Showing papers in "American Journal of Political Science in 1993"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue for the systematic incorporation of political factors that shape the electoral consequences of economic performance, and show that considerations of the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, and the clarity of its political responsibility are essential to understand the effects of economic conditions on voting for or against incumbents.
Abstract: A large literature has demonstrated that such economic factors as growth, inflation, and unemployment affect the popularity of incumbents within many democratic countries. However, cross-national aggregate analyses of "economic voting" show only weak and inconsistent economic effects. We argue for the systematic incorporation of political factors that shape the electoral consequences of economic performance. Multivariate analyses of 102 elections in 19 industrialized democracies are used to estimate the cross-national impact of economic and political factors. The analyses show that considerations of the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, and the clarity of its political responsibility are essential to understanding the effects of economic conditions on voting for or against incumbents.
1,782Â citations
TL;DR: The authors investigate the origins of voters' expectations of greater female competency on "compassion" issues, such as dealing with poverty or the aged, and greater male competency in military and defense issues.
Abstract: We investigate the origins of voters' expectations of greater female competency on "compassion" issues, such as dealing with poverty or the aged, and greater male competency on military and defense issues. We contrast two alternative explanations: gender-trait stereotypes, emphasizing a candidate's gender-linked personality traits; and gender-belief stereotypes, placing greatest importance on the differing political outlooks of male and female candidates. We test contrasting predictions from these two approaches with data from an experiment in which 297 undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to hear about a male or a female candidate with typically masculine or feminine traits. Overall, there was stronger support for the trait approach. Warm and expressive candidates were seen as better at compassion issues; instrumental candidates were rated as more competent to handle the military and economic issues. Moreover, masculine instrumental traits increased the candidate's perceived competence on a broader range of issues than the feminine traits of warmth and expressiveness. Finally, there was some limited support for the belief approach with gender-based expectations about the candidates' political views affecting their rated competency on compassion but not other types of political issues.
1,082Â citations
TL;DR: Turnout, however, presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics, for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which, although all may benefit from voting, it is rarely in the individual's self-interest to vote as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy. Voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens. Turnout, however, presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics, for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action, in which, although all may benefit from voting, it is rarely in the individual's self-interest to vote. This paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout. A basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed-basic in the sense that it is common to all such models. This basic model is shown to be incomplete, and the two most important models, the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model, are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model, along with mention of game-theoretic models. Their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed. The remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible. The first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is, for many, a low cost, low (expected) benefit decision. A "strategic politicians" account of turnout and campaigns is examined next. A reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature, its decline. These steps, I argue, make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system.
956Â citations
TL;DR: This paper found that partisan stereotypes have considerable influence in political information processing, suggesting that the political parties continue to play an important role in voters' decision-making processes, and two different cognitive strategies are outlined, a theory-driven and data-driven mode, and hypotheses about the use of these two strategies in political candidate evaluation, inference, and perception are developed.
Abstract: Research in social cognition suggests that individuals employ a variety of cognitive strategies when processing information. Some of these strategies may function as cognitive heuristics, or simplifying rules of thumb, under certain information-processing conditions. In this article, I suggest that political party stereotypes can function heuristically for voters when they are confronted with political information-processing tasks. Two different cognitive strategies are outlined, a "theory-driven" and "data-driven" mode, and hypotheses about the use of these two strategies in political candidate evaluation, inference, and perception are developed. These are tested with an experimental design that uses videotapes of political candidates as stimulus material. I find that partisan stereotypes have considerable influence in political information processing, suggesting that the political parties continue to play an important role in voters' decision-making processes.
828Â citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors describes the development and testing of survey-based measures of political knowledge, with special attention to the existing items on the National Election Study surveys, and illustrates the use of a variety of techniques for item analysis and scale construction.
Abstract: Research in political behavior has increasingly turned to the cognitions underlying attitudes. The simplest of these cognitions are political facts-the bits of information about politics that citizens hold. While other key concepts in political science-partisanship, trust, tolerance-have widely used (if still controversial) measures that facilitate comparisons across time and among studies, the discipline has no generally accepted measure of the public's level of political information. This paper describes the development and testing of survey-based measures of political knowledge, with special attention to the existing items on the National Election Study surveys. In so doing, it illustrates the use of a variety of techniques for item analysis and scale construction. We also present a recommended fiveitem knowledge index.
665Â citations
TL;DR: The authors found that black candidates were penalized by white voters based on the candidate's race, skin color, and individual levels of racial prejudice, and that voters who were racially intolerant and aware of the negative social consequences of expressing their prejudice engaged in selfmonitoring (i.e., they relied on information gained from social circumstances and suppressed the reporting of their negative attitudes toward African American candidates).
Abstract: A random sample of adults read about one of three fictitious candidates running for governor with a photograph of either a white male, a light-complected black male, or a dark-complected black male attached. The results indicate (1) that black candidates were penalized by white voters based on the candidate's race, skin color, and individual levels of racial prejudice; (2) that voters who were racially intolerant and aware of the negative social consequences of expressing their prejudice engaged in self-monitoring (i.e., they relied on information gained from social circumstances and suppressed the reporting of their negative attitudes toward African American candidates); (3) that skin color differences in the black candidate may have generated distinct forms of cognitive processing. That is, respondents exposed to the light-complected black candidate engaged in automatic cognitive processing, while subjects assigned to the dark-skinned black condition consciously processed racial information. The political consequences of these results are discussed.
407Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a working definition of liberal democracy was proposed and a theory of "method factors" in subjective measures of liberal democracies was presented. But the results suggest that the current practice of treating unadjusted democracy indicators as error free can be misleading.
Abstract: This paper examines the definition and measurement of liberal democracy. Specifically, my purposes are (1) to propose a working definition of liberal democracy; (2) to outline a theory of "method factors" in subjective measures of liberal democracy; (3) to provide the first estimates of the proportion of variance due to systematic error, validity, and random error in commonly used measures; (4) to replicate these results across several years; and (5) to estimate the degree of liberal democracy in more than 150 countries. All but one measure contain systematic error, and in some cases the bias component is large. Furthermore, a new liberal democracy index has a .96 squared correlation with the liberal democracy latent variable and has negligible correlations with the method factors that are present in the individual indicators. The results suggest that the current practice of treating unadjusted democracy indicators as error free can be misleading.
406Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors tried to determine whether parties of the left, when in government, spend more than those of the right in 15 liberal democracies over a period of 28 years, from 1960 to 1987.
Abstract: The paper attempts to determine whether parties of the left, when in government, spend more than parties of the right. It first reviews the theoretical literature and concludes that parties are likely to make a difference, but only a modest one. It then reviews previous empirical studies, which come out with conflicting results. It finally proposes a study that covers 15 liberal democracies over a period of 28 years, from 1960 to 1987, and combines longitudinal, cross-sectional, and pooled designs. The analysis shows that parties of the left do spend a little more than parties of the right. The difference, however, emerges only for majority governments whose party composition remains unchanged over a number of years, an indication that it takes time for parties to affect total spending. A quarter of a century ago, Dye (1966) concluded that policy variations in the United States ought to be attributed essentially to economic factors, political variables proving to be largely uninfluential. This was a most disturbing result for the political science discipline, whose relevance, it would seem, depends on the substantive importance of the phenomena it examines. Ten years later, Wilenski's (1975) study of the welfare state came to similar conclusions: the root cause of the level of welfare expenditure in a country is economic growth, and the mechanism that translates economic change into public policy is demographic rather than political. Enlightened political scientists knew it could not be so, and a counterattack was mounted. The case was made that politics matters, and refined analyses vindicated the revisionist view (Castles and McKinlay 1979; Castles 1982). This paper is about the most cherished of all political variables, the parties. Political scientists typically view parties as fulfilling an essential role in democracy (Epstein 1983). A strong party system is considered as a necessary condition for an adequate representation of interests and opinions (Birch 1971). Our objective is to determine whether it matters
388Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information, and find that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly.
