Zhenfeng Zhang

TL;DR: This paper first presents a security model for certificateless public-key signature schemes, and then proposes an efficient construction based on bilinear pairings that can be proved to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model with a tight reduction.

TL;DR: In this article, the security of the proposed scheme can be proved to be equivalent to the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle model with a tight reduction.

TL;DR: This paper shows that the generic construction of digital signature schemes under the framework of certificateless cryptography is insecure against key replacement attack, and proposes a modification of their scheme and shows its security in a new and simplified security model.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a generic construction of digital signature schemes under the framework of certificateless cryptography and showed that the security requirements of their generic building blocks are insufficient to support some security claim stated in their paper and proposed a modification of their scheme and show its security in a new and simplified security model.

TL;DR: Two new CP-ABE schemes are presented, which have both constant-size ciphertext and constant computation costs for a nonmonotone AND gate access policy, under chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks and can be proven CPA-secure in standard model under the decision n-BDHE assumption and the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.