Sustainable supply chain management towards disruption and organizational ambidexterity: A data driven analysis

Pricing strategy and coordination of automobile manufacturers based on government intervention and carbon emission reduction

Nowadays, with more and more WEEE (waste electrical and electronic equipment) being abandoned, WEEE recycling activities are increasingly popular. In this paper, we build a closed-loop supply chain model and focus on the recycling behaviors of the members in this supply chain, which contains two manufacturers, the retailer, and the consumer. In the reverse chain, we set up dual channels and design two recycling methods: sell-back method and trade-in method. We use classical backward induction to run the model. And then we analyze the stability of the system and the impacts of some essential parameters by numerical simulation. The speed of the manufacture’s decision adjustment has a significant effect on the stability of the model. Manufacturers should adopt a stable rather than radical price adjustment strategy in order to achieve stable profit growth in the whole supply chain and avoid a chaotic price war. Manufacturers should increase innovation investment in recycling technology to reduce the cost of remanufacturing products and improve the initiative in market competition. In the end, we adopt the parameter control method and the decision-making method to control chaos, and they both have a good control effect.

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Study on Complex Dynamics for the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Recycling Activities Oligarchs Closed-loop Supply Chain

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/3/1115/pdf

Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

Dynamic competitive game study of a green supply chain with R&D level

The Stackelberg Dynamic Game Model for a multi-channel supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and two retailers has been analyzed in this research as manufacturer provides a single product to traditional retailer, online retailer and direct channel. The complexity of the multi-channel system of such is therefore analyzed under the aid of the methods including stability domain, bifurcation diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent, attractor, and time series. The results indicate that a great adjustment of supply order quantity in direct channels, retailer's order quantity, consumers’ channel preference, and sales effort will cause the system to lose stability and trap into complexity. On condition that customer didn't prefer the channel, the speed to adjust the order quantity would influence less on the system. Otherwise, when consumers’ channel preference too strong, the players on supply chain players would not see a profit increase, no matter how hard they'd improved their sales effort. And, so will it exhibit such a meagre influence on the profits of the whole supply players chain. During the period when sales efforts being adjusted, retailers, as the rule followers, will be confronted by more limitations than the rule maker the manufacturer. Then, to further analyze, parameters adjustment control method is utilized to control the chaos of the multi-channel supply chain. Furthermore, to investigate the influence of the delay decision on the stability domain and the profits. The research findings of this study can provide a great reference for managers and decision-making process in their supply chain management.

Coordination and control of multi-channel supply chain driven by consumers’ channel preference and sales effort

The game characteristics and equilibrium strategies of a triple-channel supply chain under the carbon subsidy policy are studied in this work with three different game power structures. There are s...

Studying the Complexity of Multichannel Supply Chain with Different Power Structures Under Carbon Subsidy Policy

Considering the trends of the carbon tax and online retail market, a comparative study on the order quantity strategy of supply chain under two carbon tax policies are conducted. A multichannel sup...

Yi Tian

Papers

Coordination and control of multi-channel supply chain driven by consumers’ channel preference and sales effort

Studying the Complexity of Multichannel Supply Chain with Different Power Structures Under Carbon Subsidy Policy

Complexity and Control of Multichannel Supply Chain Under Carbon Tax Policy