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Showing papers in "Global Environmental Change-human and Policy Dimensions in 2022"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors use environmental input-output data and footprint analysis to quantify the physical scale of net appropriation from the South in terms of embodied resources and labour over the period 1990 to 2015.
Abstract: • Rich countries rely on a large net appropriation of resources from the global South. • Drain from the South is worth over $10 trillion per year, in Northern prices. • The South’s losses outstrip their aid receipts by a factor of 30. • Unequal exchange is a major driver of underdevelopment and global inequality. • The impact of excess resource consumption in the North is offshored to the South. Unequal exchange theory posits that economic growth in the “advanced economies” of the global North relies on a large net appropriation of resources and labour from the global South, extracted through price differentials in international trade. Past attempts to estimate the scale and value of this drain have faced a number of conceptual and empirical limitations, and have been unable to capture the upstream resources and labour embodied in traded goods. Here we use environmental input-output data and footprint analysis to quantify the physical scale of net appropriation from the South in terms of embodied resources and labour over the period 1990 to 2015. We then represent the value of appropriated resources in terms of prevailing market prices. Our results show that in 2015 the North net appropriated from the South 12 billion tons of embodied raw material equivalents, 822 million hectares of embodied land, 21 exajoules of embodied energy, and 188 million person-years of embodied labour, worth $10.8 trillion in Northern prices – enough to end extreme poverty 70 times over. Over the whole period, drain from the South totalled $242 trillion (constant 2010 USD). This drain represents a significant windfall for the global North, equivalent to a quarter of Northern GDP. For comparison, we also report drain in global average prices. Using this method, we find that the South’s losses due to unequal exchange outstrip their total aid receipts over the period by a factor of 30. Our analysis confirms that unequal exchange is a significant driver of global inequality, uneven development, and ecological breakdown.

76 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors examined the impact of political ideology on climate change by utilizing multinational panel data covering 98 countries during the period 1990-2016 and found that left-wing governments are more likely to exhibit less carbon dioxide emissions than right-wing ones.
Abstract: • We examine the impact of political ideology on climate change. • Investigating the potential channels by which political ideology affects climate change. • Studying whether the effect of political ideology on climate change varies among different countries. • Investigating the interaction effect of political ideology and democracies on climate change. This research tests the casual link from political ideology to national greenhouse gas emissions by utilizing multinational panel data covering 98 countries during the period 1990–2016. Overall, the baseline results and robustness tests show a political divide on national greenhouse gas emissions, whereby compared to right-wing governments, left-wing governments are more likely to exhibit less carbon dioxide emissions. We further explore this topic from the perspectives of energy efficiency and education. Three-stage OLS regressions suggest that leftist parties increase energy efficiency and spend more on secondary education, which lead to less greenhouse gas emissions. We also introduce the interaction between political ideology and economic performance as well as globalization to test the moderating effects of economic performance and globalization. The study further looks into the interaction effects of political ideology and democracies on greenhouse gas emissions by dividing the whole sample into two sub-samples. The results indicate that the ideology effect on greenhouse gas emissions varies among countries with different economic performances or different degrees of political globalization, as well as between democracies and non-democracies.

65 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Co-productive agility refers to the willingness and ability of diverse actors to iteratively engage in reflexive dialogues to grow shared ideas and actions that would not have been possible from the outset as discussed by the authors .
Abstract: Co-production, the collaborative weaving of research and practice by diverse societal actors, is argued to play an important role in sustainability transformations. Yet, there is still poor understanding of how to navigate the tensions that emerge in these processes. Through analyzing 32 initiatives worldwide that co-produced knowledge and action to foster sustainable social-ecological relations, we conceptualize ‘co-productive agility’ as an emergent feature vital for turning tensions into transformations. Co-productive agility refers to the willingness and ability of diverse actors to iteratively engage in reflexive dialogues to grow shared ideas and actions that would not have been possible from the outset. It relies on embedding knowledge production within processes of change to constantly recognize, reposition, and navigate tensions and opportunities. Co-productive agility opens up multiple pathways to transformation through: (1) elevating marginalized agendas in ways that maintain their integrity and broaden struggles for justice; (2) questioning dominant agendas by engaging with power in ways that challenge assumptions, (3) navigating conflicting agendas to actively transform interlinked paradigms, practices, and structures; (4) exploring diverse agendas to foster learning and mutual respect for a plurality of perspectives. We explore six process considerations that vary by these four pathways and provide a framework to enable agility in sustainability transformations. We argue that research and practice spend too much time closing down debate over different agendas for change – thereby avoiding, suppressing, or polarizing tensions, and call for more efforts to facilitate better interactions among different agendas.

49 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors systematically explore the configurations of types of infrastructure, actors, tactics, and outcomes of recent opposition to energy transitions across seven carbon-intensive regions in Asia, Europe, and North America.
Abstract: Given the growing frequency, severity, and salience of social mobilization and community action on energy and climate issues, in this study we systematically explore the configurations of types of infrastructure, actors, tactics, and outcomes of recent opposition to energy transitions across seven carbon-intensive regions in Asia, Europe, and North America. Based on both a literature review and an original dataset of 130 case studies spanning the past decade, we track opposition to a wide range of energy infrastructure in these regions, including low-carbon options such as renewable energy and nuclear power; provide network analyses of the actors and coalitions involved in such events; and develop a typology and frequency analysis of tactics (such as litigation or protest), and outcomes (such as remuneration, policy change, concessions, or labor protections). We show that the politics of energy transitions in carbon-intensive regions varies significantly from country to country and across types of energy, and we discuss how the configurations of infrastructure, actors, tactics, and outcomes can be explained by differences in national institutions and their responses to global or supranational pressures. By bringing both a sociotechnical and comparative perspective to the global analysis of social movements and energy transitions, we suggest how goals of energy transition are refracted through national and subnational institutions and through local mobilizations both in support of and opposed to those transitions.