Abstract: This paper explores the extent and character of interest group influence on legislative policy in a model of decision making under incomplete information. A committee may propose an alternative to a given status quo under closed rule. Policies are related to consequences with ex ante uncertainty. An interest group is able to acquire policy—relevant information at a price, and has access to legislators at both the agenda setting stage and the vote stage. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission. The price of information is itself a private datum to the group, and legislators cannot observe whether the group elects to become informed. If the group is informed, then its information is likewise private. Among the results are: that not all informed lobbyists choose to try and influence the agenda directly; that there can coexist influential lobbying at both stages of the process; and that while informative agenda stage lobbying is genetically influential, the same is not true of voting stage lobbying.
335Â citations
TL;DR: In the post-World War II era, American women have been consistently less militaristic and more opposed to war than American men as mentioned in this paper and theorists, both feminist and not, have attributed such differences to gender itself, maternalism, and feminism.
Abstract: In the post-World War II era, American women have been consistently less militaristic and more opposed to war than American men. Theorists, both feminist and not, have attributed such differences to gender itself, maternalism, and feminism. Drawing on the American National Election Study 1991 Pilot Study, we explore these hypotheses and discover no support for the maternalist explanation, some evidence in favor of the feminist accounting, and substantial support for the gender explanation. We also probe into the structure of political thinking in these areas and discover that the roots of women's and men's thinking usually differ even when they basically agree on the "bottom line." In particular, men's attitudes are much more partisan in their origins than are women's.
280Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a unique aggregate-level data set is introduced to aid in examination of the broad significance of heuristic processing of source cues, revealing clear evidence that this individuallevel cognitive efficiency mechanism exerts influence on the shape and character of mass opinion.
Abstract: Research in the field of political cognition has proceeded at a rapid pace, offering numerous new perspectives regarding the dynamics of mass political behavior. However, the primary focus of most such research has been the individual actor. For example, the political relevance of heuristic principles of judgment has been addressed in a variety of recent studies, all of which examine individual-level data. However, though it is certainly true that psychological processes operate on the individual, it is also quite clear that the political significance of mass behavior typically is found at the collective level. Thus, it is essential that researchers specify the aggregate consequences of those psychological processes that operate on the political judgments of the individual citizen. In this article, a unique aggregate-level data set is introduced to aid in examination of the broad significance of heuristic processing of source cues. The analysis reveals clear evidence that this individuallevel cognitive efficiency mechanism exerts influence on the shape and character of mass opinion.
TL;DR: The authors found that respondents tend to answer questions off the top of their heads, and their answers often take into account only the most obvious considerations on the topic, while most issues are sufficiently complex that they bring forth multiple considerations if respondents are given enough time to reflect on them.
