Showing papers in "Governance in 1993"

Explaining the Decline of Macro‐corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies

Abstract: A growing consensus among many observers of Western European politics has developed in recent years that, in certain countries, national level, consensus-based political bargaining arrangements involving representatives of organized capital, trade unions, and the state are giving way to more sectorally-based, conflictual forms of relations. These developments suggest an overall decline in the efficacy of national-level corporatist institutional structures in the liberal democracies of Western Europe. This article contends that neither of the two general theoretical approaches to the study of corporatism - the liberal model of the “neocorporatist state” (which fails to acknowledge the potential for serious system-threatening instability within corporatism) nor the Marxist model of corporatist “political structures” (which incorrectly predicts labor-generated corporatist instability due to inevitable rank-and-file discontent with the policy outputs of corporatist forms) - can account for this current wave of macro-corporatist instability and decline. In response to this theoretical impasse, this article develops a capitalist-centered explanation for the declining significance of corporatist forms. Business interests, it is maintained, may no longer be viewing corporatist arrangements as beneficial due to certain domestic structural economic changes and to transformations in the global capitalist system.

Statecraft, Social Policy, and Governance in Latin America

Abstract: This article develops an analytical framework designed to examine social policy as a strategic approach to issues of state-society relations and the problem of governance in Latin America. It argues that in Latin America and particularly Brazil social protection policy flowed from initiating capacity concentrated originally in the state, and specifically in a techno-bureaucratic elite connected to a strong executive. The policy, however, produced structures wherein initiative capacity was dispersed into a multiple of intermediate points at the nexus between the state and civil society. This in turn led to an immobilized dissipation of initiative cizpacity in this specific policy area which was symptomatic of, and reinforcing to, a generalized immobilism or power implosion that periodically has gripped these sociopolitical formations, producing shifts from formally democratic to authoritarian regimes and vice versa.

From Sectoral to Macro Green Governance: The Canadian Department of the Environment as an Aspiring Central Agency

Abstract: Through a case study of the Canadian Department of the Environment, the article examines three conceptual issues involved as governments seek to institutionalize sustainable development concepts and practices into the center of executive decision-making. The conceptual issues examined in the dynamics of moving from sectoral to macro green governance are: the dynamics of transforming a latent policy paradigm into an operational one; the organizational and concrete resource base needed for environment departments to become and remain a central agency in executive government; and the importance of viable policy communities to sustain new paradigms and make them workable in a day-to-day sense. Five practical constraints are also examined in the Canadian context: the different types of decisions and varying statutory capacities involved; the volume of decisions; the relationships with other departments; the need to mobilize and manage the green policy community and network; and the problems of analytical and scientific competence.

Bureaucratic Professionalization and the Limits of the Political Control Thesis: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission

Abstract: This article explores the political control thesis in light of the literature on bureaucratic politics and agency professionalization. It argues that existing studies of political control have been limited by a failure to analyze the impact of organizational factors on policy change. The article tests political-control and bureaucratic hypotheses through an analysis of changing enforcement priorities at the Federal Trade Commission, The results suggest that the growing role of economists in the agency, rather than congressional oversight or presidential appointments, is critical in explaining the changing antitrust priorities of the Federal Trade Commission.

Data Protection in Britain: Governance and Learning

Abstract: This article focuses upon the implementation of data protection as a learning process involving both regulators and those whose information practices are regulated. From this conceptual perspective, and using the British data protection system as an example, it describes the interactions in this process of governance within the context of factors that influence implementation and affect the achievement of policy objectives. It refers to related analytical strategies for understanding governance and learning in this rapidly changing and technologically conditioned field of regulation.

External and Domestic Determinants of Education Expansion: How Germany, Japan, and Switzerland Have Varied

Abstract: How do economically successful countries like Germany, Japan and Switzerland differ in their post-primary education policies? After identifying great variations in the structure and capacity of secondary and higher education sectors, explanations are sought in terms of domestic and inter-national factors. Switzerland and Japan emerge as polar cases in how political variables - such as centralism-federalism, parties and bureaucracies - affected choice of vehicles and extent of educational expansion. Party influence is most clearcut in Germany, but varies by sector. Whereas German and Japanese reform agendas changed in the aftermath of occupation experiences, Switzerland went its own way until prospects for European integration induced greater accommodation to the training and credential practices of its neighbors.

