Zheng Zhao

TL;DR: This paper shows how the AppSAT attack can deobfuscate 68 out of the 71 benchmark circuits that were obfuscated with state-of-the-art SAT attack defenses with an accuracy of, n being the number of inputs.

TL;DR: This paper presents a novel approach towards creating SAT attack resiliency based on creating densely cyclic obfuscated circuit topologies by adding dummy paths to the circuit by cyclic logic locking and demonstrates that cyclic IC camouflaging can be implemented at the layout level with no substrate area overhead and little delay and power overhead.

TL;DR: A quantitative security criterion is proposed for de-camouflaging complexity measurements and formally analyzed through the demonstration of the equivalence between the existing de-Camouflaging strategy and the active learning scheme and a provably secure camouflaging framework is developed by combining these two techniques.

TL;DR: An electronic-photonic computing architecture for a wavelength division multiplexing-based electronic-Photonic arithmetic logic unit, which disentangles the exponential relationship between power and clock rate, leading to an enhancement in computation speed and power efficiency as compared to the state-of-the-art transistors-based circuits.

TL;DR: This paper will revisit the security of sequential logic obfuscation within circuits where full scan-chains are not available or accessible and introduce attack methods to compromise obfuscated sequential circuits leveraging newly developed netlist analysis tools.