Abstract: and enduring. Nevertheless, this does not compromise my intent in this essay to study the process by which people arrive at their opinions on these controversial matters. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.235 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 06:27:54 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 869 angles, and it is the perspective chosen by the respondent that affects the tenor of his or her opinions. 2. People typically choose their frames of reference hastily or off the tops of their heads. They might react to an especially prominent cue in the question or relate the issue to a personal experience. They often respond to the question by saying what immediately comes to mind. Not surprisingly, respondents have difficulty framing answers to vague, open-ended "essay" questions that offer few explicit cues. On more structured questions, their answers often take into account only the most obvious considerations on the topic. For many individuals, the choice of one side or the other on a given issue depended on which considerations were jogged by the question. If the question brought to mind considerations of free speech, the right to a trial, or some other civil libertarian norm, then the respondent was more likely to take a tolerant position on the matter. On the other hand, if the question prompted thoughts about the potential costs of upholding individual rights, opinions tended to be less tolerant. 3. Since respondents tend to answer questions off the tops of their heads, it is easy to see how survey results can be biased by altering the wording, format, or context of the survey questions. By making certain cues in the question more prominent than others, we can affect which frames of reference respondents will use to base their opinions. For example, respondents were regularly swayed during these interviews by the intimation or mention of honorific principles such as free speech, majority rule, or minority rights. 4. It is apparent that the notion of a constitutional right holds a particularly strong influence on people when they are evaluating questions about individual rights and freedoms. People often try to relate the issue being discussed to their understanding of the legal norm on the subject in a conscious effort to make their opinions consistent with court rulings. Indeed, some subjects have difficulty separating their understanding of what the law is from their opinion of what the law should be. Many of the subjects were willing to defend what they believed to be a constitutional right even if they did not fully understand either the scope or justification of that right. Evidently, some people learn to endorse democratic principles by rote. They not only say what they understand to be socially desirable, but they believe it for the same reason. 5. While people may respond to a question based on a single consideration, most issues are sufficiently complex that they bring forth multiple considerations if respondents are given enough time to reflect on them. Many examples will be provided that show that people revise and often reverse their original answers in light of new considerations that were This content downloaded from 157.55.39.235 on Fri, 07 Oct 2016 06:27:54 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies, and used this approach to study the decision of an electoral system in Germany after World War II and found that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence.
Abstract: Institutions determine the results of social decision processes, yet institutions are themselves endogenous products of earlier social choices. This paper explores the hypothesis that participants in the choice of institutions seek alternatives that favor their desired policies. The choice of institutions can be analyzed in terms of bargaining between individuals or parties, where preferences derive from preferences over policy and bargaining is structured by existing institutions. This approach is used to study the choice of an electoral system in Germany after World War II. The hypothesis that parties choose electoral institutions to maximize their future policy influence explains both the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the switch to a two-vote ballot in 1953.
TL;DR: The authors used multivariate analysis to test the notion that early economic experiences have a lasting effect on postmaterialist values as measured by Inglehart and found that education and economic conditions at the time of the survey are much more important explanations for variations in the postmaterialism measure.
Abstract: The postmaterialism concept developed by Ronald Inglehart has generated a considerable body of literature over the past couple of decades. One of the critical arguments concerning postmaterialism is that economic security or conditions at the early period of political maturation have a strong and long-lasting influence on postmaterialist attitudes later in life. Employing multivariate analysis, this paper tests the notion that early economic experiences have a lasting effect on postmaterialist values as measured by Inglehart. The data are collected from eight Western European nations over the 1973-84 period. These findings are supplemented with a recent survey of the European portion of the former Soviet Union. The results of this analysis suggest that early economic conditions do not actually affect how respondents rank Inglehart's postmaterialist items. Education and economic conditions at the time of the survey are much more important explanations for variations in the postmaterialist measure.
TL;DR: This article developed a model of political-bureaucratic adaptation to changing political conditions, and tested it with output data from four Environmental Protection Agency programs between 1979 and 1988, and found that political bicluster adaptation is indeed a more complex phenomenon than suggested by earlier research.
Abstract: Through the 1980s, political science research produced a more dynamic view of how bureaucracies respond to changing political conditions. However, much of this research ignored the complex stimulus environment within which bureaucracies operate, as well as the potentially rich bureaucratic response dynamic that can exist. We extend our previous work on the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy by developing a model of political-bureaucratic adaptation. Themodel is tested with output data from four Environmental Protection Agency programs between 1979 and 1988. The results show that politicalbureaucratic adaptation is indeed a more complex phenomenon than suggested by earlier research. Stimuli to bureaucratic behavior include discrete events, event progressions, and "tonal" shifts in the policy environment; bureaucratic responses can be immediate, delayed, or distributed through time in probabilistic fashion. Substantively, the results offer new insights on how political institutions affect bureaucratic behavior. They also suggest how, why, and to what bureaucracy responds.
TL;DR: This article found that fully labeled branching measures of party identification and policy attitudes are more reliable than partially labeled non-branching measures of those attitudes, and that the difference seems to be attributable to effects of both verbal labeling and branching.
