Institution
Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli
Education•Rome, Lazio, Italy•
About: Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli is a education organization based out in Rome, Lazio, Italy. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Monetary policy. The organization has 692 authors who have published 2493 publications receiving 36411 citations. The organization is also known as: Libera Universita Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli & Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali "Guido Carli".
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the normative and conceptual difference between American monopolization and attempt to monopolize claims and European abuse of dominant position, and show that significant differences exist between these doctrines which have exerted a significant impact on the way courts apply competition tools towards IPRs.
Abstract: As intellectual property rights have encountered an expansive trend throughout the world, the debate on the relation between IPRs and competition law has regained enormous attention. The discussion about whether antitrust law is (or should) be the most appropriate instrument to constraint an over-expansionist application of IPRs has found strong supporters and opponents on both sides of the Atlantic. However, American courts and European agencies have adopted a quite different approach in the treatment of anticompetitive conduct favored by the exploitation of an intellectual property right. Namely, American courts have shown a tendency to refrain competition law tools from interfering with intangible monopolies, while European agencies have severely constrained monopolists' conduct that - in the most common example - use IPRs to leverage their dominant position in a second market. This paper aims at studying and comparing the diverse approaches outlined above starting the analysis from the normative and conceptual difference between American monopolization and attempt to monopolize claims and European abuse of dominant position. As we will see, significant differences exist between these doctrines which have exerted a significant impact on the way courts apply competition tools towards IPRs.
12 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the effectiveness of different risk sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union and compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.
Abstract: Our paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of different risk-sharing mechanisms in providing stability to a monetary union. We select two stylized tools with extreme and opposite features. The first is an expansionary but conventional monetary policy that is used to help EMU’s most fragile member states manage their public debts; the second is a centralized fiscal policy that allows for the transfer of a portion of these public debts from EMU’s most fragile member states to those considered EMU’s “core”. By a stylized periphery-core model of a monetary union, we compare the strengths and weaknesses of these two tools in order to reach some welfare implications in terms of union stability.
12 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair is proposed, where the latencies of edges are composed of free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints.
Abstract: We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed of free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We give a precise description of the dynamics induced by the individual strategies of players and of the corresponding costs, either when the traffic is controlled by a planner, or when players act selfishly. In parallel networks, optimal and equilibrium behavior eventually coincide, but the selfish behavior of the initial players has consequences that cannot be undone and are paid by all future generations. In more general topologies, our main contributions are threefold. First, we illustrate a new dynamic version of Braess paradox: the presence of initial queues in the network may decrease the long-run costs in equilibrium. This paradox can arise in networks for which no Braess paradox was previously known. Second, we show that equilibria are not unique and can induce ve...
12 citations
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TL;DR: The Italian electoral system proposed by Renzi and Berlusconi as discussed by the authors is a majority-assuring system that guarantees an absolute majority (of 340 seats) to the list that obtains at least 40% of the votes or to the winner winning a run-off if no list wins 40% at the first round.
Abstract: Italy has a new electoral system for parliamentary elections. It is the third since 1993. It was approved in May 2015, but it will come into force on 1 July 2016. It replaces the present proportional system for the Chamber of Deputies, but not that for the Senate. A constitutional reform, which is under way, aims at transforming the Senate into a second chamber without the authority to consider motions of confidence, and limited powers. The new electoral system – nicknamed the Italicum – is a majority-assuring system agreed upon by the leader of the Democratic Party, Matteo Renzi, and the leader of Forza Italia, Silvio Berlusconi. Thanks to a seat bonus, it guarantees an absolute majority (of 340 seats) to the list that obtains at least 40% of the votes or to the list winning a run-off if no list wins 40% at the first round. The losers will share 278 seats. There is a 3% threshold at the national level for entitlement to seats. The Italicum represents an appropriate balance between the objective of promot...
12 citations
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TL;DR: This article used the European Social Survey module "Europeans understandings and evaluations of democracy" and multilevel item response theory models to build a measure of the meaning of democracy in terms of multiple attributes and to account for individual-and country-level variation.
Abstract: What do citizens think democracy is and what factors contribute to its meaning? Previous works on the public understanding of democracy have shown that, overall, citizens see democracy in “minimal” terms. However, advanced democracies are complex and encompass several elements other than elections and freedoms. This article uses the European Social Survey module “Europeans’ understandings and evaluations of democracy” and multilevel item response theory models to build a measure of the meaning of democracy in terms of multiple attributes and to account for individual- and country-level variation. The findings show that the meaning of democracy can be seen as a continuum, and that middle-aged educated men who are interested in politics, have extreme ideological positions, and are engaged in civic organizations include more elements in their idea of democracy, and that the cross-country variation in the meaning of democracy mostly depends on democratic performance.
12 citations
Authors
Showing all 730 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Saverio Lombardi | 73 | 370 | 18105 |
J. Doyne Farmer | 68 | 250 | 22848 |
Henry Chesbrough | 59 | 140 | 44019 |
Jack D. Farmer | 55 | 223 | 12419 |
Cristiano Castelfranchi | 54 | 294 | 12312 |
John A. Mathews | 53 | 173 | 11223 |
Peter S.H. Leeflang | 51 | 176 | 9153 |
Werner Güth | 48 | 589 | 14386 |
Giuseppe F. Italiano | 43 | 299 | 7319 |
Dario Rossi | 40 | 257 | 5972 |
Richard L. Priem | 40 | 82 | 11992 |
Niels Noorderhaven | 39 | 135 | 7521 |
Francesco Lippi | 37 | 116 | 5664 |
John D. Hey | 37 | 160 | 5837 |
Fabiano Schivardi | 37 | 129 | 6022 |