Showing papers in "Ethics in 1993"
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, Wolin used the absence from this edition of an interview with Jacques Derrida as a springboard for examining questions about the nature of authorship and personal responsibility that are at the heart of the book.
Abstract: This anthology is a significant contribution to the debate over the relevance of Martin Heidegger's Nazi ties to the interpretation and evaluation of his philosophical work. Included are a selection of basic documents by Heidegger, essays and letters by Heidegger's colleagues that offer contemporary context and testimony, and interpretive evaluations by Heidegger's heirs and critics in France and Germany.In his new introduction, "Note on a Missing Text," Richard Wolin uses the absence from this edition of an interview with Jacques Derrida as a springboard for examining questions about the nature of authorship and personal responsibility that are at the heart of the book.Richard Wolin is Professor of Modern European Intellectual History and Humanities at Rice University. He is the author of Walter Benjamin, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, and The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism and Poststructuralism.
221 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss l'importance de l'empathie dans la determination a agir moralement, and montre en particulier le importance of l 'empathies dans the determination of a moral action.
Abstract: L'A. applique les resultats et les theories des sciences cognitives au domaine de l'ethique, en particulier au jugement de valeurs, a la question du bien procure par une action, et au mecanisme psychique qui intervient dans le sentiment et le choix moral. Il montre en particulier l'importance de l'empathie dans la determination a agir moralement
128 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of coercion on agreements and the nature of the obligations of such agreements is discussed, and the extent to which they are enforceable is discussed. But the authors do not discuss the relationship between coercion and obligations.
Abstract: Agreements and kindred phenomena are ubiquitous in human life.' They are a central source of obligation. Obligation is a forceful species of reason for action. It is therefore important to be clear about the nature of agreements and the obligations of agreement. These matters have not as yet been well understood. Or so a number of common pronouncements suggest. Among these are some prevalent claims about the impact of coercion on agreements. Philosophers standardly claim that coerced agreements do not impose obligations to fulfill the agreement: they are not binding.2 Many assert that
100 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, political philosophers address the effects of our actions on future generations, should members of one generation compensate others for past injustices and what are the obligations of young to old and old to young?
Abstract: Political philosophers address such issues as to what extent must we consider the effects of our actions on future generations, should members of one generation compensate others for past injustices and what are the obligations of young to old and old to young?
100 citations
TL;DR: The author will suggest that, as the authors get clearer about the nature of the distinction and the sources of its intuitive appeal, it may seem that the intuitions it supports are not so well grounded as one could wish.
Abstract: One of the aims of this article is to contribute to the identification of the empirical criteria governing the use of the concepts of killing and letting die. I will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the concepts but will limit the inquiry to certain problematic cases -- namely, cases involving the removal or withdrawal of life-supporting aid or protection. The analysis of these cases will, however, shed light on the criteria for distinguishing killing and letting die in other cases as well. My overall aims in the article are partly constructive and partly skeptical. I hope to advance our understanding of the nature of the distinction between killing and letting die. This, I believe, will enable us to defend the moral relevance of the distinction against certain objections -- in particular, objections that claim that the distinction fails to coincide with commonsense moral intuitions. Yet I will suggest that, as we get clearer about the nature of the distinction and the sources of its intuitive appeal, it may seem that the intuitions it supports are not so well grounded as one could wish.
95 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a man named Morty promises to meet a friend at the station by 3:00. On his way there, he sees a seriously injured child in an alley; and helping the child will make Morty late.
Abstract: Morty promises to meet a friend at the station by 3:00. On his way there, he sees a seriously injured child in an alley; and helping the child will make Morty late. Morty ought to help children in need, but he also ought to keep his promises. So it seems that Morty ought to help the child and be at the station by 3:00, even if he cannot do both. Such moral conflicts are interesting for several reasons, not least of which is that they generate now-familiar paradoxes with the following general form:
79 citations
TL;DR: Aristotle's conception of the state, A.C. Bradley aims and methods of Aristotle's "Politics", Christopher Rowe the connection between Aristotle's Ethics and "politics", A.H. Smith Aristotle and exchange value, S.F. Stalley Aristotle's defense of private property, T.W. Irwin Aristotle on prior and posterior, correct and mistaken constitutions, William Fortenbaugh Aristotle's theory of distributive justice, David Keyt Aristotle on natural law and justice, Fred Miller Jr Aristotle's analysis of oligarchy and democracy, Richard Mulgan Aristotle on political
Abstract: Aristotle's conception of the state, A.C. Bradley aims and methods of Aristotle's "Politics", Christopher Rowe the connection between Aristotle's "Ethics" and "Politics", A.W.H. Adkins Man as a political animal in Aristotle, Wolfgang Kullman three basic theorems in Aristotle's "Politics", David Keyt Aristotle's theory of natural slavery, Nicholas D. Smith Aristotle and exchange value, S. Meilke Aristotle's criticism of Plato's "Republic", R.F. Stalley Aristotle's defense of private property, T.H. Irwin Aristotle on prior and posterior, correct and mistaken constitutions, William Fortenbaugh Aristotle's theory of distributive justice, David Keyt Aristotle on natural law and justice, Fred Miller Jr Aristotle's analysis of oligarchy and democracy, Richard Mulgan Aristotle on political change, Roland Polansky politics, music and contemplation in Aristotle's ideal state.
76 citations
TL;DR: The notion of "mutuality of restrictions" was first proposed by Hart in his influential essay "Are There Any Natural Rights?" as mentioned in this paper, where he argued that if considerations of fairness or reciprocity account for the obligation to obey the law, then they should presumably justify the punishment of those who fail to fulfill this obligation.
Abstract: In his influential essay "Are There Any Natural Rights?" H. L. A. Hart appealed to a "mutuality of restrictions" to account for the obligation to obey the law. As Hart put it, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission."' As developed by John Rawls and others, Hart's ''mutuality of restrictions" acquired a new name-the principle of fairness (or fair play)-and soon played a leading part in discussions not only of legal obligation, but of legal punishment as well.2 For if considerations of fairness or reciprocity account for the obligation to obey the law, as the principle's proponents argued, then they should presumably justify the punishment of those who fail to fulfill this obligation. Now, nearly forty years after the publication of Hart's essay, the principle of fair play figures prominently in a lively debate on the question of whether there is or can be a general obligation to obey the law, with advocates and critics of the principle vigorously arguing their cases.3 Punishment remains the center of an equally lively debate,
54 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that hate speech can cause serious psychological harm to those at whom it is directed, and that such harm can be justified by hate speech regulation, sweeping or otherwise, and argue that some forms of hate speech inflict on their victims a certain kind of wrong, and it is on the basis of this wrong that regulation is justified.
Abstract: In recent years a vigorous public debate has developed over freedom of speech within the academic community. The immediate stimulus for the debate has been the enactment by a number of colleges and universities of rules against hate speech. While some have defended these rules as essential for protecting the equal dignity of all members of the academic community, others have condemned them as intolerable efforts to impose ideological conformity on the academy. Liberals can be found on both sides of this debate. Many see campus hate-speech regulation as a form of illegitimate control by the community over individual liberty of expression. They argue that hatespeech rules violate the important liberal principle that any regulation of speech be viewpoint-neutral. But other liberals see hate-speech regulation as a justifiable part of the effort to help rid society of discrimination and subordination based on such characteristics as race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. In this article, I develop a liberal argument in favor of certain narrowly drawn rules prohibiting hate speech. The argument steers a middle course between those who reject all forms of campus hatespeech regulation and those who favor relatively sweeping forms of regulation. Like those who reject all regulation, I argue that rules against hate speech are not viewpoint-neutral. Like those who favor sweeping regulation, I accept the claim that hate speech can cause serious psychological harm to those at whom it is directed. However, I do not believe that such harm can justify regulation, sweeping or otherwise. Instead, I argue that some forms of hate speech inflict on their victims a certain kind of wrong, and it is on the basis of this wrong that regulation can be justified. The kind of wrong in question
47 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyse le rapport entre la philosophie morale kantienne and les interpretations of la loi naturelle de la moralite, i.e., the concept of obligation.
