计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3–36, 1996). This extension focuses on how incumbents are removed from office. We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals.

/pdf/democracy-and-dictatorship-revisited-2oo9paz4n2.pdf

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

Growth and democracy (subjective indexes of political freedom) are analyzed for a panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 The favorable effects on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human capital Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative There is a suggestion of a nonlinear relationship in which more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained Improvements in the standard of living—measured by GDP, health status, and education—substantially raise the probability that political freedoms will grow These results allow for predictions about which countries will become more or less democratic over time

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40215879.pdf

Democracy and Growth

With which political and economic variables is change in international financial regulation robustly associated? I undertook multivariate regression analysis of this question using a quantitative measure of the regulation of international financial transactions. The measure was created by coding the laws of 64 nations. The associations between change in international financial regulation and measures of long-run economic growth, corporate taxation, government expenditures, and income inequality are estimated, using the models, methods, and data of Batro (1991), Deininger and Squire (1996a), Leamer (1983, 1985), and Levine and Renelt (1992). The findings point to a new agenda for research on international financial regulation.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400210952

The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation

A large literature has demonstrated that such economic factors as growth, inflation, and unemployment affect the popularity of incumbents within many democratic countries. However, cross-national aggregate analyses of "economic voting" show only weak and inconsistent economic effects. We argue for the systematic incorporation of political factors that shape the electoral consequences of economic performance. Multivariate analyses of 102 elections in 19 industrialized democracies are used to estimate the cross-national impact of economic and political factors. The analyses show that considerations of the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, and the clarity of its political responsibility are essential to understanding the effects of economic conditions on voting for or against incumbents.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2111378.pdf

A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context

Cross-national analyses of economic voting

Public attitudes play an important-sometimes crucial-role in the process of European integration. This is evident from the two most recent attempts at institutional and geographical reform of the European Union (EU). In a June 1992 referendum, the Danish public effectively halted the further institutional and economic integration of Europe by rejecting the Treaty on European Union. Two years later, Norwegian voters chose to reject membership in the EU. Less obviously, but more regularly, public attitudes influence EU policymaking through traditional political channels such as elections and lobbying. How do Europeans structure their attitudes toward integration? Given that economic growth and development are both central motivations for integration and among the predominant responsibilities of the European Union (EU), it seems reasonable that the EU public would evaluate integration based upon economic criteria. Previous studies have investigated this hypothesis in two ways. First, Gabel and Palmer (1995) investigated how the differential economic benefits of integrative policy relate to individual-level differences in public support for integration. They found that EU citizens' support for integration varies consistently with the differential benefits associated with occupational skills, education, wealth, and intra-EU trade. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) investigated how objective national economic conditions and national net return from the EU budget related to national-level variation in

Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration

As the research methodology more closely approximates the causal process being analyzed, the inferences and predictions derived from that methodology will better represent actual behavior. Statistical models were specified on the basis of accepted theories of voting behavior and political cleavages in the Netherlands and Great Britain. We hypothesize that multinomial models provide a more accurate characterization of voting behavior in countries with more than two political parties competing for votes. Binomial logit, multinomial logit, and nested multinomial logit models of voting behavior are estimated on Dutch and British National Election Study data. Compared to binomial methods, we find that multinomial models of voting behavior produce results that are more congruent with accepted theories of Dutch and British politics.

Heightening comparativists concern for model choice: voting behavior in Great Britain and the Netherlands

In this article, we present a new theory that, given the economic consequences of military spending, some governments may use military spending as a means of advancing their domestic non‐military objectives. Based on evidence that governments can use military spending as welfare policy in disguise, we argue that the role of ideology in shaping military spending is more complicated than simple left‐right politics. We also present a theory that strategic elites take advantage of opportunities presented by international events, leading us to expect governments that favor more hawkish foreign policy policies to use low‐level international conflicts as opportunities for increasing military spending. Using pooled time‐series data from 19 advanced democracies in the post–World War II period, we find that government ideology, measured as welfare and international positions, interacts with the international security environment to affect defense spending.

http://web.missouri.edu/~williamslaro/Whitten%20and%20Williams%202011.pdf

Guy D. Whitten

Papers

A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context

Cross-national analyses of economic voting

Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions, and Public Support for European Integration

Heightening comparativists concern for model choice: voting behavior in Great Britain and the Netherlands

Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies