Showing papers in "Interest groups & Advocacy in 2019"
TL;DR: The authors examine how, when, and why domestic and global political opportunity structures shape advocacy group effects in global governance, across global institutions, levels of government, advocacy organizations, issue areas, and over time.
Abstract: Global governance is no longer a matter of state cooperation or bureaucratic politics. Since the end of the cold war, advocacy groups have proliferated and enjoyed increasing access to global governance institutions such as the European Union, World Trade Organization, and the United Nations climate conferences. This special issue seeks to push theories of interest groups and international non-governmental organizations forward. We argue that the advocacy group effects on global governance institutions are best understood by examining how groups use and shape domestic and global political opportunity structures. The individual articles examine how, when, and why domestic and global political opportunity structures shape advocacy group effects in global governance, across global institutions, levels of government, advocacy organizations, issue areas, and over time. As special interests are becoming increasingly involved in global governance, we need to better understand how advocacy organizations may impact global public goods provision.
19 citations
TL;DR: The authors examines how population ecological dynamics affect strategic specialization among transnational advocate groups and argues that increasing resource competition resulting from organizational crowding, along with the introduction of new legal and technological tools has led to growing strategic differentiation among trans-national advocates, and has prompted a strategic division of labor whereby some groups (mainly larger, well-established and resource-rich groups) specialize in gaining political access and media attention, while others focus on developing "niche" agendas and strategies including, inter alia, radical protest, monitoring and enforcement, and litigation.
Abstract: Why do some transnational advocacy groups adopt radical, confrontational tactics whereas others focus on ‘inside’ lobbying and information provision? Why do some advocacy groups appeal to large global audiences while others approach decision-makers behind closed doors? Bringing together interest group studies and population ecology theory, this article examines how population ecological dynamics affect strategic specialization among transnational advocate groups. I argue that increasing resource competition resulting from ‘organizational crowding’, along with the introduction of new legal and technological tools has led to growing strategic differentiation among transnational advocates, and has prompted a strategic division of labor whereby some groups (mainly larger, well-established and resource-rich groups) specialize in gaining political access and media attention, while others (mainly smaller, less established groups) focus on developing ‘niche’ agendas and strategies including, inter alia, radical protest, monitoring and enforcement, and litigation. I illustrate my argument with quantitative data and comparative cases from the realm of transnational environmental conservation advocacy.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the relevance of different information types for lobbying success depends on issue characteristics such as public opinion, salience or complexity, and that the provision of expert information increases the likelihood of lobbying success, while the effect of information about public preferences is negative.
Abstract: What type of information helps interest advocates get their way? While it is widely acknowledged in the academic literature that information provision is a key aspect of lobbying, few scholars have directly tested the effect of information on lobbying success. Policymakers need information both on technical aspects and public preferences to anticipate the effectiveness of a policy proposal and electoral consequences. However, scholars have found that interest groups predominantly provide the former rather than the latter, which suggests that technical information is seen as more efficient. The paper argues that lobbying success is not solely a function of the provision of any information but of the specific type of information and its composition. It furthermore argues that the relevance of different information types for lobbying success depends on issue characteristics such as public opinion, salience or complexity. Relying on new original data of advocacy activity on 50 specific policy issues in five West European countries, the paper highlights that the provision of expert information increases the likelihood of lobbying success, while the effect of information about public preferences is, if anything, negative. The study ultimately contributes to our understanding of informational lobbying, interest representation and interest group influence.
14 citations
TL;DR: The energy-stability area (ESA) model has been used to study interest group mobilization in the early 20th century as mentioned in this paper, focusing on three interest groups: the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, the Patrons of Husbandry (Grange), and the Grand Army of the Republic.
Abstract: The energy–stability–area (ESA) model put forth by Lowery and Gray (Am J Polit Sci 39(1):1–29, 1995) focused scholarly attention on two factors critical to interest group mobilization: the density and diversity of groups within a population. Since that seminal publication, researchers have continued to refine the model and its applications. Yet, so far, these studies have been focused on modern interest groups. Here, we extend Lowery and Gray’s (1995) cross-sectional ESA model by studying the strength of state branches of three interest groups—the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, the Patrons of Husbandry (Grange), and the Grand Army of the Republic—in the mid-1910s. We find some support for the ESA model across all three groups, though density dependence, a key part of the Lowery and Gray story (1995), is not significant in our historical models. Our results further deviate from Lowery and Gray’s work by finding strong evidence for the role of government size on interest group mobilization. Ultimately, we conclude that the ESA model provides important insights on the development of membership associations during the early twentieth century, albeit with some important amendments for the period.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe a new data set based on raw counts of interest groups and organizations lobbying in the states collected by the National Institute for Money in State Politics, data which are observed annually from 2006 to 2015.
Abstract: Existing data sets on state interest group systems tend to be either cross-sectional (observations for only 1 year) or panel-style (observations of 2 years about a decade apart). In this paper, I describe a new data set based on raw counts of interest groups and organizations lobbying in the states collected by the National Institute for Money in State Politics, data which are observed annually from 2006 to 2015. After several years of careful coding, I present initial analyses of this state interest group data broken out by economic sector (based on National Center for Economic Statistics codes), support for business policies, differences between membership organizations and other organizational types, like corporations and governments. Furthermore, I also explore how the broad contours of these interest group communities shift and change over time, allowing me to see whether any type of organized interest is able to dominate their state interest group system.
11 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that elected politicians are more prone to seek out opposing societal interests than non-elected policymakers, while democratically accountable countries, who work on salient issues, are more inclined to mobilize their advocacy group allies.
Abstract: Advocacy is typically conceived of as an activity where advocacy groups seek and policymakers grant influence. In this paper, we turn the classic approach to advocacy upside down and ask under what conditions policymakers seek to exert influence on the positions adopted by opposing or allied advocacy groups. Two strategies that policymakers can use in their interactions with advocacy groups are proposed: amplification and persuasion. We build on resource exchange theory and the concept of political opportunity structures to explain which strategy a policymaker uses. The analysis relies on a unique database, which draws from 297 interviews with policymakers from 107 different countries at global climate change and trade conferences. Our results demonstrate that, overall, policymakers seek out advocacy groups more when they are faced with increased levels of political pressures. Namely, elected politicians are more prone to seek out opposing societal interests than non-elected policymakers. Moreover, policymakers from democratically accountable countries, who work on salient issues, are more inclined to mobilize their advocacy group allies.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of transnational partnerships within a transboundary policy problem, namely illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, was explored, and the variation in strategies used by transnational partnership to shape IUU policy development and implementation, drawing on theories from comparative politics and international relations.
Abstract: This paper explores the role of transnational partnerships within a transboundary policy problem, namely illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. It focuses on an understudied aspect in the partnership literature, namely ‘how and why do partnerships engage in advocacy’? The article theorizes and empirically explores the variation in strategies used by transnational partnerships to shape IUU policy development and implementation, drawing on theories from comparative politics and international relations. The paper finds that transnational partnerships often combine inside strategies with service provision, but that they rarely use outside strategies, and analyzes this variation in strategies by looking at changes in issues complexity, institutional complexity, and salience for state concerning IUU fishing policy. The paper ends by discussing the implication of these findings in relation to the previous literature on interest groups in comparative politics and on international non-governmental organizations and transnational partnerships in international relations.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine patterns of NGO participation in Global Governance Institutions and how participation is shaped by incentives and pressures at global and national levels, and find evidence that participation patterns reflect both the varying institutional design of GGIs and NGO capacity linked to domestic conditions.