Abstract: L'A. analyse le rapport entre la philosophie morale kantienne et les interpretations de la loi naturelle de la moralite. Selon Kant, les theoriciens modernes de la loi naturelle ont eu raison d'identifier le probleme du conflit social comme le probleme predominant de la moralite et de construire une theorie de la moralite autour du concept d'obligation
TL;DR: In this murky region of our subject, I am confident only of two things: that the phenomenon needs explanation, and that the true explanation will throw a flood of light on both the present and the future of moral philosophy as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: first principle and a set of inexact commonplaces that can be taught to children (or, as Hare sometimes says, to 'proles') then not only did Ross have a case for degrading those commonplaces to the status of merely prima facie rules, and leaving us to intuit our way among them, but his successors also had a case for demurring, and concluding that those commonplaces cannot be merely prima facie, but must have some real weight. And if they have real weight, then conflicts between them are authentic dilemmas. In my opinion, the entire line of thought from Sidgwick through Ross to those who think that moral deliberation is largely about moral dilemmas is an aberration from the true line, whose last great representative was Kant. Whether this line of development explains the phenomenon I have tried to explain, I of course do not know. In this murky region of our subject, I am confident only of two things: that the phenomenon needs explanation, and that the true explanation will throw a flood of light on both the present and the future of moral philosophy. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.177 on Tue, 15 Nov 2016 03:52:53 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
TL;DR: The authors explore l'interpretation et l'application of the doctrine du double effet (DDE) de W. Quinn et ce, dans le but de trouver une formulation appropriee et un raisonnement plausible de cette DDE.
Abstract: L'A. explore l'interpretation et l'application de la doctrine du double effet (DDE) de W. Quinn et ce, dans le but de trouver une formulation appropriee et un raisonnement plausible de cette DDE
TL;DR: The authors define le realisme en matiere de verite ethique, which consiste a dire qu'il existe des faits and des proprietes ethiques independant de notre attitude.
Abstract: L'A. definit le realisme en matiere de verite ethique, qui consiste a dire qu'il existe des faits et des proprietes ethiques independants de notre attitude. Il elabore une theorie du realisme ethique dispositionnel qu'il etudie dans ses rapports avec l'intuitionnisme moral, le subjectivisme et les attitudes cognitives
TL;DR: In this article, the authors define a moralite kantienne and a non-conformite moraux prones par ces derniers: "L'A. cherche a identifier les idees qui poussent les gens a adopter la moralite Kantienne et humenienne".
Abstract: L'A. cherche a identifier les idees qui poussent les gens a adopter la moralite kantienne et humenienne, et ce que Kant et Hume preconisent en tant que reponses aux vices et a la non conformite aux standards moraux prones par ces derniers
TL;DR: The Ethics with Aristotle as discussed by the authors is a rich, in-depth treatment of an extensive portion of the Nicomachean Ethics, including the discussion of human well-being, the nature of virtue, voluntariness, deliberation, practical wisdom, weakness of will, pleasure, and the philosophical life.
Abstract: Sarah Broadie's book, Ethics with Aristotle, is a splendid in-depth treatment of an extensive portion of the Nicomachean Ethics. Following the arrangement of Aristotle's treatise, she comments in great detail on his discussion of human well-being, the nature of virtue, voluntariness, deliberation, practical wisdom, weakness of will, pleasure, and the philosophical life. (The two major topics that she omits are the specific ethical virtues-courage, temperance, justice, etc.and friendship.) Because of the book's wide scope, and the philosophical depth and originality of its author, Ethics with Aristotle deserves to be recognized as one of the best and most important works on Aristotle's moral philosophy written in recent decades. Broadie's book is densely argued and not easily summarized. Rather than present a catalog of the interpretive theses she defends, I will focus entirely on one aspect of her work that I consider particularly important and provocative: her attempt to discourage students of Aristotle's moral philosophy from reading into him an exalted conception of practical wisdom, one which she finds philosophically questionable and textually unsupported. According to this misguided conception, which she labels the "Grand End" view, practical wisdom is "like a craft such as medicine: it seeks to realise, not health, but the human good without restriction; and in this it takes its cue from an explicit, comprehensive, substantial vision of that good, a vision invested with a content different from what would be aimed at by morally inferior natures. This blueprint of the good guides its possessor in all his deliberations, and in terms of it his rational choices can be explained and justified" (p. 198). I suspect that few students of Aristotle who read these words will immediately agree with Broadie that it is a misdescription of practical wisdom. In any case, I was a believer in the Grand End view before I read her book; and, having considered her arguments against it, I remain a believer. Nonetheless I welcome her
TL;DR: The authors explored whether the negative consequences of a certain category of acts are sufficiently different in kind or degree to justify treating those consequences differently from the way in which seemingly similar consequences are treated.
Abstract: My goal here is to address just one corner of the larger question whether there is a justified principle of free speech distinct from and more stringent than the general principle of liberty that is the hallmark of most liberal societies. The particular corner I explore is whether the negative consequences of a certain category of acts are sufficiently different in kind or degree to justify treating those consequences differently from the way in which seemingly similar consequences are treated. To put it more directly, although possibly misleadingly, I will inquire into whether the harms caused by speech are lesser in degree than other harms, or mediated differently from other harms.
TL;DR: The distinction between making and allowing a tree to fall depends on how the tree fell, and not on how it was made or allowed to fall as mentioned in this paper, and the difference between the two ways for that to be so.
Abstract: The tree fell, in consequence of your behavior: whether it fell or not depended on how you acted. There are two ways for that to be so. You could have felled the tree, made it fall, caused it to fall; or you could have allowed it to fall, not prevented or saved it from falling. This difference between making and allowing looms large in moral philosophy, with many urgent problems depending upon it. We need a clear understanding of what distinction it is. Here are some of the locutions through which we express it:
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TL;DR: Dyzenhaus as mentioned in this paper argued that pornography eroticizes the social and physical inequalities between men and women, thereby making such inequality seem both natural and sexy, and argued that sexual domination, as one part of a much larger program of the pansocietal domination of women by men, involves an apparent willingness and an apparent complicity on the part of the dominated.
Abstract: In a recent article in this journal,' David Dyzenhaus has argued that Mill, by his own principles, "must be open to the legitimacy of coercive action to eradicate pornography,"2 that is, censorship. This conclusion, Dyzenhaus admits, is surprising. "After all, the ingredients of the principled opposition to censoring pornography appear to have their roots in On Liberty: in Mill's articulation of a narrow harm principle as the sole legitimate basis for state coercion; in his zeal to protect a private sphere of "self-regarding" action for the sake of an ideal of individual autonomy or self-government; and in his defense of a right to complete freedom of expression."3 In light of the strong prima facie case for Mill's opposition to censorship, Dyzenhaus must argue convincingly if he is to shift the consensus of Mill-inspired liberalism. I do not think that the argument is convincing enough to sway either a true Mill-inspired liberal or Mill himself. Dyzenhaus's argument, as I understand it, runs as follows. Pornography (presumably he means not all pornography, but only that which presents "natural" acts) eroticizes the social and physical inequalities between men and women, thereby making such inequality seem both natural and sexy. Sexual domination, as one part of a much larger program of the pansocietal domination of women by men, involves an apparent willingness and an apparent complicity on the part of the dominated, and this complicity is taught, encouraged, and maintained by pornography. These points, though never made by Mill, are in the same spirit as The Subjection of Women. (Mill indeed made very similar arguments against numerous discriminatory laws, institutions, and practices in his time.) Now Mill claimed in that book that the most valued right of any person in a free society is the right to autonomy,
TL;DR: In this article, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson present an Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit, an Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue Butler: Sermons Hume: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals Crusius: Guide to Rational Living Price: In Morals Rousseau: Discourse on the Origins of Inequality On the Social Contract Emile Reid: Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind Kant: Notes on Lectures on the Metaphysics of MORALS, 1793-94 Index of names.
Abstract: III. EPICUREANS AND EGOISTS Gassendi: Three Discourses of Happiness Nicole: Of Charity and Self-Love Mandeville: The Fable of the Bees Enquiry into the Origin of Honour Gay: Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality Helvetius: One the Mind d'Holbach: Universal Morality System of Nature Paley: Moral and Political Philosophy Bentham: Introductions to the Principles of Morals and Legislation IV. AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY Shaftesbury: An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit Hutcheson: An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue Butler: Sermons Hume: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals Crusius: Guide to Rational Living Price: In Morals Rousseau: Discourse on the Origins of Inequality On the Social Contract Emile Reid: Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind Kant: Notes on Lectures on the Metaphysics of Morals, 1793-94 Index of names.
TL;DR: The collectivist theory of the First Amendment has been used to advance a powerful reform agenda, ranging from statutes designed to correct the corrosive effects of private wealth on elections to legislation calculated to free the marketplace of ideas from the distorting effects of large media oligopolies as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Some of our best and most influential constitutional scholars have recently revived the view that the essential objective of the First Amendment is to promote a rich and valuable public debate. Their claim is that First Amendment issues ought to be decided not by "reference to ... personal autonomy, or the right of self-expression" but, rather, by reference to the Amendment's "positive purpose of creating an informed public capable of self-government."' Because this understanding of the First Amendment subordinates individual rights of expression to collective processes of public deliberation, I shall call it the "collectivist" theory of the First Amendment. Moved by the disreputable state of contemporary democratic dialogue in America, proponents of the collectivist theory of the First Amendment have used the theory to advance a powerful reform agenda, ranging from statutes designed to correct the corrosive effects of private wealth on elections to legislation calculated to free the marketplace of ideas from the distorting effects of large media oligopolies. The Supreme Court has been largely hostile to this agenda, objecting to its tendency to achieve its purposes through the suppression of individual speech. Thus in Buckley v. Valeo the Court struck down limitations on independent campaign expenditures, stating that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
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TL;DR: The authors analyse l'interpretation de Donagan de l'ethique kantienne developpee dans « The Theory of Morality » (1977) and sa methode d'identifier le principe moral de base cache derriere la croyance commune morale.
