begin answering this question. The first part identifies inefficient institutions as the root cause of the economic differences between societies. The second part analyzes how these institutions change. And the final part suggests how lessons from this institutional framework can be applied.

Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w11267/w11267.pdf

Tax structure in developing countries: many puzzles and a possible explanation

The effectiveness of China's incremental industrial reform between 1980 and 1980 is investigated using a panel data set of 272 state enterprises. This paper applies a method that measures marginal products of factors and changes in total factor productivity (TFP) by comparing actual changes in output to actual changes in inputs and in the institutional environment. This paper finds that there were marked improvements in the marginal productivity of factors and in TFP between 1980 and 1989. More important, the evidence shows that over 87 percent of the TFP growth was attributable to improved incentives, intensified product market competitioni, and improved factor allocation.

https://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/liw/papers/jpe97.pdf

The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Enterprises, 1980–1989

https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2015/files/ifdp1129.pdf

Government connections and financial constraints : evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms

The Great Leap Forward disaster, characterized by a collapse in grain production and a widespread famine in China between 1959 and 1961, is found attributable to a systemic failure in central planning. Wishfully expecting a great leap in agricultural productivity from collectivization, the Chinese government accelerated its aggressive industrialization timetable. Grain output fell sharply as the government diverted agricultural resources to industry and imposed an excessive grain procurement burden on peasants, leaving them with insufficient calories to sustain labor productivity. Our analysis shows that 61 percent of the decline in output is attributable to the policies of resource diversion and excessive procurement.

https://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/liw/papers/JPE-final2.pdf

Wei Li

Papers

Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance

Tax structure in developing countries: many puzzles and a possible explanation

The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Enterprises, 1980–1989

Government connections and financial constraints : evidence from a large representative sample of Chinese firms

The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster