Feedback is one of the most powerful influences on learning and achievement, but this impact can be either positive or negative. Its power is frequently mentioned in articles about learning and teaching, but surprisingly few recent studies have systematically investigated its meaning. This article provides a conceptual analysis of feedback and reviews the evidence related to its impact on learning and achievement. This evidence shows that although feedback is among the major influences, the type of feedback and the way it is given can be differentially effective. A model of feedback is then proposed that identifies the particular properties and circumstances that make it effective, and some typically thorny issues are discussed, including the timing of feedback and the effects of positive and negative feedback. Finally, this analysis is used to suggest ways in which feedback can be used to enhance its effectiveness in classrooms.

http://www.columbia.edu/~mvp19/ETF/Feedback.pdf

The Power of Feedback

It is proposed that motivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes—that is, strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. The motivation to be accurate enhances use of those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate, whereas the motivation to arrive at particular conclusions enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. These ideas can account for a wide variety of research concerned with motivated reasoning. The notion that goals or motives affect reasoning has a long and controversial history in social psychology. The propositions that motives may affect perceptions (Erdelyi, 1974), attitudes (Festinger, 1957), and attributions (Heider, 1958) have been put forth by some psychologists and challenged by others. Although early researchers and theorists took it for granted that motivation may cause people to make self-serving attributions and permit them to believe what they want to believe because they want to believe it, this view, and the research used to uphold it, came under concentrated criticism in the 1970s. The major and most damaging criticism of the motivational view was that all research purported to demonstrate motivated reasoning could be reinterpreted in entirely cognitive, nonmotivational terms (Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Thus people could draw self-serving conclusions not because they wanted to but because these conclusions seemed more plausible, given their prior beliefs and expectancies. Because both cognitive and motivational accounts could be generated for any empirical study, some theorists argued that the hot versus cold cognition controversy could not be solved, at least in the attribution paradigm (Ross & Fletcher, 1985; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). One reason for the persistence of this controversy lies in the failure of researchers to explore the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning. Recently, several authors have attempted to rectify this neglect (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Kunda, 1987; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986). All these authors share a view of motivation as having its effects through cognitive processes: People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion.

/pdf/the-case-for-motivated-reasoning-2ki9tjbrr6.pdf

The case for motivated reasoning.

Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

https://www.motherjones.com/files/emotional_dog_and_rational_tail.pdf

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Cognitive evaluation theory, which explains the effects of extrinsic motivators on intrinsic motivation, received some initial attention in the organizational literature. However, the simple dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation made the theory difficult to apply to work settings. Differentiating extrinsic motivation into types that differ in their degree of autonomy led to self-determination theory, which has received widespread attention in the education, health care, and sport domains. This article describes self-determination theory as a theory of work motivation and shows its relevance to theories of organizational behavior. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/self-determination-theory-and-work-motivation-42ilnslrq4.pdf

Self‐determination theory and work motivation

Social behavior is ordinarily treated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) control. However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that past experience influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor. The present conclusion--that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation--extends both the construct validity and predictive usefulness of these major theoretical constructs of social psychology. Methodologically, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures--which are imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice. The finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges' attention on their judgment task provides a basis for evaluating applications (such as affirmative action) aimed at reducing such unintended discrimination.

/pdf/implicit-social-cognition-attitudes-self-esteem-and-2j32pp6h9o.pdf

Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes.

The self-concept literature is characterized by a continuing controversy over whether the self-concept is stable or malleable. In this article we suggest that it is both but that the stability observed for general descriptions of the self may mask significant local variation. In this study the social environment was varied by creating a situation in which subjects found themselves to be either very unique or very similar to others. Following this manipulation, subjects responded to a series of self-concept measures. Although the uniqueness and similarity subjects did not differ in the trait terms they used to describe themselves, they did differ systematically in their latency for these judgments, in positivity and negativity of their word associations, and in their judgments of similarity to reference groups. These findings imply that subjects made to feel unique recruited conceptions of themselves as similar to others, whereas subjects made to feel similar to others recruited conceptions of themselves as unique. The results suggest that very general self-descriptive measures are inadequate for revealing how the individual adjusts and calibrates the self-concept in response to challenges from the social environment.

Stability and malleability of the self-concept.

In reasoning about everyday problems, people use statistical heuristics, that is, judgmental tools that are rough intuitive equivalents of statistical principles. Statistical heuristics have improved historically and they improve ontogenetically. Use of statistical heuristics is more likely when (a) the sample space and the sampling process are clear, (b) the role of chance in producing events is clear, or (c) the culture specifies statistical reasoning as normative for the events. Perhaps because statistical procedures are part of people's intuitive equipment to begin with, training in statistics has a marked impact on reasoning. Training increases both the likelihood that people will take a statistical approach to a given problem and the quality of the statistical solutions. These empirical findings have important normative implications.

/pdf/the-use-of-statistical-heuristics-in-everyday-inductive-1xtjnmohwd.pdf

The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning

Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behaviors : a parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory

The authors describe a theoretical framework for understanding when people interacting with a member of a stereotyped group activate that group's stereotype and apply it to that person. It is proposed that both stereotype activation and stereotype application during interaction depend on the strength of comprehension and self-enhancement goals that can be satisfied by stereotyping one's interaction partner and on the strength of one's motivation to avoid prejudice. The authors explain how these goals can promote and inhibit stereotype activation and application, and describe diverse chronic and situational factors that can influence the intensity of these goals during interaction and, thereby, influence stereotype activation and application. This approach permits integration of a broad range of findings on stereotype activation and application.

/pdf/when-do-stereotypes-come-to-mind-and-when-do-they-color-410cjql9lg.pdf

When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application.

The motivation to form a particular impression of an individual can prompt the inhibition of applicable stereotypes that contradict one's desired impression and the activation and application of stereotypes that support it. Participants, especially those high in prejudice, inhibited the Black stereotype when motivated to esteem a Black individual (because he had praised them). Participants motivated to esteem a Black doctor also activated the doctor stereotype. In contrast, participants motivated to disparage a Black doctor (because he had criticized them) inhibited the doctor stereotype. Participants motivated to disparage a Black individual also applied the Black stereotype to him, rating him as relatively incompetent. All these effects were driven by the self-protective motives of recipients of feedback from Black evaluators; detached observers showed no such effects.

Ziva Kunda

Papers

Stability and malleability of the self-concept.

The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning

Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behaviors : a parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory

When do stereotypes come to mind and when do they color judgment? A goal-based theoretical framework for stereotype activation and application.

Reactions to a Black professional : Motivated inhibition and activation of conflicting stereotypes