Abstract: Global governance institutions (GGIs) increasingly rely upon NGO involvement for expertise, promotion of rules and standards, and democratic legitimacy. Yet NGO participation in GGIs is unevenly distributed by country of origin. This paper examines patterns of NGO participation in GGIs, and how participation is shaped by incentives and pressures at global and national levels. First, we map NGO participation by country of origin across 42 GGIs based on the roles that GGIs grant to NGOs and by variations in domestic conditions of income level and political regime type. Second, to delve more deeply into domestic factors, we provide an exploratory statistical regression based on NGO participation in two major GGIs, the UN Global Compact on corporate social responsibility and the UNFCCC Conferences of Parties on climate change. We find evidence that participation patterns reflect both the varying institutional design of GGIs and NGO capacity linked to domestic conditions. We observe that NGOs with constrained capacity due to domestic factors gravitate toward GGIs that offer the most significant roles for NGOs, with the greatest opportunity to influence policy. We suggest that domestic civil society factors beyond level of economic development and regime type shape NGO participation at the global level. Analysis of this wide-ranging set of GGIs provides more general confirmation of patterns of NGO engagement in global governance previously identified in studies limited to particular issue sectors or cases.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine digital advocacy organizations' decision-making process for refugee campaigns across seven organizations in seven different countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA) between late 2015 and 2017.
Abstract: Digital advocacy organizations are permanent institutions which can rapidly mobilize people online and offline. Scholars are beginning to examine these organizations’ distinctive mode of advocacy within national contexts. However, we know relatively little about how these organizations select their campaigns, and when they successfully mobilize the public on international issues. This is important as most advocacy targets national decision-makers, rather than international institutions. This article asks: how do digital advocacy organizations select the issues they campaign on? It examines refugee campaigns across seven organizations in seven different countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA) between late 2015 and 2017. It draws on extensive primary research, including a dozen interviews with digital activists, journalists, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It finds that digital advocacy organizations choose campaigns based on issuesalience, whereas traditional NGOs are driven by issue-expertise. Professional staff select campaigns in NGOs, whereas in digital advocacy organizations campaign decision-making is member-driven. Overall, this paper calls for International Relations (IR) and interest group scholars to examine campaign selection and decision-making in all advocacy organizations.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that CAs are dynamic and agile, at least in the long term, when facing structural changes in their political environment, and present a content analysis of Norwegian CAs' written submissions to ministerial consultations in alcohol and drug policy-making processes at three points in time over the last four decades.
Abstract: Modern societies have become more fragmented, complex and dynamic, making broad coalitions and public support imperative to achieving lobbying success. Thus, civil associations (CAs) and interest groups increasingly need to frame their arguments in more generalised ways, appealing to the public interest and downplaying their constituencies’ immediate self-interest. Previous scholars have argued that framing is primarily a reflection of an interest group’s type and constituency, thus indicating that framing is a rather static phenomenon. This article argues to the contrary that CAs are dynamic and agile, at least in the long term, when facing structural changes in their political environment. The study is based on content analyses of Norwegian CAs’ written submissions to ministerial consultations in alcohol and drug policy-making processes at three points in time over the last four decades.
7 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the policy success of transnational advocates and found that it is not so much the strategies that lobbyists develop that explain success at global diplomatic conferences, but rather the degree of preferred policy change and whether these demands for change are endorsed by the groups' national governments.
Abstract: How successful are transnational advocates? If they are successful, is this due to their advocacy efforts or because of a favourable policy context? This paper examines the policy success of transnational advocates. In doing so, it focuses on the positions interest groups adopt, the strategies they develop, and how these interact with the context of specific policy issues. Based on 467 interviews with non-state actors who were involved in 17 transnational policy issues in the fields of international climate change and trade policy, I assess the success of individual advocates by comparing the final policy outcome of each issue with the advocated policy positions. The findings demonstrate that it is not so much the strategies that lobbyists develop that explain success at global diplomatic conferences, but rather the degree of preferred policy change and whether these demands for change are endorsed by the groups’ national governments.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors surveyed nationwide interest groups in Finland and found that the more important media strategies are in their advocacy work, the more groups use public affairs consultants, especially when they face challenges with their advocacy strategies.