Abstract: Much research has suggested that citizens' political party affiliations are more persistent over time and more psychologically consequential than are their attitudes toward government policies. However, most surveys have measured party identification with branching questions in which all response alternatives were verbally labeled, whereas policy preferences have typically been measured using nonbranching questions with incomplete verbal labeling of response alternatives. We report eight experiments, involving telephone interviewing, face-to-face interviewing, and self-administered questionnaires, demonstrating that fully labeled branching measures of party identification and policy attitudes are more reliable than partially labeled nonbranching measures of those attitudes. This difference seems to be attributable to effects of both verbal labeling and branching. Thus, it appears that previous findings regarding differences between party identification and policy preferences are partly due to the failure to equate the formats of survey questions measuring those attitudes.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a participation model to analyze how lobbyists work within this linkage framework and maintain the membership of their interest groups, and find that the existence of an IGE is not always necessary to convince the government to provide a public good favoring a particular group of constituents, but the presence of a IGE provides informational gains that may reduce the number of equilibria in the game and improve the efficiency of the interactions between governments and particular interests in society.
Abstract: When fulfilling its linkage function, an interest group acts as a conduit between constituents and government officials. To help maintain the group's "raison d' etre," a lobbyist, or interest group entrepreneur (IGE), must interact successfully with two distinct sets of individuals: members (and potential members) of the associated group and government officials. An IGE's overall success depends on his or her success with each of these distinct sets of individuals. In this paper, we develop a participation model to analyze how lobbyists work within this linkage framework and, at the same time, maintain the membership of their interest groups. By emphasizing the lobbyist's informational roles, we provide a new (nonexchanged based) rationale for the emergence of lobbyists. We find that the existence of an IGE is not always necessary to convince the government to provide a public good favoring a particular group of constituents, but the presence of an IGE provides informational gains that may reduce the number of equilibria in the game and improve the efficiency of the interactions between governments and particular interests in society.
TL;DR: In this paper, a model that reconciles the positive association between income and voting found in cross-sectional studies with the negative correlation between incomes and voter turnout over time is developed.
Abstract: A model that reconciles the positive association between income and voting found in cross-sectional studies with the negative correlation between income and turnout over time is developed. Voting is modeled as a "group" rational activity. Voter turnout rates in the United States for the 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1980 elections are used to test the model. Voter turnout is found first to fall and then to rise as families move up the income distribution. Voter turnout also rises as real wages fall, as educational attainment increases, as elections become closer, and as poll taxes and literacy tests are removed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the formal logic of supervision and compliance is extended to models of the systemic component of the stochastic processes of police behavior, such as when it is time to lay a speed trap, and when is it time to go to the donut shop.
Abstract: Several recent articles outline the formal logic of supervision and compliance (e.g., Bianco and Bates 1990; Holmstrom 1982; Kreps 1990; and Miller 1992). These models lead to widely varying conclusions about what makes for effective supervision, indeed, whether supervision can induce compliance among subordinates at all. Our paper evaluates these models by extending the formal logic into models of the systemic component of the stochastic processes of police behavior. In other words, when is it time to lay a speed trap, and when is it time to go to the donut shop?
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use the theory of overhead democracy to formulate a political explanation for antitrust regulation, and show that Antitrust Division behavior is strongly affected by the major U.S. political actors, including the president, Congress, and courts.
Abstract: The purpose of antitrust regulation is to promote and maintain fair competition in the U.S. economy. Yet economists and political scientists have long been unable to identify economic determinants of antitrust activity. Recent studies have turned toward bureaucratic theory for explaining antitrust enforcement. However, we argue that both economic and bureaucratic theories of antitrust regulation fail because they ignore the overarching institutional framework within which regulation occurs. We use the theory of overhead democracy to formulate a political explanation for antitrust regulation. Drawing upon data for the Antitrust Division's resources and enforcement activity from 1970 to 1989, we show that Antitrust Division behavior is strongly affected by the major U.S. political actors, including the president, Congress, and courts. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of political, rather than market-based, antitrust regulation.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that distinctions must be drawn between "ambitious" and "experience-seeking" amateurs because no single theory can explain amateurs' motivations.
