Showing papers in "Interest groups & Advocacy in 2018"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate engagement in advocacy among community foundations in the USA, which they define as the effort to influence public policy by proposing or endorsing ideas and by mobilizing stakeholders for social change.
Abstract: Foundations are much more than disinterested philanthropic institutions that award grants to service-providing nonprofits. Foundations are political actors that seek to produce social change, not only by donating resources to nonprofits that promote causes but also by supporting policy reform in a more direct manner. We investigate engagement in advocacy among community foundations in the USA, which we define as the effort to influence public policy by proposing or endorsing ideas and by mobilizing stakeholders for social change. Drawing primarily on organizational sociology, we posit that the environmental context in which community foundations are situated and particular structural characteristics or operational features of community foundations (institutional logics, identity and embeddedness, and managerialism) will be associated with advocacy. We utilize machine learning techniques to establish an outcome measure of advocacy discourse on community foundation websites and ordinary least squares regression to model that outcome with a cross-sectional dataset compiled from multiple sources. We find considerable support for our conceptual frame, and we conclude by offering an agenda for future research on foundations as interest groups.
20 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the spread and influence of ideas supported by philanthropic foundations within the context of a broader policy network, focusing on the development of policy related to teacher quality, a field involving academic research, think tank involvement, and interest group participation.
Abstract: We examine the spread and influence of ideas supported by philanthropic foundations within the context of a broader policy network Our case focuses on the development of policy related to teacher quality—a field involving academic research, think tank involvement, and interest group participation We conduct discourse network analysis of testimony from 175 Congressional hearings from 2003 to 2015 to examine network ties based on shared policy preferences expressed in hearings, which were used to create networks linking policy actors via shared policy preferences We also conducted 51 interviews with funders, grantees, and policymakers involved in the policy debate over teacher quality We examine the spread of a key policy reform promoted by several large foundations, particularly the Gates Foundation: test score-based evaluation of teachers, with a focus on value-added evaluations We show that expert witnesses in hearings who were funded by foundations shared policy preferences with regard to teacher evaluation at a statistically significant level, compared to non-grantees We find that a group of major national foundations were sponsors of the advocacy groups that were central in Congressional hearings We show that these funders were acting as policy entrepreneurs—strategically promoting the spread of favored ideas to encourage uptake by policymakers
18 citations
TL;DR: The role of philanthropic foundations in the policy process is largely hidden and thus significantly under conceptualized as mentioned in this paper, but foundations are able to build coalitions of interest to advance and secure preferred policy alternatives through agenda setting, policy diffusion, and coordinating implementation efforts.
Abstract: The role of philanthropic foundations in the policy process is largely hidden and thus significantly under conceptualized In this paper, we argue that several key characteristics of foundations serve as advantages for them to play an intermediary role in different stages of the policy process By leveraging their independent resources, credibility, and strategic giving, they are able to build coalitions of interest to advance and secure preferred policy alternatives through agenda setting, policy diffusion, and coordinating implementation efforts We provide evidence for this intermediary role through two qualitative case studies, (1) the Pew Charitable Trust’s efforts to promote universal pre-kindergarten, 2002–2012, and (2) multiple foundations’ role in supporting extended foster care in California, 2008–2012 In both cases, we find that foundations wielded significant political power within policy communities by serving as central hubs of information, facilitating coordinated action, incentivizing action, and connecting diverse actors This allows them to play a crucial, yet veiled, role in attempts to advance policy change This phenomenon may be welcomed for supporting evidence-based policymaking and capacity building, but is troubling in regards to transparency and accountability
17 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the extent to which European Union accession and EU funding contribute to the professionalization of interest groups in Slovenia and found that EU accession has a more profound impact on professionalization than the shift from socialism to capitalism, and that the partitocratic role of national political parties and parties mediate the shape and structure of interest group professionalization via their decisions on the allocation of EU funding to groups.
Abstract: This article investigates the extent to which European Union (EU) accession and EU funding contribute to the professionalization of interest groups in Slovenia. Have EU accession and funding had a more profound impact on the professionalization of interest groups in Slovenia than the shift from socialism to capitalism? Our novel empirical evidence is drawn from two surveys of interest groups in Slovenia—the first in 1996 eight years prior to Slovenia’s membership of the EU (in 2004) and the second in 2012 eight years after its accession. Our findings show that EU accession and funding accentuate the professionalization of interest groups. However, these processes are intertwined with the partitocratic role of national political parties and parties mediate the shape and structure of interest group professionalization via their decisions on the allocation of EU funding to groups.
15 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the behavior of patrons to determine what role they played at this unique time in American history and found that a non-trivial minority of patrons, both institutional and individual, did mobilize their voice, institutional resources, and coalitions to resist the Trump agenda.