Abstract: Public relations agencies are on the rise, and studies have shown that also membership-based interest groups use their services. These agencies employ public affairs consultants who help their clients influence public policy, and their use may have important consequences for interest group systems. As we know little about why interest groups use public affairs consultants and what kind of groups use them the most, we surveyed nationwide interest groups in Finland. We argue that groups use consultants especially when they face challenges with their advocacy strategies. The results show that the more important media strategies are in their advocacy work, the more groups use public affairs consultants. Business groups are more likely to use public affairs consultants than other kinds of groups. When groups’ resources are held constant, more recently established groups use more money on consultants than older groups. We conclude that consultant use may deepen existing biases in interest group politics by strengthening the business groups’ position. The results also imply that media strategies have become especially challenging for groups in the current complex media environment.
TL;DR: In this paper, the intensity of cooperating in lobbying coalitions was analyzed using data from 1117 Swiss and German interest organisations, and it was shown that insider lobbying benefits disproportionately when groups work more closely together.
Abstract: How does the intensity of cooperating in lobbying coalitions affect the choice of lobbying strategies of interest groups? This question is analysed in this paper using data from 1117 Swiss and German interest organisations. We find, on the one hand, that the intensity of coalition building affects both directly targeting politicians (insider lobbying) but also indirect efforts of exerting influence via the media and citizens (outsider lobbying). In other words, the more intensely lobby groups cooperate, the more they make use of both insider and outsider lobbying tactics. However, we also find that the increase in these two types of lobbying efforts is not equal when cooperation intensifies. Due to the specific advantages of pooling expertise, insider lobbying benefits disproportionately when groups work more closely together.
TL;DR: In this article, a population ecology approach with the analysis of interest groups' access to parliament makes it possible to measure the level of bias characterising a fundamental part of interest group representation in Italy.
Abstract: With a very few exceptions, scholars have devoted little attention to the analysis of the Italian interest system so far. This paper aims to address exactly this lacuna. Following a diachronic perspective, the combination of a population ecology approach with the analysis of interest groups’ access to parliament makes it possible to measure the level of bias characterising a fundamental part of interest group representation in Italy. Empirical findings suggest that—over time—the density of the system increased, and also diversity changed to a great extent. Furthermore, the Italian interest system—at least with regard to parliamentary access—appears less biased in recent years than it was in the 1980s. Among the potential factors that pushed in this direction, this article sheds light on a factor often neglected in the literature: the impact of parties and party systems on interest group representation and bias. More precisely, due to the political and institutional turmoil of early 1990s, parties lost their previous role of policy gatekeepers and this implied that the policymaking process is now more chaotic, as well as open to many more different actors than it was in the past, when only interest groups which were ‘collateral’ to parties could have a role in the policymaking.
TL;DR: The authors analyzes recent research on the impact of non-party organizations on policy, describing its theoretical coherence, operationalization of key concepts, views of different types of organizations, hypothesis testing, efforts to generalize from its findings, and proposals for improving future research.
Abstract: This article analyzes recent research on the impact of non-party organizations on policy, describing its theoretical coherence, operationalization of key concepts, views of different types of organizations, hypothesis testing, efforts to generalize from its findings, and proposals for improving future research. The analysis shows that few relevant articles in major journals in political science and sociology test theory; researchers seldom explicitly define key concepts; though researchers regularly study interest groups and social movement organizations, much of their work focuses on other types of organizations; researchers regularly make no predictions about organizations’ impact on policy, and when they do, a majority of their predictions are wrong. Researchers rarely generalize; they seldom claim that their conclusions have implications for theory; and their suggestions for future work are mostly generic. The analysis points to weaknesses in current research and proposes ways to overcome them.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a method for measuring configurations of strategies using principles of qualitative comparative analysis and demonstrates the method's application to 24 NGO campaigns in Italy and the UK across four issue areas: cage eggs, ocean plastics, antibiotics in farming and digital civil rights.