32 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , a global spatially explicit analysis presented the nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) inputs, processing and biogeochemical retention and delivery to surface waters and river export to coastal seas according to the five shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP).
Abstract: This global spatially explicit (0.5 by 0.5 degree) analysis presents the nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) inputs, processing and biogeochemical retention and delivery to surface waters and river export to coastal seas according to the five shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP). Four systems are considered: (i) human system; (ii) agriculture; (iii) aquaculture; (iv) nature. Exploring the changes during 1980–2015 and 2015–2050 according to the SSPs shows that the natural nutrient sources have been declining in the past decades and will continue to decline in all SSPs in future decades due to massive land transformations, while agriculture, human sewage and aquaculture are becoming increasingly dominant (globally up to 80% of nutrient delivery). More efforts than those employed in any of the SSPs are needed to slow down the global nutrient cycles. One of the drivers of the proliferation of harmful algal blooms is the tendency towards increasing N:P ratios in global freshwaters and export to the global coastal seas; this is the result of increasing N:P in inputs in food production, more efficient biogeochemical retention of P than of N in river basins, and groundwater N legacies, which seems to be most pronounced in a united world that strives after sustainability. The diverging strategies to achieve UN Sustainable Development Goals 14 (life below water), 2 (zero hunger) and 6 (clean water and sanitation) therefore require a balanced management system for both N and P in all systems, that accounts for future nutrient legacies.

31 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the sustainable development goals (SDGs).
Abstract: Climate change and development are strongly interconnected. An efficient use of financial resources would, thus require alignment between climate finance and development priorities, as set out in the context of both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this paper, we investigate to what extent climate-related official development assistance (ODA) before and after the Paris Agreement adoption supports the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, we assess to what extent donors align this finance with recipient countries’ climate-related priorities as spelled out in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). First, we find that climate-relevant ODA contributes to multiple SDGs, above all SDG 7 (energy) and SDG 11 (cities). Second, we find that there is substantial alignment between donors’ and recipients’ SDG priorities, but that this alignment has not improved in recent years, since the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. Third, we find that albeit climate-finance continues to be allocated more to climate-change mitigation than to adaptation, the difference became smaller in recent years. This reduced the misalignment with recipient countries’ NDC climate activities, which focus more on adaptation than mitigation. Overall, we identify coherence, gaps and opportunities for further alignment of climate and development actions, and related finance. Such an alignment is essential to increase the likelihood of implementation of the two international agreements and to ensure that action is guided by recipient countries’ needs.

26 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors show how fairness concerns quantitatively condition the allocation of this global carbon budget across countries, and find the option most in line with fairness concerns to be a fourfold qualified version of the equal-per-capita approach that incorporates a limited form of grandfathering.
Abstract: Countries’ nationally determined contributions to mitigate global warming translate to claims of country specific shares of the remaining carbon budget. The remaining global budget is limited by the aim of staying well below 2 °C, however. Here we show how fairness concerns quantitatively condition the allocation of this global carbon budget across countries. Minimal fairness requirements include securing basic needs, attributing historical responsibility for past emissions, accounting for benefits from past emissions, and not exceeding countries’ societally feasible emission reduction rate. The argument in favor of taking into account these fairness concerns reflects a critique of both simple equality- and sovereignty-principled reduction approaches, the former modelled here as the equal-per-capita distribution from now on, the latter as prolonging the inequality of the status-quo levels of emissions into the transformation period (considered a form of “grandfathering”). We find the option most in line with fairness concerns to be a four-fold qualified version of the equal-per-capita approach that incorporates a limited form of grandfathering.