Abstract: After the election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, a self-defined “resistance” movement arose to block his agenda. This movement cut across the normal boundaries of political activism to create new forms of advocacy and new models of cooperation. Major components of the resistance were ideological interest groups, women’s organizations, environmentalists, heretofore disengaged Millennials, racial and ethnic groups, community nonprofits, and, ostensibly, foundations and leading philanthropists—those we term “patrons.” We systematically examine the behavior of patrons to determine what role they played at this unique time in American history. We place this research in the context of interest group behavior, asking how patrons may have facilitated representation, altered strategic plans, reoriented advocacy, and repositioned themselves within policy communities supporting similar goals. Our findings undermine the idea that patrons played a central role in the developing resistance to the new administration, despite the fact that the new president was working against their values and the programs they support. However, a non-trivial minority of patrons, both institutional and individual, did mobilize their voice, institutional resources, and coalitions to resist the Trump agenda. These examples allow us to explore how patrons in some conditions might fulfill the roles of interest groups conventionally understood.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of policymaking vetoes on cross-territorial lobbying patterns was analyzed using the veto player and multilevel lobbying literatures, and it was found that subnational actors partially redirect their lobbying effort to the federal level when state policymaking channels are blocked.
Abstract: Drawing on the veto player and multilevel lobbying literatures, the article analyzes the impact of policymaking vetoes on cross-territorial lobbying patterns. This comparative study of the American states finds that the incidence of federal lobbying by state interest groups and corporations is higher from states with divided government. Federal lobbying is higher also from states with unified Democratic Party control. The findings of a two-level statistical analysis of Lobbying Disclosure Act data from 2005 to 2015 suggest that subnational actors partially redirect their lobbying effort to the federal level when state policymaking channels are blocked. The empirical analysis builds on a multilevel interactive game and is supported further by a case study of lobbying patterns that followed the 2010 elections, when the Republican Party gained control of many state legislative chambers. Future research on lobbying in multilevel polities must simultaneously consider the relative powers of government levels and the partisan control of those levels.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined and compared groups' advocacy activities during three issues that were each debated in California and Switzerland and found that citizen groups are more frequently multi-venue players than business groups, regardless of the policy sector or the political system.
Abstract: Whereas some recent studies underline interest groups’ strategy to specialize in certain venues when lobbying, we investigate under which conditions groups develop a multi-venue strategy. This study examines and compares groups’ advocacy activities during three issues that were each debated in California and Switzerland. Empirical evidence shows that the policy issue at stake influences the diversity of groups that mobilize to influence an issue, while institutional factors and group types are key to explain the level of multi-venue advocacy. Multi-venue groups are proportionally more numerous in the Swiss neo-corporatist system than in the Californian pluralist system. And citizen groups are more frequently multi-venue players than business groups, regardless of the policy sector or the political system. These findings demonstrate the added value of a research design encompassing advocacy activities in all venues visited during a policy process and, furthermore, comparing these advocacy activities across political systems and policy domains.
11 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that new, but not old, foundations are more likely to support education reform policies when giving to state education agencies, while old foundations focus less on politics and more on state need.
Abstract: Scholars have found differences between older and newer foundations and their giving priorities and strategies, especially in education. Foundations founded in recent decades with still-living benefactors have been more vocal, result-oriented, and focused on education initiatives like charter schools and alternative certification than their older counterparts. In this paper, I examine whether these differing patterns hold for new and old foundation grants to state departments of education, leading new foundations to target contexts politically amenable to education reform while old foundations focus less on politics and more on state need. Using data on the largest 1000 foundations, in addition to grants from the Gates and Wallace Foundations, I find that new, but not old, foundations, are more likely to support education reform policies when giving to state education agencies. I also find that new, but not old, foundations support state education agencies possessing political contexts conducive to education reform as well as higher levels of child poverty. I illustrate these findings with the case of Kentucky. These findings suggest that, by taking advantage of state need while seeking out political allies, new foundations behave like interest groups in their grants to government.
9 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that healthcare lobbyists were significantly more likely to give to members of the committees drafting the Affordable Care Act relative to other members and other times, and that individual lobbyists make contributions in predictable ways, favoring key members at key times.
Abstract: Scholars looking for evidence of corruption in Congress have focused on the data available to them: the limited contributions of political action committees. This literature has largely failed to identify systematic money-induced legislative behavior. But what if lobbyists are using their personal funds to contribute to congressional campaigns? I use newly available data to show that individual lobbyists make contributions in predictable ways, favoring key members at key times. In particular, healthcare lobbyists were significantly more likely to give to members of the committees drafting the Affordable Care Act relative to other members and other times. The findings represent an important step forward in understanding what actors who are interested in legislative decisions might expect in return for their campaign contributions.
8 citations
TL;DR: This article investigated factors that predict PAC fundraising success between 2008 and 2014 and examined the impact of PAC contributions on House candidates' vote margins since 1992, finding that PAC contributions to House candidates have increased in importance.