Abstract: One of the main focal points of studies on interest groups and lobbying has been the different strategies that groups use. Despite the fact that political actions can target both the state and the market, these have not been examined together within either the literature on lobbying or social movements. Moreover, while it is now accepted that groups use combinations of inside and outside strategies, these combinations have been difficult to measure in practice. This paper develops a method for measuring configurations of strategies using principles of qualitative comparative analysis and demonstrates the method’s application to 24 NGO campaigns in Italy and the UK across four issue areas: cage eggs, ocean plastics, antibiotics in farming and digital civil rights. I find that inside and outside strategies are used differently in the state and the market, and that market strategies can be used either to supplement lobbying on public policy or to directly target companies. These findings imply that it is worthwhile including market strategies in studies, as they improve our understanding of the ways in which NGOs address different audiences while lobbying.
TL;DR: In this paper, the interaction between resources and institutions provides organizations with "programmatic flexibility" that enables them to adjust their strategies without changing their core mission, and demonstrate how organizations with high programmatic flexibility can navigate regulations and shape policy in their target country while those without this flexibility are shut out of policy discussions and often the target country itself.
Abstract: A wave of legislative and regulatory crackdown on international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) has constricted the legal environment for foreign advocacy groups interested in influencing domestic and global policy. Although the legal space for advocacy is shrinking, many INGOs have continued their work and found creative ways to adapt to these restrictions, sometimes even reshaping the regulatory environments of their target countries in their favor. In this article, I explore what enables INGOs to cope with and reshape their regulatory environments. I bridge international relations and interest group studies to examine the interaction between INGO resource configurations and institutional arrangements. I argue that the interaction between resources and institutions provide organizations with ‘programmatic flexibility’ that enables them to adjust their strategies without changing their core mission. I illustrate this argument with case studies of Article 19 and AMERA International, and demonstrate how organizations with high programmatic flexibility can navigate regulations and shape policy in their target country, while those without this flexibility are shut out of policy discussions and often the target country itself. I conclude by exploring how the interaction between internal characteristics and institutional environments shapes and constrains the effects of interest groups in global governance.
TL;DR: This paper identified an element of advocates' political strategy that increased the likelihood of policy change: the prominence of domestic violence prevention advocates and the strategic absence of larger gun control groups in the policy debate.
Abstract: In the USA, gun deaths occur at a rate that is 25 times higher than that of other developed countries (Grinshteyn and Hemenway in Am J Med 129(3):266–273, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amjmed.2015.10.025
). However, legislation targeted toward regulating firearms often fails to pass into law. While surprising to many observers, this policy response follows an established pattern in American politics: despite public support for tighter gun laws, the gun rights lobby often successfully suppresses gun reform due to their greater monetary resources, political savvy, and access to grassroots support than advocates of gun control (Bruce-Briggs in The Public interes 45:37, 1976; Goss in Disarmed: the missing movement for gun control in America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006). However, laws that restrict domestic abusers from owning firearms have diverged from this pattern. This study identifies an element of advocates’ political strategy that increased the likelihood of policy change: the prominence of domestic violence prevention advocates and “strategic absence” of larger gun control groups in the policy debate. The insights generated by this study shed light on broader questions about advocacy strategy, the policy-making process, and the modern politics of firearms.
TL;DR: The authors provided a tripartite classification of death as a selective benefit: the ritual of death, the presentation of death (cemeteries, headstones, and grave markers), and the memorialization of death.