22 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors determined the changes in trans-Arctic routes from 1979 to 2019 by combining two harmonized high-quality daily sea ice products and found that the trans-arctic routes are becoming navigable much faster than projected by the GCMs.
Abstract: Rapid declines in Arctic sea ice coverage over the past four decades have increased the commercial feasibility of trans-Arctic routes. However, the historical changes in navigability of trans-Arctic routes remain unclear, and projections by global circulation models (GCMs) contain large uncertainties since they cannot simulate long-term Arctic sea ice changes. In this study, we determined the changes in trans-Arctic routes from 1979 to 2019 by combining two harmonized high-quality daily sea ice products. We found that the trans-Arctic routes are becoming navigable much faster than projected by the GCMs. The navigation season for open water (OW) vessels along the Northeast Passage (NEP) has lengthened from occasionally navigable in the 1980 s to 92 ± 15 days in the 2010 s. In contrast, previous GCM projections have suggested that navigability would not be achieved until the mid-21st century. The 90-day safety shipping area for OW vessels expanded by 35% during 1979–2018, reaching 8.28 million km2 in 2018, indicating an increasing rate of 0.08 ± 0.01 million km2 per year. The shortest trans-Arctic routes were also shifted further north than the model projections. Regular ships have been able to safely travel north along the islands in the NEP and transit through the M’Clure Strait in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago during the 2010 s, while previous studies have projected that this would not be feasible until the mid-21st century. We also found that the improved navigability of trans-Arctic routes enables commercial ships to transport approximately 33–66% (at the same load factor) more goods from East Asia to Europe during the Arctic shipping season than by the traditional Suez Canal route. These findings highlight the need for aggressive actions to develop mandatory rules that promote navigation safety and strengthen environmental protection in the Arctic.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the share of global GHG emissions driven by urban areas from 1990 to 2100 based on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)-representative concentration pathway (RCP) framework is estimated.
Abstract: • Urban areas have accounted for the majority of global GHG emissions in 2015 (61.8%). • Urban emission scenarios are established within seven pathway combinations to 2100. • The scenarios have implications for urban mitigation and climate neutrality targets. • Two regions can represent up to 73.3% of cumulative consumption-based urban emissions during 2020–2100. • The study provides a new approach for quantifying urban emissions within scenarios. Projections of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are critical to enable a better understanding and anticipation of future climate change under different socio-economic conditions and mitigation strategies. The climate projections and scenarios assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, following the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP)-Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) framework, have provided a rich understanding of the constraints and opportunities for policy action. However, the current emissions scenarios lack an explicit treatment of urban emissions within the global context. Given the pace and scale of urbanization, with global urban populations expected to increase from about 4.4 billion today to about 7 billion by 2050, there is an urgent need to fill this knowledge gap. Here, we estimate the share of global GHG emissions driven by urban areas from 1990 to 2100 based on the SSP-RCP framework. The urban consumption-based GHG emissions are presented in five regional aggregates and based on a combination of the urban population share, 2015 urban per capita CO 2 eq carbon footprint, SSP-based national CO 2 eq emissions, and recent analysis of urban per capita CO 2 eq trends. We find that urban areas account for the majority of global GHG emissions in 2015 (61.8%). Moreover, the urban share of global GHG emissions progressively increases into the future, exceeding 80% in some scenarios by the end of the century. The combined urban areas in Asia and Developing Pacific, and Developed Countries account for 65.0% to 73.3% of cumulative urban consumption-based emissions between 2020 and 2100 across the scenarios. Given these dominant roles, we describe the implications for potential urban mitigation in each of the scenario narratives in order to meet the goal of climate neutrality within this century.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors provide insights into the factors that influence perceptions of various dimensions of flood risk to draw lessons to guide flood risk communication strategies, and offer recommendations for improving flood risk communications policies, specifically increasing the frequency of communication.
Abstract: • We test a variety of drivers of flood risk perceptions, such as risk communication. • Risk perceptions are shaped in several dimensions by intuitive and rational thinking. • Mixed evidence for several drivers is explained by an implicit selection bias. • People who do not know how to answer are triggered by socio-demographic drivers. • Recommendations are provided for improving flood risk communication policies. Flood damages have increased in many regions around the world, and they are expected to continue to rise in the future due to climate change. To reverse this trend, awareness of flood risk among the population is required to support flood risk management policies and improve flood preparedness. However, empirical studies on the drivers of flood risk perceptions conducted thus far have reported mixed and contradictory results. The aim of this study is to provide insights into the factors that influence perceptions of various dimensions of flood risk to draw lessons to guide flood risk communication strategies. We test a variety of hypotheses of possible factors of influence on flood risk perceptions that are motivated by theoretical concepts and previous empirical studies, whilst also controlling for socio-demographic variables. A representative sample of 2,976 residents answered our survey assessing the role that past flood experiences and risk communication play in shaping flood risk perceptions. Besides exploring flood risk perceptions more robustly, this large sample also facilitates the systematic study of ‘don’t know’ answers, which are often dismissed as missing data in many studies. Rather in this study we analyze what ‘don’t know’ answers reflect in terms of knowledge about particular dimensions of flood risk. The study finds that older people, as well as those who have higher levels of income and education, are significantly more likely to express their flood risk perceptions, respondents who are unable to answer the questions on flood risk perceptions face a lower flood risk, report to have been living in their neighbourhood for a shorter period of time and have less first-hand flood experience. Previous studies might thus be biased by an implicit selection effect. Finally, we show that findings are highly dependent on other explicit choices made by researchers, including the apparently self-fulfilling impact of selecting one explanatory framework over another. New insights emerge from the role that information campaigns and social vulnerability play in the ability to answer the questions. Based on our findings, we offer recommendations for improving flood risk communication policies, specifically increasing the frequency of communication, ensuring that campaigns are focused in terms of the content they provide and the subgroups of the population they target.

19 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors comprehensively assess whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries, particularly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries.
Abstract: • Prioritizing the most vulnerable countries is a key goal of global climate change finance. • For the first time, we comprehensively assess whether the biggest climate fund, the GCF, achieves this goal. • Many of the most vulnerable countries have not been able to access GCF funds, particularly LDCs in Africa. • Institutional capacity is a major factor in determining a country’s access to funding. • Capacity development and simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture. The evolving architecture of global climate change adaptation finance is shifting towards fund mechanisms with competitive application and allocation principles. At the same time, prioritization of the most vulnerable countries is a key goal within this emerging architecture. The paper analyses whether the Green Climate Fund (GCF), by far the largest climate change fund, has so far delivered on its promise to prioritize the most vulnerable countries. For our analysis, we consider the USD 2.5 billion GCF funding allocated until the end of the first mobilization phase and disaggregate it project-by-project into its mitigation and adaptation related amounts. We then analyze the adaptation flows in terms of the recipient country’s level of vulnerability and institutional capacity. We further analyze whether funds are being accessed through independent national entities or international intermediaries and whether recipient countries have developing country priority status. The results show that funds-based adaptation finance creates an ambiguous picture: On the one hand, the GCF is on track in allocating its funds largely to country groups which its statutes aim to prioritize, particularly LDCs, African countries and SIDS. At the same time, the proposal process results in the fact that many countries with the highest climate vulnerability but weak government institutions and fragile state-bureaucracies have missed out and not been able to access project funding, mostly LDCs in Africa and conflict-ridden countries. Further, most countries have not yet been able to access project funds independently through their national entities, limiting direct access and country ownership – the strengthening of which is a major goal of the fund. The findings suggest that simplified approval tracks need to be strengthened in the emerging climate finance architecture so that populations in countries with the lowest institutional capacity but highest vulnerability are not being left behind in the long-run.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper examined the impact of anti-corruption activities on the corporate environmental responsibility (CER) performance of listed Chinese enterprises from 2010 to 2016, and employed a Difference-in-Differences design to identify the causal effect by using the anticorruption campaign as an exogenous policy shock.
Abstract: • The relationship between China’s Anti-corruption Campaign and Corporate Environmental Responsibility is analyzed. • Anti-corruption campaign improves the CER performance of high-corruption enterprises. • The promotion effect is heterogeneous by corporate ownership and industry. • Mechanisms are environmental regulations, corporate rent-seeking and innovation behaviors. • Anti-corruption improves corporate profitability, but the effect is partly offset by increased CER. Taking advantage of China’s vigorous anti-corruption campaign implemented in 2013, this study examines the impact of anti-corruption activities on the corporate environmental responsibility (CER) performance of listed Chinese enterprises from 2010 to 2016. The empirical analysis employs a Difference-in-Differences design to identify the causal effect by using the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous policy shock. Results indicate that China’s unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched in 2013 significantly improves the CER performance of high-corruption enterprises. Such an effect is most evident for state-owned enterprises, especially local government-owned ones and those in pollution-intensive industries. These results remain after a series of robustness tests. The mechanism results suggest that the promotion effects of the anti-corruption campaign on CER performance can be achieved through environmental regulations, corporate rent-seeking, and innovation behaviors. Moreover, anti-corruption improves the profitability of enterprises, but the effect is significantly offset by increased CER activities.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors assess the threat imposed by mining to isolated peoples and the indigenous territories they occupy, and show that mining requests are significantly related to the presence of isolated groups.
Abstract: The largest concentration of isolated indigenous peoples in the world is in the indigenous lands of the Brazilian Legal Amazon. However, the right to self-isolation and the survival of these societies are at risk because powerful interests want to exploit the natural assets of their relatively untouched areas. These ambitions are reflected in a recent bill (PL191/2020), which proposes opening up indigenous lands to mining. We assess the threat imposed by mining to isolated peoples and the indigenous territories they occupy. Specifically, we cross data on mining requests received by the National Mining Agency with information on the distribution of isolated indigenous groups recorded by the Socio-Environmental Institute, in order to evaluate the number and aerial extent of requests for mineral prospecting and operation registered in indigenous lands with isolated groups. We also analyze whether mining requests are related to the presence of isolated groups, the state of knowledge about them, and the current existence of illegal mining operations. Our results indicate that, even though mining is not yet allowed in indigenous lands, mining companies are very active in the search for exploitable areas in these territories. If bill PL191/2020 passes, mining operations would affect more than 10 million hectares in 25 indigenous lands in the Legal Amazon region that are home to 43 isolated groups. We found that the situation is especially worrisome for 21 isolated groups whose lands concentrate 97% of all mining requests. Mineral-rich areas overlap remote areas where more indigenous peoples persist in isolation, so that mining requests are significantly related to the presence of isolated groups. Nonetheless, we show that companies are hesitant to invest in lands with well-known isolated groups that could impede the licensing process and pose reputational risks to the companies. Brazil’s mechanisms for environmental and indigenous protection have been dismantled by the current presidential administration and offer no guarantees for a safe coexistence between extractive operations and isolated peoples. Thus, the approval of bill PL191/2020 could lead to undesired contact and the extinction of a large number of unique peoples, societies and cultures.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors developed a theoretical model to predict how command-and-control environmental regulation affects innovation, and derived its channels using the difference-in-difference-indifference in-differences strategy and a comprehensive dataset at city-industry-year level of manufacturing sectors in China.
Abstract: The relevance of analyzing effects of environmental regulation on innovation cannot be overemphasized. In this paper, we first develop a theoretical model to predict how command-and-control environmental regulation affects innovation, and then we derive its channels. Using the difference-in-difference-in-differences strategy and a comprehensive dataset at city-industry-year level of manufacturing sectors in China, we found that the more stringent environmental regulations that are faced by cities, measured by the reduction targets of chemical oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) during the eleventh Five-Year Plan, are negatively associated with innovation. Thus, the evidence contradicts the Porter Hypothesis. On average, a one standard deviation increase in the reduction targets of COD (SO2) is associated with a 0.023 (0.016) standard deviation decrease in the innovation index. We controlled carefully for various potential confounders, and the results were supported by robustness and falsification checks. There exists an evident heterogeneity effect across regions and industries with different pollution intensities. The channel analysis shows that stricter environmental regulation also accounts for a sharp decline in labor demand, firm entry, and inbound foreign direct investment. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures for innovation and environmental regulation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors present findings from the UNEP report "Making Peace with Nature" and reflections on how to take advantage of the 50 years of experience gained since the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.
Abstract: Today’s increasingly unequal and resource intensive development model degrades and surpasses Earth’s finite capacity to sustain human well-being. Society must restore this capacity and adapt to it without surrendering hard won development gains while also honoring the rightful aspirations of poorer nations and people to enjoy better living standards, according to the UNEP report “Making Peace with Nature”. This article presents findings from the report and reflections on how to take advantage of the 50 years of experience gained since the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The interconnected environmental emergencies of climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollution need to be addressed together. International scientific assessments are providing the knowledge base for informed evidence-based decision-making, but none of the internationally agreed environmentally targets for climate and biodiversity have been met and the situation is becoming more dire with each passing year. Unless these issues are addressed in the next 5–10 years none of the 2030 sustainable development goals will be achieved. Human knowledge, ingenuity, technology and cooperation need to be mobilized in such an effort. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals provides a blueprint for the transformation. The international environmental governance structure needs to facilitate a system-wide cross-sectoral transformation of humankind's relationship with nature. Transformed economic, financial and productive systems can lead and power the shift to sustainability. Major shifts in investment and regulation are key to just and informed transformations that overcome inertia and opposition from vested interests. Government actions at all levels are needed together with strengthened actions by all actors in society and the next decade is critical.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors developed a global long-term high-resolution dataset of daytime surface urban heat island (SUHI), offering an insight into the space-time variability of the urban-rural temperature differences which is unprecedented at global scale.
Abstract: Surface temperatures are generally higher in cities than in rural surroundings. This phenomenon, known as Surface Urban Heat Island (SUHI), increases the risk of heat-related human illnesses and mortality. Past global studies analysed this phenomenon aggregated at city scale or over seasonal and annual time periods, while human impacts strongly depend on shorter term heat stress experienced locally. Here we develop a global long-term high-resolution dataset of daytime SUHI, offering an insight into the space–time variability of the urban–rural temperature differences which is unprecedented at global scale. Our results show that across urban areas worldwide over the period 2003–2020, 3-day SUHI extremes are on average more than twice as high as the warm-season median SUHI, with local exceedances up to 10 K. Over this period, SUHI extremes have increased more rapidly than warm-season medians, and averaged worldwide are now 1.04 K or 31% higher compared to 2003. This can be linked with increasing urbanisation, more frequent heatwaves, and greening of the earth, processes that are all expected to continue in the coming decades. Within many cities there are hotspots where extreme SUHI intensity is 10–15 K higher compared to relatively cooler city parts. Given the limited human adaptability to heat stress, our results advocate for mitigation strategies targeted at reducing SUHI extremes in the most vulnerable and exposed city neighbourhoods.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors compared conflicts reporting no human health impacts to those reporting health impacts linked to toxic pollution and found that health impacts are a key concern for working-class communities.
Abstract: Analysing a sample of 3,033 environmental conflicts around the globe, we compared conflicts reporting no human health impacts to those reporting health impacts linked to toxic pollution. Our study suggests four main findings. First, health impacts are a key concern for working-class communities. Second, the long-term effects of toxic pollution undermine communities' ability to act preventively. Third, industrial activities, waste management and nuclear energy conflicts are more likely to report health impacts than other economic activities. Last, mobilising groups are reluctant to consider the closure of a polluting project a successful outcome because of the persistence of toxic pollution across time. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of what we have termed ‘environmental health conflicts’ (EHCs).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the concept of boundary agency is defined as the agency "possessed" when willing and able to translate between different epistemological communities invested in a similar policy and governance challenge such as climate change.
Abstract: Effective action taken against climate change must find ways to unite scientific and practice-based knowledges associated with the various stakeholders who see themselves as invested in the global delivery of climate governance. Political decision-makers, climate scientists and practitioners approach this challenge from what are often radically different perspectives and experiences. While considerable work has been done to develop the idea of ‘co-production’ in the development of climate action outputs, questions remain over how to best unite the contrasting epistemological traditions and norms associated with different stakeholders. Drawing on the existing literatures on climate action co-production and from translational perspectives on the science-policy interface, in this paper we develop the concept of ‘boundary agency’. Defining this as the agency ‘possessed’ when willing and able to translate between different epistemological communities invested in a similar policy and governance challenge such as climate change, we offer it as a useful means to reflect on participants’ understanding of the ‘co’ in co-production. This is in contrast to the more established (often academic-led) focus on what it is that is being produced by co-production processes. We draw from two complementary empirical studies, which explicitly encouraged i) engagement and ii) reflection on cross-boundary co-production between climate action stakeholders from different backgrounds. Reflecting on the two studies, we discuss the benefits of (and barriers to) encouraging more active and sustained engagement between climate action stakeholders so as to try to actively blur the boundaries between science and policy and, in doing so, invent new epistemological communities of practice.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors assess the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on the network structure of 276 international organizations in the period 2012-2019, that is, four years before and four years after the launch of the sustainable development goals.
Abstract: • The SDGs have failed to reduce fragmentation in global sustainability governance. • We provide a novel network model to measure fragmentation using website data. • We draw on 1.5 million hyperlinks connecting 276 international organizations. • Silos are strengthening around the 17 issue areas of the SDGs. • Siloization is stronger outside the UN system and among regional organizations. Global sustainability governance is marked by a highly fragmented system of distinct clusters of international organizations, along with states and other actors. Enhancing inter-organizational coordination and cooperation is thus often recognized as an important reform challenge in global sustainability governance. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals, agreed by the United Nations in 2015, thus explicitly aim at advancing policy coherence and institutional integration among the myriad international institutions. Yet, have these goals been effective in this regard? We assess here the impact of the Sustainable Development Goals on the network structure of 276 international organizations in the period 2012–2019, that is, four years before and four years after the launch of the Sustainable Development Goals. The network structure was approximated by analyzing data from the websites of these 276 international organizations that were joined by more than 1.5 million hyperlinks, which we collected using a custom-made web crawler. Our findings are contrary to what is widely expected from the Sustainable Development Goals: we find that fragmentation has in fact increased after the Sustainable Development Goals came into effect. In addition, silos are increasing around the 17 SDGs as well as around the social, economic, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For instance, this article found that younger generations reported greater increases in worry about climate change and, to a lesser degree, anger and guilt, within the two youngest generations relative to changes among Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent and Greatest Generations.
Abstract: The emergence of concern about and evidence of climate change has been argued to create a cultural milieu unique to the Millennial generation (born between 1981 and 1996) and iGeneration (aka iGens or Generation Z born after 1997). The present research tested a) claims of unique angst about climate change among younger versus older generations, b) growing generational discrepancies over time in emotions about climate change, c) generational differences for several emotions about climate change, and d) the implications of these emotions for motivating people to discuss climate change with others, potentially aiding coping with climate change and facilitating action to address climate change. Survey data gathered from 2010 to 2019 of a representative sample of United States residents (N = 22,468) document greater increases in worry about climate change and, to a lesser degree, anger and guilt about climate change, within the two youngest generations relative to changes among Generation X, Baby Boomers, and the Silent and Greatest Generations. Although generational differences were small and suggest overstatements of unique effects for younger generations, increases in younger generations’ emotions transform into the two youngest generations reporting the strongest emotions in 2019. Over ten years, these differential shifts in emotions explain more substantial increases in the frequency of discussing climate in the youngest generations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors used multiple global forest sector models to project forest carbon impacts across 81 shared socioeconomic (SSP) and climate mitigation pathway scenarios, highlighting the strong influence of SSPs on forest sector model estimates.
Abstract: Deforestation has contributed significantly to net greenhouse gas emissions, but slowing deforestation, regrowing forests and other ecosystem processes have made forests a net sink. Deforestation will still influence future carbon fluxes, but the role of forest growth through aging, management, and other silvicultural inputs on future carbon fluxes are critically important but not always recognized by bookkeeping and integrated assessment models. When projecting the future, it is vital to capture how management processes affect carbon storage in ecosystems and wood products. This study uses multiple global forest sector models to project forest carbon impacts across 81 shared socioeconomic (SSP) and climate mitigation pathway scenarios. We illustrate the importance of modeling management decisions in existing forests in response to changing demands for land resources, wood products and carbon. Although the models vary in key attributes, there is general agreement across a majority of scenarios that the global forest sector could remain a carbon sink in the future, sequestering 1.2–5.8 GtCO2e/yr over the next century. Carbon fluxes in the baseline scenarios that exclude climate mitigation policy ranged from −0.8 to 4.9 GtCO2e/yr, highlighting the strong influence of SSPs on forest sector model estimates. Improved forest management can jointly increase carbon stocks and harvests without expanding forest area, suggesting that carbon fluxes from managed forests systems deserve more careful consideration by the climate policy community.

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TL;DR: This article examined the effect of recipients' climate vulnerability on the allocation of climate funds by controlling for other commonly-identified determinants, finding that the relationship between vulnerability and funding was parabolic, suggesting "moderately vulnerable" countries likely to receive more funding than the most vulnerable countries.
Abstract: The ‘climate justice’ lens is increasingly being used in framing discussions and debates on global climate finance. A variant of such justice – distributive justice – emphasises recipient countries’ vulnerability to be an important consideration in funding allocation. The extent to which this principle is pursued in practice has been of widespread and ongoing concerns. Empirical evidence in this regard however remains inadequate and methodologically weak. This research examined the effect of recipients’ climate vulnerability on the allocation of climate funds by controlling for other commonly-identified determinants. A dynamic panel regression method based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) was used on a longitudinal dataset, containing approved funds for more than 100,000 projects covering three areas of climate action (mitigation, adaptation, and overlap) in 133 countries over two decades (2000–2018). Findings indicated a non-significant effect of recipients’ vulnerability on mitigation funding, but significant positive effects on adaptation and overlap fundings. ‘Most vulnerable’ countries were likely to receive higher amounts of these two types of funding than the ‘least vulnerable’ countries. All these provided evidence of distributive justice. However, the relationship between vulnerability and funding was parabolic, suggesting ‘moderately vulnerable’ countries likely to receive more funding than the ‘most vulnerable’ countries. Whilst, for mitigation funding, this observation was not a reason for concern, for adaptation and overlap fundings this was not in complete harmony with distributive justice. Paradoxically, countries with better investment readiness were likely to receive more adaptation and overlap funds. In discordance with distributive justice, countries within the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions, despite their higher climatic vulnerabilities, were likely to receive significantly less adaptation and overlap fundings. Effects of vulnerability were persistent, and past funding had significant effects on current funding. These, coupled with the impact of readiness, suggested a probable Low Funding Trap for the world’s most vulnerable countries. The overarching conclusion is that, although positive changes have occurred since the 2015 Paris Agreement, considerable challenges to distributive justice remain. Significant data and methodological challenges encountered in the research and their implications are also discussed.