Abstract: In the wake of Citizens United, political action committees (PACs) face new sources of competition from super PACs and 501(c)4 social welfare organizations and 501(c)6 professional associations for both donor contributions and electoral influence. Using itemized and summary committee files from the U.S. Federal Election Commission, I investigate factors that predict PACs’ fundraising success between 2008 and 2014 and I examine the impact of PAC contributions on House candidates’ vote margins since 1992. While I uncover evidence of PAC fundraising challenges that may relate to growing competition from other groups, I also find PAC contributions to House candidates have increased in importance. Taken together, the results suggest PACs continue to occupy a vital niche in campaign financing.
6 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that some legislators use committee hearings to represent elite interests, and that elites take that form of representation as a credible commitment, and they show that those who speak with greater similarity to interest group representatives are more likely to take jobs as lobbyists upon leaving office.
Abstract: Prior scholarship suggests that public committee hearings allow legislators to grandstand, but serve little purpose from a representation perspective. Here, I show some legislators use committee hearings to represent elite interests, and that elites take that form of representation as a credible commitment. Using a novel dataset of hearing transcripts in the 1990–2016 period, I show legislators who speak with greater similarity to interest group representatives are more likely to take jobs as lobbyists upon leaving office. Public committee hearings allow legislators to commit to the preferences of organized interests. I also show public committee hearings have not become more acrimonious, inconsistent with a pure “grandstanding” theory, nor less sophisticated over time.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors lay out the rationale for thinking about foundations as interest groups in the American political system and argue that the choices foundations make as to whether to consciously try to influence government appears to be guided by organizational norms, regulatory requirements and the beliefs of boards, donors, and internal leadership.
Abstract: Foundations are traditionally viewed as civic-minded but politically neutral organizations. Yet foundations, if they choose, can become involved in a wide variety of activities aimed at influencing public policy. Here we lay out the rationale for thinking about foundations as interest groups in the American political system. There are differences between conventional interest groups and foundations to be sure, but there are similarities as well. The choices foundations make as to whether to consciously try to influence government appears to be guided by organizational norms, regulatory requirements, and the beliefs of boards, donors, and internal leadership.
TL;DR: Schiff et al. as discussed by the authors used the same explanatory model employed by Schiff et al., extending their analysis to the same principals' spending with smaller lobby firms, and discussed the implications of their findings for the generalizability of agency problems in lobbying relationships between principals and agents.
Abstract: Several scholars have suggested that agency problems might significantly influence how well lobby agents represent the interest of their lobby principals (Stephenson and Jackson in Harv J Legis 47(1):1–20, 2010; Kersh in Crit Rev 14:237–258, 2000; Lowery and Marchetti in Interest Groups Advocacy 1(2):139–170, 2012). Schiff et al.’s (Interest Group Advocacy 4(3):225–248, 2015) analysis of lobby spending by major clients of the top 19 lobby firms in Washington in 2012 found strong support for these expectations. We address the generalizability of their finding by using the same explanatory model employed by Schiff et al. (Interest Group Advocacy 4(3):225–248, 2015), extending their analysis to the same principals’ spending with smaller lobby firms. After outlining competing expectations about the severity of agency problems with smaller lobby firms, we assess their veracity with 2012 data. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings for the generalizability of agency problems in lobbying relationships between principals and agents.
TL;DR: This paper used the theory of Red Queen competition to predict patterns in the founding of nationally active interest groups in the USA and found strong support for the theory and its substantive predictions, and tested these predictions against data from two group populations.
Abstract: This article uses the theory of Red Queen competition to predict patterns in the founding of nationally active interest groups in the USA. The theory of Red Queen competition holds that competition among groups in a population is history-dependent such that each organization’s competitiveness is a function of its historical experience. The theory predicts that: (1) a population relatively full of recently experienced incumbent organizations is extremely uninviting for newcomers; and (2) a population relatively devoid of recently experienced competitors (and thusly full of incumbents whose competitive experiences are either minimal or concentrated in the distant past) is relatively inviting for newcomers. We test these predictions against data from two group populations. Ultimately, we find strong support for the theory of Red Queen competition and its substantive predictions.
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the effect of increased partisan polarization on the degree and quality of access enjoyed by labor union leaders to the President of the USA and concludes that the rise of polarization has pushed unions and Democratic presidents closer together, and unions and Republican presidents further apart, irrespective of changes in the level of union resources.
Abstract: This article analyzes the effect of increased partisan polarization on the degree and quality of access enjoyed by labor union leaders to the President of the USA. The relationships between union leaders and two sets of presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and George W. Bush and Barack Obama, are analyzed in order to trace change from a time of bipartisan bargaining to one of extreme polarization. The central argument is that the rise of polarization has pushed unions and Democratic presidents closer together, and unions and Republican presidents further apart, irrespective of changes in the level of union resources.