Showing papers by "Institute for the Study of Labor published in 1983"

Public Sector Labor Markets

Abstract: This paper provides a critical survey of the literature dealing with public sector labor markets. It discusses the research by economists on wage determination in the state and local sector (including the effects of unions), on the estimation of compensating wage differentials for pecuniary and nonpecuniary job characteristics, on the effects of unions on productivity, on the estimation of public/private pay differentials, and on gender and race discrimination in the public sector. Numerous suggestions for future research are offered.

Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence

Abstract: This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration. Simple models of arbitrator behavior are developed under each of these alternative mechanisms. These models are estimated and tested using data on the outcomes of both forms of arbitrationin New Jersey, a state in which arbitration is mandatory for unresolved pay disputes involving police officer unions and public employers. The major findings are (1) that the high proportion of union victories under final-offer arbitration were generated by a set of impartial arbitrators applying the same standards used in conventional arbitration, and (2) that union bargainers appear to be considerably more risk averse than employer bargainers, with the wage increases under final-offer arbitration having a lower mean and a lower variance than under conventional arbitration.

Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs: Some Data Problems

Abstract: Our paper attempts to identify the types of data nee3ed to estimate tradeoffs between wages and fringe benefits (such as pensions); it also explores the usefulness for this estimation of one particular employer- based data set collected by gay Associates. We stress three things: first, that employer-based data sets are required. Second, because pensions and many other fringe benefits are actuarial functions of wages or salaries, these technical relationships must be accounted for in estimation. Third, to take account of unobservable heterogeneity of employees across employers, one must use econometric methods that control for these unobservable variables. The paper concludes with a discussion of our attempts to estimate the tradeoff between wages and fringe benefits using a unique database for 200 establishments that contains information on wages and actuarial valuations of employer costs of fringe benefits at three different job levels.

Incentive Effects of Pensions

Abstract: Many different types of pension plans exist in American firms. The stipulations of plans vary dramatically, even among large firms, with respect to vesting, relationship of the pension to final salary, maximum and minimum years of service constraints, and maximum and minimum benefit levels. These provisions are examined to determine their effects on worker behavior.Specifically, the paper analyes which plans encourage or discourage appropriate worker responses in hours worked, turnover, human capital investment and effort. An attempt is made to explain the provisions in light of the findings.

Inflation and Labor-Market Adjustment

Abstract: The implications of downward nominal and ex ante real wage rigidity,and of wage contracting for the dispersion of relative wage changes in the presence of price inflation are examined. Rigidity implies that unexpected inflation will raise the variability of relative wage changes; contracting implies unexpected inflation reduces variability. Using data on manufacturing industries for 1955-81, and on private nonfarm industries for1965-81,these hypotheses are studied. The dispersion in relative wage cnanges is reduced by greater price inflation. Most of the reduction is a response to unexpected inflation: Expected inflation has little impact on dispersion.These findings hold for subperiods within the sample, and are robust to different choices of measures of price expectations,including those of the Livingston survey, the Survey Research Center household data, and ARMA forecasts. They stand in striking contrast to the commonly accepted result that price inflation is associated with greater dispersion of relative price changes. They suggest that inflation reduces the ability of relative wages to signal disequilibria among labor markets.

Food Stamps as Money and Income

Abstract: Food Stamps represent nearly $11 billion of personal income in the United States. The coupons that are issued to represent the purchasing power available to recipients are also reserves for the commercial banking system.This study asks how closely these coupons are substitutable for what is usually considered as money, and how well Food Stamps function as a fiscal stabilizer (whether they increase consumption more than does ordinary income). The results, based on estimates for 1959-1981, suggest that Food Stamp coupons are perfectly substitutable for Ml, and a revised money-supply series including "Food Stamp Money" is included in an Appendix. Estimates of consumption functions indicate that the MPC out of income in the form of Food Stamps is higher than that out of ordinary income. Taken together, the results suggest that the Food Stamp program is an automatic fiscal and monetary stabilizer -- under its provisions, both the money stock and disposable income are increased during a recession.

Economic and Statistical Analysis of Discrimination in Hiring

Abstract: Legal and administrative determinations of employers' compliance with "equal employment opportunity" (EEO) requirements often hinge on the issue of the availability of protected class members to employers. That is,courts and affirmative action review agencies compare the hire rates of protected class members (the ratio of the number of protected class members hired to the number who applied or who were potentially available) to the comparable ratio for other applicants, in assessing whether an employer's hiring policies meet the standards required of them by equal opportunity regulations. The purpose of this paper is to review what economic theory suggests affects availability and to analyze the extent to which these factors are considered in administrative or judicial decisions concerning hiring policies. In our analyses, we point out areas where there seem tobe inconsistencies or unresolved issues.

Raids and Imitation

Abstract: Many job changes occur without intervening spells of unemployment. A model is constructed in an attempt to understand this phenomenon. It implies that the best workers are hired away first because, with imperfect information, prices do not fully adjust for quality. Thus, there develops stigma associated with failing to receive outside offers. The force of the stigma, which affects wages, depends upon the likelihood of discovering a worker's ability, the size of the market, and the speed of diffusion of information. In some occupations, it implies that there quickly develop pronounced differences in the treatment of raided and unraided workers. A consequence is a theory of occupational wage dispersion. The Peter Principle - that workers are promoted to a level of incompetence - is a direct implication.The model can be applied to product markets as well to explain the relationship between price and time on the shelf.