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Pengwei Du1
TL;DR: This article found that the capacity to self-organize, and nurturing diversity are sufficient conditions for Arctic communities whose livelihoods have been resilient, or for communities who have been transformed, and identified governance patways to support adaptations and transformations in the Arctic, a geography with some of the most dramatic social and natural challenges.
Abstract: Resilience is the capacity of any system to maintain its function, structure and identity despite disturbances. Assessing resilience has been elusive due to high levels of abstraction that are difficult to empirically test, or the lack of high quality data required once appropriate proxies are identified. Most resilience assessments are limited to specific situation arenas, making comparision one of the unresolved challenges. Here we show how leveraging comparative analysis can provide insights on how Arctic communities (N = 40) can best deal with social and environmental change. We found that the capacity to self-organize, and nurturing diversity are sufficient conditions for Arctic communities whose livelihoods have been resilient, or for communities whose livelihoods have been transformed. Our study provides an alternative perspective on how to assess resilience by leveraging comparsion across cases. It also identify governance patways to support adaptations and transformations in the Arctic, a geography with some of the most dramatic social and natural challenges to come.

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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors developed an Environmentally Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output (EE-MRIO) model with compiling a global MRIO table based on the latest Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 10 database, where they specifically constructed a water withdrawal account and matched it to each economy at the sectoral level.
Abstract: Exploring the environmental impact of dietary consumption has become increasingly important to understand the carbon-water-food nexus, vital to achieving UN sustainable development goals. However, the research on diet-based nexus assessment is still lacking. Here, we developed an Environmentally Extended Multi-Regional Input-Output (EE-MRIO) model with compiling a global MRIO table based on the latest Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 10 database, where we specifically constructed a water withdrawal account and matched it to each economy at the sectoral level. The regional heterogeneity and synergy of carbon-water nexus affected by dietary patterns in nine countries was explored. The results show that: (1) Dietary consumption is the main use of water withdrawal for each country; Japan, the US, South Korea, and India have a high per capita dietary water footprint. Mainly due to consumption of processed rice, Japan has the highest per capita value of 488 M3/year, accounting for 63.4% of the total water footprint. (2) The total dietary carbon footprints in China, India, and the US are high, which is mainly caused by the high consumption of animal products (including dairy) either due to the large population (China, India) or animal-based diet (the US). Americans have the highest per capita dietary carbon footprint, reaching 755.4 kg/year, 2.76 times that of the global average. (3) Generally, imported/foreign footprints account for a greater share in dietary water and carbon footprints of developed countries with an animal-based diet. (4) In the nexus analysis, the US, Japan, and South Korea are key-nexus countries, vegetables, fruit and nuts, tobacco and beverages, and other food products are selected as key-nexus sectors with relatively high dietary water and carbon footprint. Furthermore, dietary consumption choices lead to different environmental impacts. It is particularly important to find a sustainable dietary route adapted to each country considering that heterogeneity and synergism exist in key-nexus sectors to achieve the relevant Sustainable Development Goals.

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TL;DR: In this article , a qualitative comparative analysis of local climate mitigation plans in 885 European cities was conducted, and the authors found that urban climate action is systematically associated with four qualitatively different configurations of factors, each with its own consistent narrative (networker cities, green cities, lighthouse cities, and fundraising cities).
Abstract: Research on urban climate action has identified a broad range of potential factors explaining why and how local governments decide to tackle climate change. However, empirical evidence linking such factors in order to explain actual urban climate action has so far been mixed. To address this roadblock, our paper relies on a novel approach, postulating that different configurations of factors may lead to the same outcome (“equifinality”), through a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). It is based on an available data set of local climate mitigation plans in 885 European cities. We find that urban climate action is systematically associated with four qualitatively different configurations of factors, each with its own consistent narrative (“networker cities”, “green cities”, “lighthouse cities”, “fundraising cities”). Crucially, some factors play a positive role in some configurations, a negative in others, and no role in further configurations (e.g., whether a city is located in a country with supportive national climate policies). This confirms that there is no single explanation for urban climate action. Achieving greater robustness in empirical research about urban climate action may thus require a shift, both conceptual and methodological, to the interactions between factors, allowing for different explanations in different contexts.

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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors argue that China is leveraging this enhanced soft power to elevate the importance of adaptation in multilateral climate negotiations, advance a technocentric approach to climate mitigation, export its development model, and promote industrial-scale afforestation as a nature-based climate solution.
Abstract: China’s influence on climate governance has been steadily increasing since the adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015. Much of this influence, this article argues, has come from China forging a path for climate adaptation and mitigation for the global South. This is having far-reaching consequences, the article further argues, for the politics of global climate governance. China’s discursive and diplomatic power in climate politics is growing as China builds alliances across the global South. China is leveraging this enhanced soft power to elevate the importance of adaptation in multilateral climate negotiations, advance a technocentric approach to climate mitigation, export its development model, and promote industrial-scale afforestation as a nature-based climate solution. China’s strategy is enhancing climate financing, technology transfers, renewable power, and adaptation infrastructure across the global South. To some extent, this is helping with a transition to a low-carbon world economy. Yet China’s leadership is also reinforcing incremental, technocratic, and growth-oriented solutions in global climate governance. These findings advance the understanding of China’s role in global environmental politics, especially its growing influence on climate governance in the global South.