Abstract: L'A. analyse l'interpretation de Donagan de l'ethique kantienne developpee dans « The Theory of Morality » (1977) et sa methode d'identifier le principe moral de base cache derriere la croyance commune morale
TL;DR: Tribe as mentioned in this paper argues that what is at stake is not really the absolute in whose name the battle has been fought, but rather the common principles, sentiments, and commitments that individuals on opposite sides of abortion issues can recognize as deep and important.
Abstract: In Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes, Laurence Tribe seeks to change people's perception of the terms, and the intractability, of the abortion conflict. Though the dispute is often represented as requiring us to decide between according primacy to the value of (a fetus's) life and according primacy to the value of (a woman's) liberty, Tribe seeks to show that, "on either side of the question, what is at stake is not really the absolute in whose name the battle has been fought" (p. 242). He both challenges "the inevitability of permanent conflict on [the public question of abortion policy] and tries to lay the groundwork for moving on" (p. 7). Like Faye Ginsburg in Contested Lives, Tribe seeks to develop a Moderate position through a Strategy of Rapprochement, the identification of common principles, sentiments, and commitments that individuals on opposite sides of abortion issues can be got to recognize as deep and important.' Tribe, who is Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard, unsurprisingly sees the main issues as being ones about constitutional law and addresses "the legal framework in which the constitutional question of abortion rights must be decided" (p. 8). But he also sees The Clash of Absolutes as a book about the morality of abortion. Unlike Ginsburg, who does not address Pro-life or Pro-choice arguments but focuses, instead, on abortion activists' actual remarks, Tribe is interested in subjecting abstract Pro-choice and Pro-life positions to critical examination. But Tribe shares many of Ginsburg's aims and concerns,
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue for two links of law and morality, which they argue for by adapting and narrowing two claims-the first by Lon Fuller, the second by Philip Soper-that there is a necessary link between law and moral argument.
Abstract: In this article I argue for two links of law and morality. Neither is among or entailed by the conditions for a set of social rules to be a legal system; nor is either among or entailed by the truth conditions for any particular proposition of law; nor do these links generate an obligation to obey the law either in general or in any particular case.1 The links I argue for are thus aslant the usual debates on law and morality. Nevertheless, each stems from that debate. For I argue for each by adapting and narrowing two claims-the first by Lon Fuller, the second by Philip Soper-that there is a necessary link of law and morality.2 Although the links I argue for are quite different from one another, they are similar in that each is, in a sense, local. Each may represent a link of law and morality characteristic only of relatively recent western societies. Each embeds law in a specific context of moral psychology and moral argument. Each shows something about a specific set of local customs. The interest of the links is that these customs are ours.
TL;DR: This paper argued that rational actions can be rationally required, rationally allowed, or rationally prohibited (irrational) and that both of the former two categories count as rational actions.
Abstract: I am delighted that Bruce W. Price and B. C. Postow in their critiques of my article, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," have provided me with the opportunity to further clarify my account of rationality.1 I am aware that my account of rationality differs so radically from all of the current standard philosophical accounts that it is very difficult for many to appreciate how much of these accounts I am challenging. Of the standard theses about reasons and rationality which I challenge and which both Postow and Price accept without argument, the most important may be that when choosing between doing A and doing B it is irrational to choose to do B when A is supported by reasons and B is not. This very plausible-sounding and widely accepted thesis is the result of regarding the relationship between reasons and rationality as much more simple than it actually is. Neither Postow nor Price defend any of the formal accounts of rationality, including Gauthier's and Railton's, which I criticize in most detail in my article, but both object to my starting with irrationality rather than rationality. They accept a simple dichotomy between rational and irrational actions and hold that a unitary definition of rational actions can be provided without making use of the concept of irrationality. I claim that there is a trichotomy: that actions can be rationally required, rationally allowed, or rationally prohibited (irrational) and that both of the former two categories count as rational actions. This point explains why rational actions do not share any important feature except not being irrational. It is the category of rationally allowed actions-that is, actions about which completely informed rational persons can disagree over whether to do them-which sometimes