Bank of Israel

About: Bank of Israel is a based out in . It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Inflation. The organization has 125 authors who have published 394 publications receiving 11002 citations.

Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies

Abstract: Like other recent studies, we find a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section of countries, but show that this result is driven by the experience of "new democracies". The political budget cycle in new democracies accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger samples that include these countries and disappears when they are removed from the larger sample. The political deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed economies, for the stronger cycle in weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one that it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical phenomenon, the other that voters punish rather than reward fiscal manipulation.

Consumption and Risk Sharing Over the Life Cycle

Abstract: A striking feature of U.S. data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age. Using both panel data and an equilibrium life cycle model, we argue that this is informative for understanding the importance and the characteristics of idiosyncratic labor market risk. We find that uncertainty distributed throughout the working years accounts for 40 percent of life time uncertainty, with the remainder being realized prior to entering the labor market. We estimate that the shocks received over the life cycle contain a highly persistent component, with an autocorrelation coefficient between 0.98 and unity. The joint behavior of earnings and consumption inequality, interpreted using our model, adds to the body of evidence suggesting that labor market risks are imperfectly pooled and that a precautionary motive is an important aspect of U.S. savings behavior. The restrictions imposed by general equilibrium theory play an important role in arriving at each of these conclusions.

Inflation and the Poor

Abstract: The poor suffer more from inflation than the rich do, reveals this survey of poor people in 38 countries Using polling data for 31,869 households in 38 countries and allowing for country effects, Easterly and Fischer show that the poor are more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a top national concern This result survives several robustness checks Also, direct measures of improvements in well-being for the poor - the change in their share of national income, the percentage decline in poverty, and the percentage change in the real minimum wage - are negatively correlated with inflation in pooled cross-country samples High inflation tends to lower the share of the bottom quintile and the real minimum wage - and tends to increase poverty This paper - a joint product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group, and the International Monetary Fund - is part of a larger effort to study the effects of macroeconomic policies on growth and poverty

How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries

Abstract: Conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected, but this has not been tested in a large cross-section of countries. We test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. We find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries - developed and less developed, new and old democracies, countries with different government or electoral systems, and countries with different levels of democracy. In developed countries and in old democracies, election-year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected, with similar, although smaller, negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent's term in office. Higher growth rates of real GDP per-capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies, but voters are affected by growth over the leader's term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth. Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries. The effects we find are not only statistically significant, but also quite substantial quantitatively. We also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies.