Feedback is one of the most powerful influences on learning and achievement, but this impact can be either positive or negative. Its power is frequently mentioned in articles about learning and teaching, but surprisingly few recent studies have systematically investigated its meaning. This article provides a conceptual analysis of feedback and reviews the evidence related to its impact on learning and achievement. This evidence shows that although feedback is among the major influences, the type of feedback and the way it is given can be differentially effective. A model of feedback is then proposed that identifies the particular properties and circumstances that make it effective, and some typically thorny issues are discussed, including the timing of feedback and the effects of positive and negative feedback. Finally, this analysis is used to suggest ways in which feedback can be used to enhance its effectiveness in classrooms.

http://www.columbia.edu/~mvp19/ETF/Feedback.pdf

The Power of Feedback

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning. The notion that goals or motives affect reasoning has a long and controversial history in social psychology. The propositions that motives may affect perceptions (Erdelyi, 1974), attitudes (Festinger, 1957), and attributions (Heider, 1958) have been put forth by some psychologists and challenged by others. Although early researchers and theorists took it for granted that motivation may cause people to make self-serving attributions and permit them to believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it, this view, and the research used to uphold it, came under concentrated criticism in the 1970s. The major and most damaging criticism of the motivational view was that all research purported to demonstrate motivated reasoning could be reinterpreted in entirely cognitive, nonmotivational terms (Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Thus people could draw self-serving conclusions not because they wanted to but because these conclusions seemed more plausible, given their prior beliefs and expectancies. Because both cognitive and motivational accounts could be generated for any empirical study, some theorists argued that the hot versus cold cognition controversy could not be solved, at least in the attribution paradigm (Ross & Fletcher, 1985; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). One reason for the persistence of this controversy lies in the failure of researchers to explore the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning. Recently, several authors have attempted to rectify this neglect (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). All these authors share a view of motivation as having its effects through cognitive processes: People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion.

/pdf/the-case-for-motivated-reasoning-2ki9tjbrr6.pdf

The case for motivated reasoning.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Cognitive evaluation theory, which explains the effects of extrinsic motivators on intrinsic motivation, received some initial attention in the organizational literature. However, the simple dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation made the theory difficult to apply to work settings. Differentiating extrinsic motivation into types that differ in their degree of autonomy led to self-determination theory, which has received widespread attention in the education, health care, and sport domains. This article describes self-determination theory as a theory of work motivation and shows its relevance to theories of organizational behavior. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/self-determination-theory-and-work-motivation-42ilnslrq4.pdf

Self‐determination theory and work motivation

Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion--that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation--extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures--which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.

/pdf/implicit-social-cognition-attitudes-self-esteem-and-2j32pp6h9o.pdf

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes.

Heuristics and Biases: The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning

Looking over the 11 thoughtful commentaries on our three target articles, we were each struck by the remarkable consensus among this diverse set of experts on motivational approaches to social cognition. There is little disagreement among the commentators and ourselves about the past, present, and future of motivational treatments of social psychological phenomena. There is little contention about the historical status of motivational approaches in social psychological research, although commentators do disagree somewhat on whether such approaches were ever out of favor (e.g., compare the comments of Brown and Marshall and of Snyder with those of Sherman and Sherman). More important, there is little disagreement about the present status of motivational approaches. With one exception, the commentators all share our view that motivation can and does affect cognition. (The exception is when Fein et al. argue that the notion that motivation can affect cognition is useful but not unequivocally proven.) Thus, it appears the debate over whether motivation influences judgment has been settled. As is evident from the commentators' shared reactions, the field has come to accept and endorse the importance of motivational influences in social cognition. Most commentators expressed this view in no uncertain terms. For example, Taylor and Hardin state that "the case for motivated cognition is undeniable," and Sherman and Sherman assert "that motivations and cognitions critically influence and constrain one another is certain." The commentaries also point to the wide range of domains in which such motivated influences have been demonstrated. Our own research focused on motivated thinking about the self, motivated use of stereotypes when forming impressions of others, and motivated reasoning about one's intimate partners and relationships. The commentators note that motivation may also shape reactions to persuasive messages, social comparisons, and self-evaluations. Having noted that past research has established the importance and prevalence of motivated cognition, the commentators all turn their attention to the future and contemplate what shape the "next generation" of research on motivated social cognition should take. What key questions should researchers focus on? What core principles or ideas should take center stage in work of this type? Two major themes emerge from the commentators' many valuable and provocative suggestions: It is necessary to gain deeper understanding of the interplay between motivation and cognition, and it is important to investigate what happens when people are driven by multiple, often conflicting motives simultaneously. We too consider these issues central and wish to provide some thoughts as to why.

What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About

AUTHORS' RESPONSE What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About

In this article, we review evidence showing that both the activation and the application of stereotypes may be influenced by motivation. When an applicable stereotype supports their desired impression of an individual, motivation can lead people to activate this stereotype, if they have not already activated it spontaneously. Motivation can also lead people to apply this stereotype to individuals to whom they might not have applied it otherwise. On the other hand, when an applicable stereotype casts doubt over their desired impression of an individual, motivation can lead people to inhibit the activation of this stereotype. Even ifpeople are unable to inhibit its activation, motivation may still lead them to inhibit its application to this individual. People pick and choose among the many stereotypes applicable to an individual, activating those that support their desired impression of this individual and inhibiting those that interfere

Ziva Kunda

Papers

Heuristics and Biases: The Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning

What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About

AUTHORS' RESPONSE What the Commentators Motivated Us to Think About

Activation, Application, and Inhibition

Motivational versus cognitive accounts reply