Abstract: Voluntary membership associations played a pivotal role in the development of American society after the Civil War. These associations were active in the practices of death, but the extant literature has yet to provide a framework for understanding death as a selective benefit of membership, especially for politically oriented associations. This study adds to scholars’ understandings by providing a tripartite classification of death as a selective benefit: the ritual of death (funerals), the presentation of death (cemeteries, headstones, and grave markers), and the memorialization of death (memorial days). Through these actions, associations of this era were able to use death to motivate existing membership, uniting them to a greater purpose, demonstrating to members that their associational lives would not perish upon their passing. In this way, associations used death to build social and political capital among the living.
TL;DR: The literatures on INGOs and on interest groups have generally worked in parallel, but rarely overlapped as discussed by the authors, which is unfortunate, as many insights from these literatures are highly applicable to one another.
Abstract: The literatures on INGOs and on interest groups have generally worked in parallel, but rarely overlapped. This is unfortunate, as many insights from these literatures are highly applicable to one another. Just as sociologists studying social movement organisations and political scientists studying interest groups have come to appreciate, there is value in cooperation to advance understanding. Yet there are costs in so doing. This essay will reflect on the contents of this special issue on global governance and in so doing will review the points of overlap that are prime candidates for cooperation, while noting areas where work might be more difficult.
TL;DR: The authors found that elected politicians are more prone to seek out opposing societal interests than non-elected policymakers, while democratically accountable countries, who work on salient issues, are more inclined to mobilize their advocacy group allies.
Abstract: Advocacy is typically conceived of as an activity where advocacy groups seek and policymakers grant influence. In this paper, we turn the classic approach to advocacy upside down and ask under what conditions policymakers seek to exert influence on the positions adopted by opposing or allied advocacy groups. Two strategies that policymakers can use in their interactions with advocacy groups are proposed: amplification and persuasion. We build on resource exchange theory and the concept of political opportunity structures to explain which strategy a policymaker uses. The analysis relies on a unique database, which draws from 297 interviews with policymakers from 107 different countries at global climate change and trade conferences. Our results demonstrate that, overall, policymakers seek out advocacy groups more when they are faced with increased levels of political pressures. Namely, elected politicians are more prone to seek out opposing societal interests than non-elected policymakers. Moreover, policymakers from democratically accountable countries, who work on salient issues, are more inclined to mobilize their advocacy group allies.
TL;DR: This paper assess an underexplored source of variation in advocacy populations, namely the governance level at which advocacy populations are located, and analyze whether national advocacy group populations are more likely to contain relatively large proportions of business interest associations compared to transnational advocacy groups populations.
Abstract: Why are some advocacy group populations biased towards business interest representatives? In this paper, we assess an underexplored source of variation in advocacy populations, namely the governance level at which advocacy populations are located. More precisely, we analyse whether national advocacy group populations are more likely to contain relatively large proportions of business interest associations compared to transnational advocacy group populations. We examine three competing hypotheses: (1) biases are stronger at the national level than the global level, (2) biases are more pronounced at the global level than the national level and (3) no differences emerge in business mobilization across the national and transnational levels. We test our hypotheses based on a novel dataset of national, European Union (EU) and global advocacy group populations. Our results indicate that the global level is different from the EU and national levels, in that it contains relatively low proportions of business interest representatives.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effect of interest group participation in state supreme court criminal cases and the extent to which, if any, amicus participation affects decision making that favors the government.