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TL;DR: In this paper , the authors make the case for holistic, integrated, and interdisciplinary thinking that challenges assumptions and worldviews, crucially based on public participation and engagement, to create the enabling conditions for sustainability to emerge.
Abstract: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted as reference and universal guidepost for transitioning to Sustainable Development by the United Nations in 2015 as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, are intended to be used as a set of interconnected goals and global targets for ‘Transforming our world’, as the 2030 Agenda is titled. This is a far more challenging task than business as usual; it requires systems thinking for understanding the conditions that generate and propagate sustainability challenges, moving away from the reductionist and anthropocentric thinking that created them in the first place. Taking a systems approach to addressing these challenges has been gaining currency with academics and policymakers alike, and here we make the case for holistic, integrated, and interdisciplinary thinking that challenges assumptions and worldviews, crucially based on public participation and engagement, to create the enabling conditions for sustainability to emerge. System transformations require interconnected changes to technologies, social practices, business models, regulations and societal norms, an intentional process designed to fundamentally alter the components and structures that cause the system to behave in its current unsustainable ways, a paradigm shift enabling the transition to sustainability.

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TL;DR: In this article , the authors provided an up-to-date CO 2 emission inventory for China's iron and steel sector, and estimated the future CO 2 emissions from China's steel industry in pathways that consider the influence of different technology portfolios, technology maturity, decarbonization of power systems, and future steel production output.
Abstract: • We provide an up-to-date CO 2 emission inventory for China’s iron and steel sector. • Conventional technology is estimated to reduce emissions by only 54%. • Innovative technological retrofitting is the key to net-zero emission pathway. As a hard-to-abate sector, the iron and steel industry is responsible for 22% of China’s total carbon emissions and therefore plays a crucial role in achieving China’s carbon peaking and neutrality target. Nearly 90% of China’s iron and steel output is produced with coal-based blast furnaces, which results in high carbon emission intensity. To peak China’s carbon emissions and achieve the carbon neutrality target, it is essential to accelerate the application of breakthrough technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen-based steel-making. This paper estimates the future CO 2 emissions from China’s iron and steel industry in pathways that consider the influence of different technology portfolios, technology maturity, decarbonization of power systems, and future steel production output. The results show that using currently available technology, China’s iron and steel industry can reduce CO 2 emissions by more than 50%. However, it cannot achieve the neutrality target without using innovative technologies. By combining conventional strategies with net-zero emission technologies such as CCS and hydrogen metallurgy, approximately 80–90% emission reduction can be achieved, thus leading to a carbon neutrality pathway, which can meet the 1.5°C targets of the carbon budget limit either. In the future, carbon emissions' reduction potential will be influenced by the decarbonization of power systems and the diffusion rate of innovative technologies. To achieve carbon neutrality, it is essential to act sooner and faster.

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TL;DR: In this article , the authors use a foresight approach to identify, quantify and map megatrends and detect where they coincide in the future of European agriculture at the regional scale.
Abstract: A range of intensifying pressures is making the future of European agriculture dynamic and contested. Insights into these pressures are needed to inform debates about the future of the sector. In this study, we use a foresight approach to identify, quantify and map megatrends. Megatrends are long-term driving forces which are observable today and will likely have transformational potential in the future. By mapping these megatrends at the regional scale, we establish a geography of megatrends and detect where they coincide. Four megatrends significant for the future of European agriculture at the regional scale are assessed: Climate change, demographic change, (post-) productivism shifts, and increasingly stringent environmental regulations. The direction and intensity of these megatrends differs between regions, which drives regions into different systemic lock-ins or dynamics. In most regions, megatrends converge to destabilize the current system, forewarning impending systemic changes. While the specific megatrends contributing to this instability differ regionally, this result highlights that many regions are on a dynamic rather than stable trajectory, and the governance challenge is to steer these dynamics towards a desirable future. However, some regions are found to be highly persistent, indicating that megatrends reinforce business as usual, and change needs to be triggered through purposeful governance. In a minority of regions megatrends may drive marginalization as the current system becomes increasingly unviable. We argue that research and policies concerning agricultural sustainability transitions should be cognizant of the regional diversity of European megatrends and the pressures they create.

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TL;DR: In this article , the authors argue that sustainability pathways need to be conceived as emerging from the catalytic interaction of multiple and overlapping efforts to change the status quo, and suggest that pathways can be conceptualized as being composed of 'stepping stones': bundles of related interventions that seize or create opportunities to build momentum for the implementation of innovations, the form of which is not predetermined.
Abstract: The notion that pathways can be identified and followed towards more sustainable futures has become an increasingly prevalent idea across the science and policy of global environmental change. Focusing on the debate within literatures on socio-technical systems, we find that pathways are often tied to the concept of scaling up such that they are dependent on trajectories which extend from the geographically small to large scale or from singular incidences to widespread adoption. Building on relational approaches to scaling, in this paper we argue that sustainability pathways need to be conceived as emerging from the catalytic interaction of multiple and overlapping efforts to change the status quo. We suggest that pathways can be conceptualized as being composed of ‘stepping stones’: bundles of related interventions that seize or create opportunities to build momentum for the implementation of innovations, the form of which is not predetermined. Drawing on 243 interviews, participant observation, and document analysis examining urban nature-based solutions across six European countries and the EU, we identify 20 stepping stones that can be used to accelerate the uptake of urban NBS in European cities. In the case of urban NBS in Europe, we find that the capacity of stepping stones to generate catalytic change strongly depends on how they interact with one another. We illustrate that pathways are not given but rather assembled through key interventions that collectively generate the capacities and momentum needed to overcome inertia and generate new socio-material orders in which such interventions are normalized as mainstream responses to sustainability challenges.