A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

The measurement of meaning

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hypotheses (Cohen, 1969, 1992).

Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

The affect heuristic

When do speakers take into account common ground

1. Address correspondence to Michael E. Lamb, Section on Social and Emotional Development, National In stitute of Child Health and Human De velopment, 9190 Rockville Pike, Be thesda, MD 20814; e-mail: michael_ lamb@nih.gov. 2. Readers interested in a more complete and exhaustively referenced review than is possible here are re ferred to Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, and Orbach (1997). References

The Egocentric Basis of Language Use: Insights From a Processing Approach

https://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~who610/documents/HortonandGerrigCognition2005.pdf

The impact of memory demands on audience design during language production.

Speakers in conversation routinely engage in audience design. That is, they construct their utterances to be understood by particular addressees. Standard accounts of audience design have frequently appealed to the notion of common ground. On this view, speakers produce well-designed utterances by expressly considering the knowledge they take as shared with addressees. This article suggests that conversational common ground, rather than being a category of specialized mental representations, is more usefully conceptualized as an emergent property of ordinary memory processes. This article examines 2 separate but equally important processes: commonality assessment and message formation. Commonality assessment involves the retrieval of memory traces concerning what information is shared with an addressee, whereas message formation involves deciding how to use that information in conversation. Evidence from the CallHome English corpus of telephone conversations shows how each of these processes is rooted in ...

/pdf/conversational-common-ground-and-memory-processes-in-2rbk9kcd8v.pdf

Conversational Common Ground and Memory Processes in Language Production

This study explores phonetic convergence during conversations between pairs of talkers with varying language distance. Specifically, we examined conversations within two native English talkers and within two native Korean talkers who had either the same or different regional dialects, and between native and nonnative talkers of English. To measure phonetic convergence, an independent group of listeners judged the similarity of utterance samples from each talker through an XAB perception test, in which X was a sample of one talker’s speech and A and B were samples from the other talker at either early or late portions of the conversation. The results showed greater convergence for same-dialect pairs than for either the different-dialect pairs or the different-L1 pairs. These results generally support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between phonetic convergence and interlocutor language distance. We interpret this pattern as suggesting that phonetic convergence between talker pairs that vary in the degree of their initial language alignment may be dynamically mediated by two parallel mechanisms: the need for intelligibility and the extra demands of nonnative speech production and p erception.

/pdf/phonetic-convergence-in-spontaneous-conversations-as-a-2ijmzantw2.pdf

William S. Horton

Papers

When do speakers take into account common ground

The Egocentric Basis of Language Use: Insights From a Processing Approach

The impact of memory demands on audience design during language production.

Conversational Common Ground and Memory Processes in Language Production

Phonetic convergence in spontaneous conversations as a function of interlocutor language distance