Showing papers in "Economic Policy in 2001"

Is the crisis problem growing more severe

Abstract: Financial crises Lessons from the last 120 years The crisis problem is one of the dominant macroeconomic features of our age. Its prominence suggests questions like the following: Are crises growing more frequent? Are they becoming more disruptive? Are economies taking longer to recover? These are fundamentally historical questions, which can be answered only by comparing the present with the past. To this end, this paper develops and analyses a data base spanning 120 years of financial history. We find that crisis frequency since 1973 has been double that of the Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods and is rivalled only by the crisis‐ridden 1920s and 1930s. History thus confirms that there is something different and disturbing about our age. However, there is little evidence that crises have grown longer or output losses have become larger. Crises may have grown more frequent, in other words, but they have not obviously grown more severe. Our explanation for the growing frequency and chronic costs of crises focuses on the combination of capital mobility and the financial safety net, including the implicit insurance against exchange risk provided by an ex ante credible policy of pegging the exchange rate, which encourages banks and corporations to accumulate excessive foreign currency exposures. We also provide policy recommendations for restoring stability and growth. — Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez‐Peria

Inequality and convergence in Europe’s regions: reconsidering European regional policies

Abstract: Europe's regions Income disparities and regional policies In this paper we take a critical look at current European regional policies. First, we document the motivation for such policies, that is, the large income disparities across the regions of the EU15. Large disparities are certainly present. Second, we illustrate the various instruments adopted and discuss their underpinnings in established economic theories. Next, we look at available data, searching for three kinds of evidence: (1) if disparities are either growing or decreasing, we conclude they are neither; (2) which are the major factors explaining such disparities and, in particular, if they are the factors predicted by the economic models adopted by the Commission to justify current policies, we conclude this is most certainly not the case; (3) if there are clear signs that EU policies, as opposed to other social and economic factors, are actually reducing such disparities, we cannot find any clear sign of such desired impact. Our conclusion is that regional and structural policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose, motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European Union is built. They have little relationship with fostering economic growth. This casts a serious doubt on their social value and, furthermore, strongly questions extending such policies to future members of the European Union. A successful EU enlargement, in our view, calls for an immediate and drastic revision of regional economic policies. — Michele Boldrin and Fabio Canova

Currency unions and trade: how large is the treatment effect?

Abstract: Currency unions and trade What can the data say? The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7–45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated. — Torsten persson I have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large, but I am not convinced by Torsten Persson’s diagnosis and proposed solution. I apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set, where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time–series as well as cross–sectional evidence. The results are similar to my earlier ones: the effect of a single currency on trade is large. — Andrew Rose

Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens

Abstract: Welfare state reform A survey of what Europeans want The fundamental problems facing European welfare states – high unemployment and unsustainable public pensions plans in particular – have been in the political debate for years, so why have we seen so little reform? To find out, we surveyed the opinions of citizens in France, Germany, Italy and Spain on their welfare states and on various reform options. This is what we found. First, most workers underestimate the costs of public pensions, though they are aware of their unsustainability. Second, the status quo is a majoritarian outcome: a majority of citizens opposes cuts to social security and welfare spending, but also opposes further increases. Since population ageing without reform implies an automatic expansion, our results suggest that most citizens would favour reforms that stabilize but do not shrink the current welfare states. Third, many would welcome changes in the allocation of benefits. A large number of workers in Italy and Germany would be willing to opt out of public pensions and replace them with private pensions, though the details of how this scheme is formulated matter for its popularity. And many Italians and Spaniards would welcome an extension of the coverage of unemployment insurance. Fourth, conflicts over the welfare state are mainly shaped by the economic situation of the respondent, while political ideology plays a limited role. Disagreements are found along three dimensions: young versus old, rich versus poor, and ‘outsider’ versus ‘insider’ in terms of labour market status. From a practical point of view, this suggests that there is scope to bundle reforms strategically in order to build a large and mixed coalition of supporters. — Tito Boeri, Axel Borsch‐Supan and Guido Tabellini

Implications of Ethnic Diversity

Abstract: Ethnically differentiated societies are often regarded as dysfunctional, with poor economic performance and a high risk of violent civil conflict The author distinguishes between dominance, in which one group constitutes a majority, and fractionalization, in which there are many small groups In terms of overall economic performance, the research shows that both theoretically and empirically, fractionalization is normally unproblematic in democracies, although it can be damaging in dictatorships In terms of the risk of civil war, the author shows that both theoretically and empirically fractionalization actually makes societies safer, while dominance increases the risk of conflict A policy implication is that fractionalized societies are viable and secession should be discouraged

Currency unions and trade: the effect is large

Abstract: The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7-45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated. Copyright CEPR, CES, MSH, 2001.

Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union

Abstract: One monetary policy in EMU Countries, regions, channels I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co–ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross–country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone. — Ilian Mihov

The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Abstract: Local fiscal referenda The dampening effect on taxes and spending Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens’ preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a ‘natural laboratory’ for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens. — Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner

Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms

Abstract: Fighting collusion Regulation of communication between firms This paper is an attempt to create a coherent approach to the design of competition policy enforcement against collusion based on theoretical considerations, evidence from economic experiments, and case studies. I argue that collusion should primarily be fought indirectly by targeting types of communication between firms that are particularly likely to facilitate collusion. In particular, I identify types of communication which have high potential anti‐competitive effects but where it is unlikely that prohibiting communication will lead to efficiency losses. This analysis leads to some simple rules concerning communication between firms, which could also guide the development of competition rules for B2B electronic market places. — Kai-Uwe Kuhn

Should we beware of the Precautionary Principle

Abstract: Precautionary Principle The economic perspective How should society deal with risks when there is scientific uncertainty about the size of these risks? There has been much recent discussion of the Precautionary Principle, which states that lack of full scientific knowledge should not be used as a reason to postpone cost–effective preventive measures. We show in this paper that the Precautionary Principle contradicts one important intuition about the right way to act in the face of risk, namely the principle of ‘looking before you leap’. When we expect to learn more about the future, the effectiveness of our preventive measures will be greater if we learn before we act. However, a number of other ways of taking uncertainty into account are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Precautionary Principle. First, postponing preventive measures may increase our vulnerability to damage, which induces a precautionary motive for risk–prevention, similar to the precautionary savings motive. Secondly, stronger preventive actions often yield more flexibility for the future, so that acting early has an option value. Thirdly, when better information comes from a process of learning–by–doing, the risk associated with early events is amplified by the information they yield about the future. This plays a role analogous to that of an increase in risk aversion, making us more cautious. Fourthly, because imperfect knowledge of the risk makes it difficult to insure, the social cost of risk should include a risk premium. Finally, uncertainty about the economic environment enjoyed by future generations should be taken into account. This raises the benefit of acting early to prevent long–term risks. If the Precautionary Principle sometimes gives good and sometimes gives bad advice, there is no escape from the need to undertake a careful cost–benefit analysis. We show that standard cost–benefit analysis can be refined to take account of scientific uncertainty, in ways that balance the Precautionary Principle against the benefits of waiting to learn before we act. Furthermore, it is important that they be used to do so, for instinct is an unreliable guide in such circumstances. Abandoning cost–benefit analysis in favour of simple maxims can result in some seriously misleading conclusions. — Christian Gollier

Some simple economics of GM food

Abstract: Genetically modified food Evaluating the econamic risks Public opposition to the genetic engineering of food crops (GM food) has not been based solely on concern about biological risks. Economic risks have been widely cited too: the fear that the world’s food supply will be concentrated in the hands of a few large firms, the fear that such firms will engage or are already engaging in anti–competitive practices, and the fear of the transfer of ownership rights over genetic resources to the private sector. Are these fears justified? We argue that the GM food industry may be on course for further consolidation, and this could be anti–competitive. In fact, policymakers face a dilemma: a stringent regulatory approval process enhances food safety, but at the cost of increasing market concentration. We argue also that the integration of seed and agri–chemical manufacturers may bias the introduction of GM traits in undesirable directions. Some business practices (such as tie–in contracts between seeds and complementary products such as herbicides) may have an exclusionary motive that warrants scrutiny on anti–competitive grounds, while some other practices (such as the use of terminator genes) appear more benign. Finally, we argue against granting patents on genes or even on gene ‘functions’. Doing so may delay the development of socially beneficial applications. — Dietmar Harhoff, Pierre Regibeau and katharine Rockett

International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality

Abstract: International Bailouts The IMF's role The large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer. We argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no, or very few, costs to the international community. Instead, the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies, thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers. This may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality, in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis. — Olivier Jeanne and Jeromin Zettelmeyer