Are Leftist Governments More Generous Toward Public Sector Employees? Evidence From Canada, 1967–1984

Abstract: This article tests the hypothesis that leftist governments concede higher wage increases to their public sector employees than right-wing governments. Leftist governments are expected to be more generous toward public sector employees because of their commitment to public sector intervention, and because of the heavy representation of the public sector among leftist party elite and clientele. The study examines all major wage settlements signed between 1967 and 1984 in the Canadian provincial public sector and finds that, everything else being equal, wage increases are 10% higher under leftist governments. The standard economic variables (labor demand, expected inflation and spillover from previous contracts) that have been shown to affect wage increases in the private sector also emerge as significant. Finally, the data indicate that the greater the public debt the more constrained governments feel to negotiate minimal wage increases. These findings establish that a proper understanding of public sector labor relations requires a consideration of political as well as economic variables.

Economic Reform and the Strange Case of “Liberalization” in Sierra Leone

Abstract: The International Monetary Fund imposes policy conditions upon Sierra Leone in exchange for loans. The country's president, however, shapes these policies into tools for his domestic struggle to control strongmen-politicians active in the informal (black) market. The president seeks political gain by manipulating creditor demands that he promote foreign in-vestment. This internal dynamic of “reform” does not accomplish creditors' public aims of supporting stronger state institutions. But creditors acquiesce in some of the president's manipulations of reforms when they generate arrears payments. Ironically, Sierra Leone's president proves able to translate creditor and foreign investor demands into political resources in his effort to bolster his extremely weak political authority.

Public Administration in a Conflict Situation: The Case of Northern Ireland

Abstract: This article examines recent developments in the public administrative system in Northern Ireland. The conflict in Northern Ireland has received widespread publicity, Yet government in the region continues. Public services are delivered. The article considers how the public administrative system has played its part in the management by the British government of the conflict. There are many other situations where there is political violence. The Northern Ireland case may offer insights to public administrators and policymakers in managing such situations.

Management by Groping Along: The Limits of a Metaphor

Abstract: The usefulness of a management metaphor derived from the analysis of individual public managers is highly sensitive to the specific environments of the managers. This principle is illustrated by analyzing the descriptive utility of one metaphor - “Management By Groping Along” (MBGA) -which has gained some currency in the teaching and the practice of public management in the United States. While management metaphors cannot be subjected to strict scientific tests, their explication in different environ-ments can display the reach (or the limits) of their explanatory power and, ultimately, their prescriptive value. This argument is developed by describing the metaphor of management by groping along and investigating its usefulness in a specific type of environment - one dominated by remedial law. The article shows that rather restrictive conditions are necessary for MBGA to serve as a useful addition to a manager's repertoire in such an environment.

EC Credit Assistance Programs in the Light of the US Experience: Budgetary, Financial and Political Aspects

Abstract: The bulk of the subsidy cost of European Communities (EC) credit programs is not represented in the EC budget. The cost of EC loans and guarantees are not shown, and only token entries are included for the possible activation of guarantees connected to borrowing and lending. Only in the case of credit programs which entail an interest-rate subsidy, does the budget show an amount corresponding to the subsidy cost. EC budgeting and accounting methods, like those in most member states, hide the full cost of the EC credit programs. The lack of subsidy disclosure has political implications in terms of budget decision-making and control; budget authorities have neither adequate information to compare the trade-offs among the various credit assistance programs and other expenditure programs, nor to evaluate or measure the efficiency and effectiveness of credit operations. Moreover, the citizens of Europe, who are taxpayers both in their states and, to a lesser extent, in the Community, do not have a clear understanding of the costs and benefits of credit programs, either at the state or the EC level. The article refers to the US experience of federal credit reform, especially with regard to the disclosure of the cost of credit programs, as a good example of budget transparency and investigates to what extent this experience could be applied to the European Communities.