Showing papers in "American Psychologist in 1975"

Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology.

Abstract: The historic separation of experimental psychology from the study of individual differences impeded psychological research, So I argued when last I had occasion to address the APA audience (Cronbach, 1957). It was time, I said, for the'manipulating and the correlating schools of research to crossbreed, to bring forth a science of Aptitude x Treatment interactions (ATIs). As that hybrid discipline is now flourishing, a progress report on ATI studies is the appropriate first business of this article. It is not practical to treat here the studies of ATIs in social behavior (e.g., Fiedler, 1973; McGuire, 1969), ATIs in response to drugs and therapy (e.g., Insel & Moos, 1974; Lasagna, 1972; Schildkraut, 1970), or ATIs in learning and motivation generally. I confine myself to ATIs related to instruction, drawing on a comprehensive review Richard Snow and I have just completed (Cronbach & Snow, in press). In that field, several research programs have brought us a long way; particularly to be acknowledged are the sustained inquiries, of Bill McKeachie, Jack Atkinson, Russ Kropp and Fred King, George Stern, David Hunt, Victor Bunderson and Jack Dunham, and Snow and his graduate students. Important as ATIs are proving to be, the line of investigation I advocated in 1957 no longer seems sufficient. Interactions are not confined to the first order; the dimensions of the situation and of the person enter into complex interactions. This complexity forces us to ask once again, Should social science aspire to reduce behavior to laws?

On the conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition.

Abstract: Reports the APA Presidential address delivered at the Chicago convention, August 1975. Urban humanity is considered as a product of both biological and social evolution. Evolutionary genetics shows that when there is genetic competition among the cooperators (as for humans but not for the social insects), great limitations are placed upon the degree of socially useful, individually self-sacrificial altruism that biological evolution can produce. Human urban social complexity is a product of social evolution and has had to counter with inhibitory moral norms the biological selfishness which genetic competition has continually selected. Because the issues are so complex and the available data are so uncompelling, all of this should be interpreted more as a challenge to an important new area for psychological research than as established conclusions. It is emphasized, however, that these are important issues to which psychology should give much greater attention, and that scientific reasons exist for believing that there can be profound system wisdom in the belief systems our social tradition has provided us with. (31/2 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)

Mnemotechnics in Second Language Learning.

Abstract: For some time I have been involved in efforts to develop computer-controlled systems for instruction. One such effort has been a computer-assistedinstruction (CAI) program for teaching reading in the primary grades (Atkinson, 1974) and another for teaching computer science at the college level (Atkinson, in press). The goal has been to use psychological theory to devise optimal instructional procedures—procedures that make moment-by-moment decisions based on the student's unique response history. To help guide some of the theoretical aspects of this work, research has also been done on the restricted but well-defined problem of optimizing the teaching of a foreign language vocabulary. This is an area in which mathematical models provide an accurate description of learning, and these models can be used in conjunction with the methods of control theory to develop precise algorithms for sequencing instruction among vocabulary items. Some of this work has been published, and those who have read about it know that the optimization schemes are quite effective—far more effective than procedures that permit the learner to make his own instructional decisions (Atkinson, 1972a, 1972b; Atkinson & Paulson, 1972). In conducting these vocabulary learning experiments, I have been struck by the incredible variability in learning rates across subjects. Even Stanford University students, who are a fairly select sample, display impressively large betweensubject differences. These differences may reflect differences in fundamental abilities, but it is easy to demonstrate that they also depend on the strategies that subjects bring to bear on the task. Good learners can introspect with ease about a "bag of tricks" for learning vocabulary items, whereas poor

Individual differences as a crucible in theory construction.

Abstract: My proposal is that we should formulate our nomothetic theories in a way that will allow an immediate individual-differences test. I am proposing this because, among other benefits, I believe this approach will make individual differences a crucible in theory construction. The argument I advance is applicable to theory construction in all areas of experimental psychology, but my illustrations come largely from the areas of learning and memory. I feel impelled initially to reconstruct as best I can the reasons that led me to compose an article dealing with theory construction. It has resulted from a professional uneasiness that has grown over the past few years. These pinpricks of uneasiness seemed to say that our profession needed to open a discussion of theory construction in psychology, a discussion led by psychologists, for psychologists. When the uneasy feelings were articulated in this manner, I was able to identify three developments that had been responsible for the pinpricks. And then a fourth development took place which led me to presume I might have something to say that could just possibly initiate the discussion. The first source of uneasiness was quite an unlikely one, namely, the undergraduate student. On occasion, a perceptive one will ask me, "How do you get a theory?" How does one answer this question? I found myself answering with a few pieces of trivia of the kind that any experienced teacher has ready for such mpments. My lack of

Functionalism, Darwinism, and the Psychology of Women

Abstract: Examines the psychology of women as it was studied from the middle of the 19th century to the 1st 3rd of the 20th century. During that period 3 topics received the most attention: sex differences in brain size and complexity and their implications for cognitive and affective behavior; the hypothesis of greater male variability (a corollary of evolutionary theory) and its social implications; and the expression of maternal instinct. Each topic is examined in relation to evolutionary theory and its influence on the conduct of 19th century science. The antecedents of each topic are traced as is the subsequent redefinition of each within the paradigm of behaviorism. It is proposed that each of these topics functioned as "scientific myth" which justified and explained contemporary cultural values. (71 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)

The crisis of confidence in social psychology.

Abstract: Social psychologists once knew who they were and where they were going. The field's major scientific problems were obvious, and means to solve them were readily available. Particularly during World War II and the two subsequent decades, the total number of social psychologists increased rapidly, exciting new research discoveries were often reported, and theoretical developments seemed to promise dramatic advances in the understanding of human behavior. One observer, after visiting a number of researchers, noted,

Toward a behavioral definition of genius.

Abstract: The idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds. They are either names of things which do not exist (for as there are things left unnamed through lack of observation, so likewise are there names which result from fantastic suppositions and to which nothing in reality corresponds), or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, 1939

A reappraisal of Wilhelm Wundt.

Abstract: Approximately 100 years ago, in an era of intellectual ferment, events of marked consequence took place in the history of psychology. It was in the decade of the 1870s that the first handbook of experimental psychology appeared, followed soon by the founding of the first formal laboratory of experimental psychology. Both were the achievements of Wilhelm Wundt, ever since recognized as experimental psychology's great patron, though later barred from any role that might remotely resemble sainthood. Soon after the wave of "new" psychologists spread out from Wundt's laboratory, a series of intellectual revolutions largely erased from memory the content of Wundtian psychological theory. Now that the movement set in motion by Wundt has come through its first century, it would seem fitting to mark the centenary by briefly turning back, reexamining psychology's historical foundations, and paying homage to the founding father. There is, however, another reason for review, being less ceremonial and clearly more interesting. To put it simply, the few current Wundt-scholars (and some do exist) are in fair agreement that Wundt as portrayed today in many texts and courses is largely fictional and often bears little resemblance to the actual historical figure (cf. Blumenthal, 1970; Bringmann, Balance, & Evans, 1975; Mischel, 1970). Naturally, it might be suspected that the above radical statement is only the nit-picking of a few antiquarians obsessed with minor matters of interpretation. But alas, such is not the case. These are claims about the very fundamentals of Wundt's work, often asserting the opposite of what has been a standard description prevailing over much of the past century. Yet, if popular historical accounts