Showing papers in "Journal of Cold War Studies in 2010"

The Soviet Union's Partnership with India

Abstract: The relationship between the Soviet Union and India was a hallmark of the Cold War. Over nearly forty years, Soviet-Indian relations passed through three distinct periods, coinciding with the ascendance of three extraordinary pairs of leaders, each extraordinary for different reasons—Jawaharlal Nehru and Nikita Khrushchev, Indira Gandhi and Leonid Brezhnev, and Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev. The rise and decline of a political dynasty in India paralleled the trajectory seen in the Soviet Union. None of the periods ended well—the first in debacles with China, the second with Indira Gandhi's assassination, the third with the demise of the Soviet Union. The relationship in its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s was the product of a unique set of circumstances during the early Cold War. In the end, however, the relationship proved to be little more than a sideshow in the larger drama of the Cold War.

Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to go to War with Vietnam

Abstract: The decision by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to launch a war against Vietnam in early 1979 has not been subject to scrutiny until now. The decision was shaped in part by the deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Hanoi, by Vietnam's new alliance with the Soviet Union, and by Vietnam's regional hegemony, but it also stemmed from the PRC's effort to improve its strategic position in the world. Three events took place in Beijing in December 1978 that also had an important impact on China's decision to go to war: Deng Xiaoping's reascendance to the top leadership at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Beijing's adoption of economic reform as the highest national priority, and the normalization of China's relationship with the United States. Deng Xiaoping, as a chief architect of China's national strategy in the immediate post-Mao era, played a dominant role in China's decision to go to war.

The United States and the Kurds: A Cold War Story

Abstract: In a prolonged quest for independence after 1945, Kurdish nationalists reportedly sought help from U.S. officials who viewed the Kurdish issue through a Cold War prism and who regarded the Kurds as querulous mountain tribes useful primarily in keeping the Soviet Union and its Arab clients off balance. Recently declassified documents shed new light on three key episodes in this story: first, the secret encouragement provided by Washington to Kurds opposed to Iraq's Abdul Karim Qassim, who tilted toward Moscow after seizing power in 1958; second, the covert action launched by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in Iraqi Kurdistan after Saddam Hussein allied himself with the USSR in 1972; and third, the half-hearted U.S. attempts to foment regime change in Iraq in the early 1990s. In each case, the U.S. government stirred up anti-Arab resentments among the Kurds, helped ignite an insurrection, and then pulled the plug when events spiraled out of control. U.S. duplicity plus Kurdish factionalism equaled tragedy...

Breaking the Ring of Encirclement: The Sino-Soviet Rift and Chinese Policy toward Vietnam, 1964–1968

Abstract: The recent literature on China's relations with North Vietnam has given insufficient attention to the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict. This article underscores the centrality of the Soviet factor in Beijing's relations with Hanoi and the importance of triangular relations during the 1964–1968 period. The article points to the Sino-Soviet conflict as the main cause of the fissures in the Sino-North Vietnamese alliance that emerged more fully after the Vietnam War.

Advertising America: The United States Information Service in Italy (1945-1956) (review)

Abstract: The profound ideological nature of the Cold War made words, spoken and written, formidable weapons aimed at the hearts and minds of friends and foes alike. Advertising America is a welcome contribution to the already extensive scholarship on U.S. cultural approaches to the Cold War. Simona Tobia makes abundantly clear that her purpose is not to explain U.S. cultural inouence in Italy or Italian culture as a whole but to analyze the objectives of the United States Information Service (USIS) and their evolution through the 1950s. Even within this limited scope, the book provides insights on issues of cultural diplomacy and Americanization. In light of previous accounts, Tobia speciaes that the process of Americanization remains vague if USIS activities are not analyzed in depth. This premise implies that U.S. inouence was preponderant, but Advertising America also shows the limits of the Americanization process in Italy. The U.S. State Department ranked target countries of its propaganda according to risk assessments and vulnerability to Communism. Among West European countries, Italy was at the top of the “Danger Zone” list, both because of its need to establish a vital democracy after the fascist decades and because it was home to the largest Communist party in the West. This warranted special attention and massive propaganda efforts, which, for example, resulted in the highest quota of Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasts among U.S. allies. Tobia provides thorough background on U.S. information diplomacy, describing in detail the various mutations of the State Department’s psychological and propaganda operations after World War II and highlighting the intersecting roles of media personalities and career diplomats. Paralleling the evolution of the Fulbright exchange program, which through the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 focused on anti-Communist propaganda, the State Department’s “information” services (or International Information Administration) were increasingly dominated by diplomats bent on waging a cultural Cold War. At arst, U.S. propagandists were convinced that “popular and mass culture could play a crucial role in mobilizing the people’s choices” (p. 62). Therefore, they targeted the mass audience, relying on VOA broadcasts, the publication of magazines such as Nuovo mondo, the establishment of American libraries, and, the distribution of documentaries (mostly under the aegis of the Marshall Plan) and motion pictures. In 1951, at the peak of the Truman administration’s interest in psychological warfare, the budget for informational programs was raised from approximately $40 million to $130 million. VOA programs, however, were gradually cut to afteen minutes per day and were abolished as of 1957. Also, USIS bulletins ceased to be distributed in 1953, when the agency decided to establish direct contacts with the Italian press. State Department ofacials also realized that the costly VOA did not reach the expected number of listeners and did not have the expected impact on the masses, who enjoyed the

Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Jistuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State

Abstract: Japan's Changing International Role - M.M. Mochizuki. The Domestic Foundations of Japanese Foreign Policy - M. Kohno. Security Policy. War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy - J. Tsuchiyama. Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations - G. Ito. A Defense Posture for Multilateral Security - M. O'Hanlon. Economic Relations. Adapting to Global Economic Change - E.J. Lincoln. Building Stable International Financial Relations - Y. Kojo. Responding to the Asian Financial Crisis - J. Inada. Regional Diplomacy. Memory Politics and Foreign Relations - T.U. Berger. The Role of Human Rights: The Case of Burma - C. Dalpino. Dealing with a Rising China - M.M. Mochizuki. Conclusion. The Pragmatic Liberalism of an Adaptive State - T.U. Berger.

The British Government and the Challenge of McCarthyism in the Early Cold War

Abstract: The domestic policies and excesses of American anti-Communism in the early Cold War, dominated by the image of Senator Joseph McCarthy, have been the subject of controversy and a great deal of historical research. No less significant and much commented on at the time was the influence of McCarthyism on foreign relations and perceptions of the United States abroad. This article deals with the British government's responses to the anti-Communist fervor in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Britain was itself grappling with the challenges posed by the Cold War, including those relating to security and civil liberties in a democratic society. The impact of American anti-Communism was felt strongly in that context. The article draws extensively on recently released files from the British security services and other British government agencies.

Cold War “Bridge-Building”: U.S. Exchange Exhibits and Their Reception in the Soviet Union, 1959–1967

Abstract: Following the presentation of the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, nine exhibits organized by the United States Information Agency traveled in the Soviet Union from 1961 to 1967. This article discusses the aims, preparation, content, and reception of these exhibits, which attracted more than five million visitors and provoked diverse reactions. The exhibitions and their guides served as a unique form of communication with Soviet citizens, informing them about U.S. achievements and freedoms and the American way of life. The initiatives offset Soviet Communist propaganda, advanced popular understanding of the United States, and promoted popular goodwill toward Americans. The low-key interactions between the guides and the visitors shed valuable light on the mindset and experiences of ordinary citizens in the USSR, who were a major target audience of these exhibitions, and also, more broadly, on U.S. public diplomacy during the Cold War.

Cultural Education as Containment of Communism: The Ambivalent Position of American NGOs in Hong Kong in the 1950s

Abstract: This article discusses the ambivalent role of U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in shaping Hong Kong's institutions of higher education in the 1950s. Cold War concerns about Communist expansion induced the NGOs to pursue ideological goals that were not part of their main mission, even as they continued policy directions that superseded and sometimes unintentionally counteracted Cold War thinking and strategies. Hong Kong, as a site important but marginal to both China and Britain, had strategic value in the Cold War and as such impelled many different forces to contest it. By examining how U.S. NGO educational work in Hong Kong both reinforced and destabilized Cold War ideology, one gains a clearer picture not only of Hong Kong's cultural significance in Cold War politics but also the ambiguity of Cold War intellectual paradigms of culture and education.

From Instrumental to Expressive: The Changing Goals of the U.S. Cold War Strategic Embargo

Abstract: The U.S. strategic embargo against the Soviet bloc, adopted in 1947–1948, had been designed to restrict the supply of weapons technology to the Soviet Union and to retard Soviet economic growth. When these objectives failed to materialize by 1957, a lengthy reevaluation of the purpose, benefits, and costs of the embargo ensued. The Kennedy administration eventually concluded that the strategic embargo was an integral part of U.S. Cold War strategy and, as such, could not be abandoned without suffering important diplomatic costs. The embargo became a means of bargaining with the Soviet Union and a medium through which to convey messages. Like any other tool of statecraft, the embargo proved to be as flexible as officials wanted to make it. Even if it failed in its original purpose, it could be used in other ways.

When Empathy Failed: Using Critical Oral History to Reassess the Collapse of U.S.-Soviet Détente in the Carter-Brezhnev Years

Abstract: Drawing on “critical oral history” conferences held after the demise of the Soviet Union, this article seeks to explain why the detente in U.S.-Soviet relations collapsed at the end of the 1970s. Both the U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, and the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, had sought to improve bilateral ties, but instead they found that the relationship deteriorated and then broke down altogether after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The article suggests that neither side had a sufficient appreciation of how the other side perceived the relationship. The authors argue that the critical oral history helped officials on both sides to develop a sense of empathy for how the other side viewed its own interests and objectives. Empathy does not imply any sympathy; instead, it merely entails an effort to understand the other side's perceptions and goals. Presenting excerpts from an oral history conference, the authors argue that greater empathy in the policymaking process might have helped t...

Stepping Back from the Third World: Soviet Policy toward the United Arab Republic, 1965–1967

Abstract: This article shows that for two years prior to the June 1967 Six-Day Mideast War, Soviet-Egyptian relations had begun to fray because the Soviet Union wanted to loosen its ties with radical regimes in the Third World, including Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soviet leaders urged Nasser to reform the Egyptian economy, decrease Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, and allow the Soviet Navy unfettered access to Egyptian ports. But like numerous other small powers during the Cold War, Egypt was able to fend off the pressure of its superpower ally. In May 1967, when Egypt unilaterally decided to bring its forces into the Sinai, Soviet leaders were divided over how to respond to the crisis that engulfed the Middle East. In the end, the more cautious faction in Moscow prevailed, and the Soviet government continued to be wary of becoming embroiled in conflicts initiated by radical Third World regimes.

Engaging Southeast Asia? Labor's Regional Mythology and Australia's Military Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, 1972–1973

Abstract: This article draws on previously classified Australian and British archival material to reevaluate Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam’s foreign policy. The article focuses on the Whitlam government’s decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore—a decision that constitutes a neglected but defining episode in the evolution of Australian postwar diplomacy. An analysis of this decision reveals the limits of Whitlam’s attempt to redefine the conduct of Australian foreign policy from 1972 to 1975, a policy he saw as too heavily influenced by the Cold War. Focusing on Whitlam’s approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, this article contends that far from being an adroit and skillful architect of Australian engagement with Asia, Whitlam irritated Australia’s regional allies and complicated Australia’s relations with its immediate neighbors. Australia’s subsequent adjustment to its neighborhood was not the success story implied in the general histories of Australian diplomacy. Whitlam’s policy toward Southeast Asia, far from being a “watershed” in foreign relations, as often assumed, left Australia increasingly isolated from its region and more reliant on its chief Cold War ally, the United States. © 2010 Project MUSE®.

Delusion or Reality?: Secret Hungarian Diplomacy during the Vietnam War

Abstract: This article builds on work published in the Journal of Cold War Studies in 2003 by James G. Hershberg, who presented newly released archival evidence from Budapest and Warsaw concerning the role that Hungary and Poland played as intermediaries between Washington and Hanoi during the 37-day pause in the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam in December 1965 and January 1966. The evidence presented here, drawing on unpublished Hungarian (and partly unpublished U.S.) archival sources, refines some of Hershberg's conclusions and sheds new light on Budapest's mediatory attempt as well as Hungary's role in the Vietnam conflict. The article provides the first critical appraisal of Delusion and Reality, the 1978 book by Janos Radvanyi, Hungary's former charge d'affaires in Washington. For 25 years, Radvanyi's book constituted the only available Soviet-bloc account of the secret Communist peace efforts during the Vietnam War.

Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945 (review)

Abstract: The ongoing discussions about globalization, American hegemony and September 11 and its aftermath have moved the debate about the export of American culture and cultural anti-Americanism to center stage of world politics. At such a time, it is crucial to understand the process of culture transfer and its effects on local societies and their attitudes toward the United States. This volume presents Germany as a case study of the impact of American culture throughout a period characterized by a totalitarian system, two unusually destructive wars, massive ethnic cleansing, and economic disaster. Drawing on examples from history, culture studies, film, radio, and the arts, the authors explore the political and cultural parameters of Americanization and anti-Americanism, as reflected in the reception and rejection of American popular culture and, more generally, in European-American relations in the \"American Century.\" Alexander Stephan is Professor of German, Ohio Eminent Scholar, and Senior Fellow of the Mershon Center for the Study of International Security and Public Policy at Ohio State University, where he directs a project on American culture and anti-Americanism in Europe and the world.

The First Uprising of the Cultural Revolution at Nanjing University Dynamics, Nature and Interpretation

Abstract: The “2 June Incident” at Nanjing University in 1967 was a seminal event at the start of China's Cultural Revolution. By closely analyzing the origins and nature of the incident on the basis of recently released Chinese sources, the article shows that local tensions and protests had unexpectedly wide consequences. The incident was seized on by the central CCP authorities to radicalize the Cultural Revolution and plunge China into greater chaos, which also contributed to unpredictable shifts in PRC foreign policy.

Soviet Campaigns against “Capitalist Ideological Subversives” during the Cold War: The Latvian Experience

Abstract: This article discusses the Soviet Union's use of propaganda warfare during the Cold War, focusing on the specific case of Soviet Latvia. Archival materials from recently opened archives in the former USSR show that the Soviet Union pursued a methodical ideological campaign against certain groups of U.S. citizens, including the post-World War II political refugees from Latvia. The main institution charged with this task was the Liaison Committee for the Cultural Relations with Countrymen Abroad (LCCR), which was highly influential at the time. Archival materials allow scholars to examine the LCCR's history, methods, and goals, as well as its successes and failures. Among the findings in the article is the importance the Soviet Union attached to propaganda and to programs to counter and discredit “anti-Soviet” emigre organizations.

Gregg Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy

Abstract: Viewed from the perspective of Washington, DC, the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is a rare breed: a successful example of nation building. Among the dozens of countries to emerge from colonialism since the end of World War II, the ROK is one of a select few to achieve both economic prosperity and political democracy. How the ROK made the transition from indigence and despotism to pluralism and plenty—and what role the United States played in this journey—is the subject of Gregg Brazinsky’s Nation Building in South Korea, a welcome addition to the New Cold War History series edited by John Lewis Gaddis. The success of the Korean experiment was not preordained. Brazinsky cites Odd Arne Westad, who has found that of the more than 30 postcolonial countries in which the United States has intervened since 1945, only South Korea and Taiwan achieved both economic growth and stable democracy. As Brazinsky portrays it, U.S. nationbuilding and South Korean agency worked in tandem to foster the ROK’s postwar evolution. Both elements were key. But South Korean actions and the manner in which South Koreans accepted, rejected, and modiaed American ideas were the most crucial factors in shaping the country’s transformation. South Koreans adapted to U.S. inouence “with the same oexibility and creativity that had long marked their dealings with other stronger powers” (p. 7). Nation Building in South Korea covers the period from the collapse of Japanese colonialism in Korea in 1945 to the end of military rule in 1987 but focuses most heavily on the 1945–1972 period. Throughout these years, U.S. ofacials attempted to balance their desire for political liberalization in South Korea with their concerns about security and stability and their determination to promote the ROK’s economic development. Frequently, when a choice had to be made, security and stability trumped all else. On at least three occasions—1945–1948, 1960–1961, and 1979– 1980—U.S. actions “proved vital to the assumption of power by autocrats at the expense of governments or political leaders who enjoyed stronger popular support” (p. 251). Yet, Brazinsky argues, on the arst two of these occasions, U.S. support for Syngman Rhee and, later, Park Chung Hee prevented outcomes that would have been even less happy for the ROK. Some will conclude that Brazinsky is rather too forgiving of U.S. policies that sustained military strongmen in Korea for 40 years. Brazinsky readily concedes that building an anti-Communist bastion on the southern half of the Korean peninsula exacted “an enormous cost” not only from the South Korean people but also from the U.S. architects. “Americans sacriaced not only their lives and resources but also their ideals” in their Korean nation-building project, Brazinsky concludes (p. 40). Still, he adds, “some of the long-term consequences of U.S. actions in South Korea were better than the intentions behind them” (p. 253).

FORUM: Mao, Khrushchev, and China's Split with the USSR: Perspectives on The Sino-Soviet Split

Abstract: This forum includes six commentaries on Lorenz M. Luthi's book The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, published by Princeton University Press in 2008. Drawing on recently declassified documents and memoirs from numerous countries, Luthi explains how and why the close alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China fell apart in a remarkably short time, dissolving into fierce mutual enmity. Amassing a wealth of evidence, Luthi stresses the role of ideology in the split, lending support to the arguments put forth nearly five decades ago by analysts like Donald Zagoria in his pioneering book on the Sino-Soviet rift. Six leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-Soviet relations discuss the strengths of Luthi's book but also raise questions about some interpretations and omissions. The forum includes Luthi's reply to the commentaries.

Managing Religion in Communist-Era Poland: Catholic Priests versus the Secret Police

Abstract: Solidarity, the free Polish trade union that emerged in 1980, acted in close alliance with the Roman Catholic Church. The union's struggle for human dignity and freedom became a question of national redemption and often used religious symbols and rituals. Although one can argue whether Pope John Paul II was personally the fulcrum of revolt, Solidarity and the demise of Polish Communism are hard to imagine without him. Not surprisingly, the Polish security forces made vigorous efforts to penetrate the Polish Catholic Church, eventually enlisting as informants some 15 percent of the clergy. Recent revelations of extensive collaboration by priests, notably in Father Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski's acclaimed book, provide a valuable correction to the historical record but do not greatly detract from the overall image of the Church as having resisted Communism. The Church, among other things, served as a refuge for many in the darkest moments of the Communist era and helped to force change by throwing its support ...

On Empathy and Critical Oral History: A Commentary

Abstract: Six former U.S. State Department officials, all of whom were involved in U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration, respond to the article by James Blight and janet Lang. Their reactions vary, but one common point of concern is whether Blight and Lang are correct in arguing that “empathy” as an organizing concept or analytical tool will be useful “not just in conferences in which the past is revisited, but also in the present and future, when it really matters.” Even though most of the commentators accept at least some of the points about the U.S.-Soviet detente in the late 1970s, they have questions about the conceptual underpinnings of the article. The forum ends with a response from Blight and Lang.

Empathy in International Relations: A Commentary

Abstract: Six former U.S. State Department officials, all of whom were involved in U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration, respond to the article by James Blight and janet Lang. Their reactions vary, but one common point of concern is whether Blight and Lang are correct in arguing that “empathy” as an organizing concept or analytical tool will be useful “not just in conferences in which the past is revisited, but also in the present and future, when it really matters.” Even though most of the commentators accept at least some of the points about the U.S.-Soviet detente in the late 1970s, they have questions about the conceptual underpinnings of the article. The forum ends with a response from Blight and Lang.

When the Levee Breaks: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1967–1970

Abstract: Romania's position regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the culmination of almost a decade of increasingly autonomous moves vis-a-vis Moscow. Based on new evidence from the Romanian archives, this article paints a more complete picture of Nicolae Ceausescu's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, placing it in the context of the international system and especially the Sino-Soviet split. Following the invasion, Romania remained just as committed as before to the goal of ensuring its maneuverability on the world scene, especially with regard to sovereignty and independence. Although Romanian leaders tried not to provoke the Soviet Union outright, they did not back down on important issues concerning Sino-Romanian relations and did not embrace Moscow's call for a common Warsaw Pact foreign policy. Romania did agree to certain compromises, but only because Ceausescu believed that Romania would remain largely unaffected by them.

Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (review)

Abstract: Communism.” But the key to Hollywood’s success in crafting audience-pleasing alms that have burnished America’s image and transmitted American ideas and ideals is that the movie industry is a private enterprise geared to making a proat as well as art. To be sure, Hollywood has intermittently cooperated with the U.S. government, most notably during World Wars I and II, as well as to a lesser extent during the Cold War and beyond—and sometimes propaganda can be good art and good entertainment, as any viewer of Casablanca, made by Warner Brothers. under the watchful eye of the U.S. Oface of War Information in 1942, can attest. But Hollywood’s bottom line has been pleasing audiences and collecting cash in the United States and overseas with the message a secondary (or even tertiary) concern. Propaganda reverses the equation, to the detriment of achieving wide circulation and, often fundamentally, the alm’s quality (the infamously dreadful 1952 anti-Communist cinematic screed My Son John is the perfect example). Hollywood has a stomach for failure that government propagandists cannot and do not have: as Walter Mirisch, producer of such classics as The Great Escape, The Pink Panther, and In the Heat of the Night, noted in his recent memoir, I Thought We Were Making Movies, Not History: “I learned the lesson very early on that one really successful alm can more than make up for the losses of many unsuccessful ones.” Just try operating on that principle with taxpayer money, even when the money is covertly diverted from other projects. If you cannot play the percentages, you are unlikely to produce the hits—as Mirisch observes, even Babe Ruth’s lifetime batting average was only .342. Orwell Subverted is a valuable study of the intentions of U.S. covert propagandists during the early Cold War,, the “psy warriors” who perceived the Soviet challenge in both hard and soft power terms and sought to respond in kind. Even though Leab repeatedly disapproves of their activities, he magnanimously grants them a prescience that exceeded Orwell’s pessimistic view of the Communist world’s long-term future. The blasphemous act of changing Orwell’s ending from cynical collusion to a popular uprising in some ways preagures the revolutions in the Soviet bloc in 1989 and the dissolution of the USSR itself in 1991. Where both Orwell and the CIA’s psy warriors got it wrong was in not being able to imagine a Soviet system that could fundamentally lose faith in its own raison d’être and allow itself to be extinguished.