Abstract: Why do hundreds of amateurs challenge entrenched U.S. House incumbents every two years? Previous work offers a range of explanations, from naivetd to love of politics. The most systematic study of this question concluded that amateurs challenge incumbents because it maximizes their chances of being elected to the House. This article argues that distinctions must be drawn between "ambitious" and "experience-seeking" amateurs because no single theory can explain amateurs' motivations. Ambitious amateurs respond to favorable district and national conditions in their decision to run, like their experienced counterparts, while experience-seeking amateurs do not.
TL;DR: This paper examined the relative importance of party ideology, organization, and competitiveness as mobilizing forces in U.S. gubernatorial elections and found that party competitiveness and ideology are significantly related to turnout, while party organization is not.
Abstract: Using aggregate data on statewide turnout, we examine the relative importance of party ideology, organization, and competitiveness as mobilizing forces in U.S. gubernatorial elections. We find that party competitiveness and ideology are significantly related to turnout, while party organization is not. We also show that the effect of each party attribute is essentially the same in presidential and off-year elections; that party ideology and competitiveness remain significant when controlling for candidate spending; and that the impact of ideology and competition differs depending on the restrictiveness of a state's voter registration requirements. Party competition is the only significant mobilizing force in states with more restrictive voter registration laws, while party ideology and candidate campaign spending are mobilizing forces in states with less restrictive registration laws.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether new Supreme Court justices experience what have been known as "freshman effects." The results of several studies examining various aspects of the effects are, at best, mixed.
Abstract: Over the years, there has been substantial interest in whether new Supreme Court justices experience what have been known as "freshman effects." The results of several studies examining various aspects of the effects are, at best, mixed. I offer four reasons for these mixed results. First, most previous studies test the new justice's behavior against that of the other justices, rather than his or her own later behavior. Second, many previous studies focus on opinion writing rather than voting behavior. Third, most previous studies have not considered possible differences from one issue area to another. Fourth, previous studies did not control for the direction of the lower court decision. After establishing that some justices do experience these effects, I examine possible explanations as to why some justices experience them and others do not.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a political economic interaction model for India for the 1960-91 sample period and used a mixed qualitative and continuous variable simultaneous equation estimation procedure to test the political business cycle theory in the context of a parliamentary democracy with endogenous election timing.
Abstract: This paper develops a political-economic interaction model for India for the 1960-91 sample period. India presents an ideal case for testing the political business cycle theory in the context of a parliamentary democracy with endogenous election timing. Using a mixed qualitative and continuous variable simultaneous equation estimation procedure, the paper considers the two-way interaction that results from the control by the cabinet over election timing. Several conclusions can be derived from this study. First, the results indicate the presence of business cycle-electoral interaction in India. Second, there is strong support for the surfing hypothesis, implying that the Indian cabinet tends to ride on natural business waves. Third, no support is found for the manipulative hypothesis.
TL;DR: This article developed and estimated a model of U.S. federal budgetary outcomes that allows for considerable disaggregation across spending categories while providing, through cross-equation coefficient restrictions, substantially more statistical power than traditional approaches.
Abstract: This paper develops and estimates a model of U.S. federal budgetary outcomes that allows for considerable disaggregation across spending categories while providing, through cross-equation coefficient restrictions, substantially more statistical power than traditional approaches. We identify significant "top-down" fiscal policy effects on budgetary allocations primarily within the defense budget. Budgetary responses to macroeconomic conditions are generally countercyclical, although middle-class entitlements appear to react procyclically to inflation. Political control of Congress influences budgetary outcomes, with Democrats giving higher priority to domestic spending programs. The relative rate of public sector inflation affects spending growth, consistent with "Baumol's disease." Public opinion affects defense and low-income entitlement spending. Defense spending has also been influenced by perceived Soviet threat as well as the level of armed conflict. There appear to be small election-year effects, although not of the sort predicted by political business cycle models. With a few exceptions, administration-specific impacts are relatively small and not systematically related to the party of the president.