Abstract: Party capability theory posits that litigation success is predicated on litigants’ experience as parties to lawsuits as well as their access to resources. The stakes are particularly high for disadvantaged litigants in asymmetric power relationships, such as those between government (“The Haves”) and criminal defendants (“The Have Nots”). Scholars have found that interest group participation via amicus curiae—or “friend of the court”—briefs can reduce litigant power disparities in federal appellate cases, but it remains unclear whether the same holds in criminal matters before courts of last resort. As a starting point to understanding interest group behavior in state supreme court criminal cases, this study examines party capability theory and the extent to which, if any, amicus participation affects decision making that favors the government. Findings underscore the importance of interest group participation that supports disadvantaged litigants and the impact crime severity has on outcomes in criminal state supreme court cases.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the decision to lobby multiple global venues is a function of the extent of firms' international business activities and investments, and they test this theory in the case of post-crisis banking regulation in the European Union and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Abstract: The galloping pace of globalisation has not only led to the expansion of firms across national borders and an exponential increase in the interdependency of international markets, but it has also triggered the development of the regulatory environment into a multilevel arena consisting of numerous and often overlapping and competing global institutions and regulatory jurisdictions. Our paper examines venue shopping at this global level. We argue that existing theories of multilevel venue shopping are not well suited to explaining global venue shopping. Advancing a novel theoretical framework, we argue that the decision to lobby multiple global venues is a function of the extent of firms’ international business activities and investments. We test this theory in the case of post-crisis banking regulation in the European Union and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Assessing banks’ international activities in terms of the number, international scope, and geographical diversity of their subsidiaries, we find evidence supporting our argument. The new post-crisis banking rules posed a serious threat to banks’ international financial activities and banks facing the greatest costs of these new rules were also most likely to engage in global venue shopping.
TL;DR: In the special issue "Advocacy Groups in Global Governance: Global and Domestic Opportunity Structures" as mentioned in this paper, the authors make four main points: 1) One can reflect critically on the framing concepts of advocate groups, global governance, and opportunity structures, and 2) research on civil society and global governance needs to give serious attention to national and global dynamics.
Abstract: This commentary on the special issue ‘Advocacy Groups in Global Governance: Global and Domestic Opportunity Structures’ makes four main points. First, one can reflect critically on the framing concepts of ‘advocacy groups,’ ‘global governance,’ and ‘opportunity structures.’ Second, research on civil society and global governance needs to give serious attention to national as well as global dynamics. Third, studies need fully to examine the interrelation of national and global spheres in world politics; the two are not ontologically discrete. Fourth, it is important to dissect both the national and the global, particularly in order to expose the social stratifications that shape these arenas.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the effect of reward and punishment on vote switching in Congress and find that rewards from labor PACs make it more likely that incumbent Democrats will switch their vote, while rewards from business PAC make it much less likely.
Abstract: Previous research demonstrates that interest groups punish congressional allies by withholding campaign contributions. But, past studies did not indicate whether this punishment strategy is effective at getting members of Congress to change their voting behavior. The literature on vote switching in Congress ignores how legislators may respond to pressure, in the form of punishment, from allied interest groups. We propose competing hypotheses. Punishment could cause incumbents to switch their vote, but punishment may also be seen as an unwelcome tactic and met with resistance from incumbents. We also hypothesize that rewards will lead to more vote switching. We test this theory in the context of labor PAC punishment and reward of House Democrats who voted for free trade. We find that punishment backfires by making incumbents less likely to switch their vote on trade. We also find that rewards from labor PACs make it more likely that incumbent Democrats will switch their vote, while rewards from business PACs make it much less likely. We conclude with thoughts on the importance of understanding the effect of interest group tactics on vote switching in Congress and how labor’s strategic choices may affect its influence in American politics.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present transcripts of the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission's public meetings to demonstrate how enforcing lobbying regulations requires a stipulation practice, and they argue that the enforcement of lobbying regulations involves ordinary practices for passing proposed enforcement actions.
Abstract: Interest group and advocacy researchers have closely studied how different lobbying regulations emerge in varying political systems, but less attention has been given to the practices for enforcing those regulations or the interactional work of regulatory professionals. Through presenting transcripts of the Los Angeles City Ethics Commission’s public meetings, the article demonstrates how enforcing lobbying regulations requires a stipulation practice. Though there are multiple practices required to effectively enforce lobbying regulations, investigative staff and commissioners approach this stipulation practice by scrutinising whether proposed actions, namely financial penalties, reflect the commission’s strategy across each and every case. Drawing on ethnomethodology and studies of legal professionals, the article argues that the enforcement of lobbying regulations involves ordinary practices for passing proposed enforcement actions.