Yanfei Lan

TL;DR: In this article, an incentive subsidy mechanism based on the service level of a bus line was proposed to overcomes the problem of information asymmetry between public transport companies and the local government in the subsidy process and reinforces that bus companies should provide efficient services on lines of different profitability levels.

TL;DR: A model in which the retailer designs a non-risk-sharing or a risk-sharing contract for the manufacturer given both random yield and private productivity information is built, illustrating that asymmetric information always harms the retailer and benefits the manufacturer regardless of whether or not the retailer shares risk.

TL;DR: In this paper, two classes of fuzzy bilevel programming models are developed for the incentive contract design problem for a project manager who operates a project consisting of multiple tasks performed sequentially by different subcontractors in which all task completion times are uncertain and described by fuzzy variables.

TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper considered two shareholding rates (forward and backward) and proposed three shareholding strategies (forward, backward and cross-shareholding) in a supplier-lead green supply chain to investigate the operation mechanism behind it.

TL;DR: This paper proposes the optimal revenue-sharing contract that provides guidance for the two participators to make their respective optimal decisions and is supported with the numerical results by analyzing the evolutions of the optimal contract under various influencing factors.