TL;DR: The authors found that the likelihood of civil service is quite sensitive to differences in cities' governance structures, suggesting that structural differences may account for some public-private distinctions that are commonly attributed to attitudinal or historical causes.
Abstract: Though much has been written about the public sector's propensity to impose procedural restrictions on managerial discretion, this propensity is generally viewed as an inherent and fixed characteristic of life in the public sector. This paper challenges that view by looking at the prevalence of civil service systems across U.S. cities. It finds that the likelihood of civil service is quite sensitive to differences in cities' governance structures. This result suggests that structural differences may account for some public-private distinctions that are commonly attributed to attitudinal or historical causes. It also offers support for a view of public organizations as shaped more by political than by efficiency considerations.
TL;DR: The authors developed a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government and splitticket voting in the United States, where parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy outcomes.
Abstract: This paper develops a simple model of institutionally driven party competition which may explain the persistence of divided government. In the basic model, two parties that are solely motivated to win elections compete for two offices, the legislature and the executive. Parties offer positions in a single dimension to a single-district sophisticated electorate that understands the institutionally defined relationship between electoral and policy outcomes. When parties are risk-averse, competition for the two offices leads to a prisoner's dilemma: the parties can jointly improve on the one-shot Nash equilibrium in which they adopt convergent positions. Several extensive form election games are shown to allow the parties to solve their prisoner's dilemma in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, parties adopt widely separated positions, and divided government and splitticket voting occur with high probability. Unlike typical voting models, in the basic model there is no tendency for electoral equilibrium to produce the (expected) median voter's ideal policy outcome. These results are robust to a variety of extensions, including significant sincere voting, multiple policy dimensions, and defections by incumbent candidates.
TL;DR: The authors found that there is a well-defined relationship between U.K. government popularity in the postwar period and a small set of economic variables (i.e., unemployment, inflation, and real interest rates).
Abstract: Economic theory suggests that government popularity may be related to the rate of change of (nonstationary) economic quantities and the level of (stationary) financial variables (like inflation or interest rates). Political theory suggests that this relationship may not be stable over time. We find that there is a well-defined relationship between U.K. government popularity in the postwar period and a small set of economic variables (i.e., unemployment, inflation, and real interest rates). Unusual political events are also important. Voters appear to discount history at a high rate. Remarkably, the estimated equation is very stable and passes a battery of stability tests, including postsample parameter stability tests. Furthermore, estimation using the Kalman filter shows no tendency for the parameters to vary systematically over time, implying that voter preferences have remained broadly constant throughout the postwar years.
TL;DR: This paper developed a campaign attention model of non-voting and found that variations in individuals' attention to campaigns create different conditions for nonvoting, and demographic characteristics, general political interest, and the electoral context heighten or lessen these conditions.
Abstract: This study offers the first exploration of types of nonvoters. Heretofore, researchers have analyzed factors that distinguish voters from nonvoters, but they have not studied factors that reveal distinctions among nonvoters. Scholars view nonvoters as a large monolith, assuming that they respond (or fail to respond) to politics in the same way. This paper develops a campaign attention model of nonvoting that proposes that variations in individuals' attention to campaigns create different conditions for nonvoting. In addition, demographic characteristics, general political interest, and the electoral context heighten or lessen these conditions. Together these elements help identify profiles or types of nonvoters. A cluster analysis finds five distinct types of nonvoters in the 1990 midterm Senate elections: politically ignorant nonvoters (those who are uninformed about the campaign), indifferent nonvoters (those who see no difference between the candidates), selectively aware nonvoters (those who are aware of only one candidate), dissatisfied nonvoters (those who dislike one or both candidates), and the conditionally inactive (those who do not participate because they are unemployed).